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RIGHTS AND IRRESPONSIBILITY
LINDA C. MCCLAINt
INTRODUCTION

There can be little doubt that a marked discontent with rights
and "rights talk" is in the air, as are calls for a turn to responsibility and "responsibility talk."' In a broad range of contemporary
discourses, rights are juxtaposed against responsibility as if the two
were inversely or even perversely related to one another. Indeed,
rights are said to license irresponsibility. Academics, politicians,
and the popular media claim that Americans increasingly invoke
rights talk and shrink from responsibility talk and that as a result
America suffers from an explosion of frivolous assertions of rights'
and a breakdown of responsible conduct. The problem is framed
as "too many rights" and "too few responsibilities."2
This Article examines a cluster of charges about the relationship between rights and responsibility that I call the "irresponsibility critique" of rights. That cluster includes criticisms of the
rhetoric of rights, the nature and structure of rights, the societal
t
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This Article is a revised version of the 1993-1994 Duke Law Journal Lecture,
which benefitted from comments by students and faculty, particularly Katharine Bartlett
and Martin Golding. I presented a draft at the University of Virginia School of Law's
Legal Studies Workshop and received instructive comments from participants. I also benefitted from presenting this project in an early stage at Faculty Workshops at Hofstra Law
School and the Hofstra Philosophy Department. For multiple, constructive readings of
drafts and responsible criticism, I am indebted to James Fleming. I would like to thank
Mary Anne Case, Eric Freedman, John DeWitt Gregory, Tracy Higgins, Jody Kraus,
Sandy Levinson, Daniel Ortiz, Wendy Rogovin, and Suzanna Sherry for helpful comments
concerning an earlier draft. Thanks go as well to the students in my jurisprudence classes
at Hofstra and the University of Virginia and to my research assistants at Hofstra: John
Hamberger, Jean Kephart Cipriani, Cathy DiFiglia, and Robert Stone. A Hofstra Law
School summer research grant supported this work.
1. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOUR.SE (1991).
2.

AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND

THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA 161 (1993).
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effects of rights and their exercise,. and the messages that rights
allegedly send to citizens.3 In assessing the irresponsibility critique,
I consider how its proponents conceive of rights, what they mean
by irresponsibility, and how they propose to shore up responsibility. Furthermore, I explore the extent to which the charges lodged
against rights and rights talk are apt, whether the irresponsibility
critique is really targeted at or fairly traceable to rights at all or
whether it is aimed instead at a perceived social or cultural breakdown, and how the critique should affect the recognition, justification, and content of legal rights.4

The primary sources of the irresponsibility critique that this
Article examines are Mary Ann Glendon's prominent work, Rights
Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse, and various publications produced by members of the Responsive Communitarian
movement. That movement is associated with Glendon, Amitai
Etzioni, and William Galston and publicly endorsed or applauded
by an array of academic, political, and other public figures across
the political spectrum.' The very title of the movement's journal,
3. The term "rights" as used in this Article is general and unspecified. I focus on
rights as they are discussed in the irresponsibility critique. Often, the critique speaks
generally about "rights" and "responsibilities." To the extent that it targets particular
kinds of legal rights and their features (e.g., constitutional rights), I address those rights
specifically. Cf. Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822,
830 (1993) (arguing for the importance of drawing distinctions among kinds of legal
entitlements).
4. This Article does not analyze responsibility in general, for example, in the sense
of legal responsibility for wrongs committed in criminal law or responsibility in standards
of care and causation in tort law. At the same time, distinctions between the different
meanings of responsibility will be helpful. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY 211-12 (1968) (distinguishing between role responsibility, causal responsibility, and capacity responsibility). Nor in focusing on responsibility and irresponsibility
am I generally taking up the question of free will versus determinism.
5. Glendon is a law professor at Harvard Law School. Often described as the "father" of the new communitarian movement, Etzioni is a professor of sociology at George
Washington University. Galston, a political philosopher and formerly a professor at the
University of Maryland, is presently a domestic policy advisor to President Clinton. The
Responsive Communitarian Platform lists some 70 signatories who endorse the "broad
thrust" of the Platform, if not every specific statement. See The Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and Responsibilities, 2 RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Winter
1991-1992, at 18-20 [hereinafter Platform]. A sampling from the Responsive Community
"reading list" includes: ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., THE GOOD SOCIETY (1991) [hereinafter BELLAH ET AL., GOOD SOCIETY]; ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE

HEART (1985) [hereinafter BELLAH ET AL., HABITS]; ETZIONI, supra note 2; WILLIAM A.
GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES (1991); GLENDON, supra note 1; and MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982). See RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, READ-

ING LIST (undated pamphlet, on file with author). For a discussion of the influence of
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The Responsive Community: Rights and Responsibilities, proclaims
a need to correct an imbalance between rights and responsibilities.6 Because the "new communitarians" 7 generally assume that

liberal legal and political theory are the primary bases for contemporary legal rights and rights talk and'that contemporary societal
problems stem from the excesses of both liberalism and liberal
virtues, I consider the irresponsibility critique in light of liberal
justifications of rights and liberal accounts of the relationship

between rights and responsibility.'

the new communitarianism on President Clinton's administration, see infra notes 28-33
and accompanying text.
6. Glendon, James Fishkin, a professor of government at the University of Texas,
and Thomas Spragens, Jr., a professor of political science at Duke University, are CoEditors of The Responsive Community. Galston was a Co-Editor, but is currently on
White House leave. Etzioni is the Editor.
7. Communitarianism is not a new philosophy or perspective, nor is the
communitarian criticism of liberalism new. See, e.g., DEREK L. PHILLIPS, LOOKING BACKWARD: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF COMMUNITARIAN THOUGHT (1993); SANDEL, supra
note 5; LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984); see also Stephen A.
Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH. L. REv. 685, 685-89
(1992) (offering a framework for assessing contemporary communitarian positions and
their relationship to liberalism). The Responsive Communitarians draw on that criticism
of liberalism. See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 1, at 191 n.4 (acknowledging her indebtedness to Sandel's criticism of liberal theory as ignoring the "situated" or "encumbered"
self). Nonetheless, both media coverage of the Responsive Communitarian movement and
some of the movement's own literature often refer to Etzioni as the "father" or "founder" of communitarianism and to communitarianism as a new social movement (if not a
new philosophy). See, e.g., Pat B. Nicklin, Sounding a Call for Community Spirit, USA
TODAY, May 28, 1993, at 7D; Barbara Vobejda, "Communitarians" Press Hill on ProFamily Policies, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1993, at A6; see also THE ONLY COMMUN1TARIAN
QUARTERLY (describing the new journal, The Responsive Community) (undated pamphlet,
on file with author). In this Article, I refer to this movement interchangeably as the
and
communitarianism,"
"new
the
movement,"
Communitarian
"Responsive
"communitarianism." For the Responsive Communitarian movement's definition of
communitarianism, see infra text accompanying notes 70-75, 136-38.
8. For one definition of liberalism, see STEPHEN HOLMES, THE ANATOMY OF
ANTILIBERALISM 4 (1993) (arguing that the four "core norms or values" of liberalism are
personal security, impartiality, individual liberty, and democracy and that the "most novel
and radical principle of liberal politics" may have been that "public disagreement is a
creative force"). In this Article, I explicate and defend an account of liberalism as a
political philosophy and a liberal justification for rights by drawing on a number of
sources. See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE (1989);
STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES (1990); JOHN RAwLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM
(1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM]; JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, THEORY]; LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE (Nancy
L. Rosenblum ed., 1989); Ronald Dworkin, Foundations of Liberal Equality, in XI THE
TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 1 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 1990). The jurisprudential account of rights that I offer draws particularly on the work of Ronald Dworkin.
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The communitarian discontent with rights and yearning for
responsibility provide an opportunity for exploring a number of
arresting questions about rights and their relationships to responsibility and irresponsibility.9 What is it about rights that triggers the
irresponsibility critique? Do legal rights include a right to be irresponsible, and if so, why defend such rights? Does the structure of
legal rights discourage or even preclude individual, community, or
societal reflection on right conduct and efforts to foster responsible behavior? Have liberal justifications of legal rights invited
discontent by being inattentive to or silent about the relationships
between such rights and responsibility? How much of what is at
issue in charges of irresponsibility is really about rights, as distinguished from behavior that is already subject to civil (if not criminal) sanction? In sum, does the irresponsibility critique establish
its charges against rights and rights talk?
I argue that much of the communitarian discontent with rights
stems from a social (rather than a jurisprudential) critique of
American society centered around a complex set of social problems, attitudes, and behaviors that have little analytical or causal
See infra subsection IV(A)(2) and Section IV(C).
9. The new communitarians are not the only advocates of certain features of the
irresponsibility critique. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, "Without Virtue There Can Be No Liberty," 78 MINN. L. REV. 61, 75-82 (1993) (arguing for a revival of civic republicanism,
responsibility, and independence); Robin West, The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REv. 43, 47 (1990) (calling for "a reformulation of liberal ideals in American culture that would take seriously not only the
individual's demand for rights but also the burdens of his responsibility"). For an exploration of the rights/responsibility dichotomy in the context of the atomism critique of
liberalism that is prominent in relational feminist jurisprudence, see Linda C. McClain,
"Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S.CAL.
L. REV. 1171 (1992). A version of the irresponsibility critique (which I do not fully explore in this Article) is the feminist argument that the immunity or legal unaccountability
that certain rights afford to men (e.g., the right of privacy) harms women. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1311
(1991) (arguing that "[i]n gendered light, the law's privacy is a sphere of sanctified isolation, impunity, and unaccountability"). Finally, another variant of the irresponsibility critique that I leave for elaboration elsewhere would invoke the language of responsibility
in justifications for rights to combat not irresponsibility so much as the misperception
that exercise of rights reflects irresponsibility and to deepen appreciation of and respect
for people exercising rights. See West, supra, at 82 (arguing that prevailing justifications
of rights "may reinforce the damaging misperception that the demand for abortion reflects the irresponsible worst of us and worst within us") (footnote omitted); cf. Anne C.
Dailey, Feminism's Return to Liberalism, 102 YALE LJ. 1265, 1283 (1993) (reviewing
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991) (arguing that "[a] feminist politics built upon narrative can replace the critical distance of
'empty tolerance' with empathetic understanding") (citation omitted).
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connection to legal rights. Although the critique highlights pressing
social problems, some of which implicate "significant issues concerning the relationship between rights and responsibility in a constitutional democracy, it makes unconvincing and implausible causal
assertions about the logic and excesses of liberalism and rights.
Indeed, although the new communitarianism may be read as simply calling attention to the gap between actual American society
and the ideals of liberalism, it is illuminating to view certain aspects of that movement as a form of what Stephen Holmes has
called "soft antiliberalism."''
To the extent that the irresponsibility critique does offer a
jurisprudential critique of rights, I attempt to separate out two
interwoven strands of the critique: "immunity" and "wrongness."'" The immunity critique begins with a recognition that a
legal right creates a certain immunity, a realm within which one is
free from coercion and not legally responsible or accountable to
others for social costs or harms resulting from one's actions. The
problematic social messages said to be drawn from this feature of
immunity are, first, that rights are "trumps" 2 that are more important than any societal interest, and second, that they insulate a
right-holder from the moral scrutiny or disapproval of others. The
starting point of the wrongness critique is the observation that
having a legal right to do something does not mean that it is the
right thing to do. Regrettably, it is claimed, because "[t]he language of rights is morally incomplete,"13 rights talk sends the erroneous social message that the existence of a right signals the
nonexistence of responsibilities constraining its exercise. In turn,
that leads to the view that having a legal right to do something is
a sufficient reason to do it or, worse yet, that legal rights equal
moral rightness.

10. HOLMES, supra note 8, at 88, 176. Holmes distinguishes "soft antiliberals" from
"hard antiliberals:" soft antiliberals "malign liberalism verbally, but when faced with practical choices, reveal a surprising fondness for liberal protections and freedoms;" hard
antiliberals, on the other hand, "damn liberalism from a wholly nonliberal point of view
and dare to draw the shocking political consequences." Id. at 88. Examples of hard
antiliberalism are the political philosophies of Joseph de Maistre and Carl Schmitt. Id. at
13-60.

11. See infra Sections IV(A)-(B).
12. Evidently, the expression of "rights as trumps" was first coined by Ronald
Dworkin 17 years ago. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977).

For a treatment of the nature and limits of this notion, see infra subsection IV(A)(2)(a).
13. Platform, supra note 5, at 14.
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I contend that both strands of the irresponsibility critique are
overstated and that they understate the extent to which liberal
accounts of rights allow for prescriptions like those the
communitarians support. I also argue that the irresponsibility critique wavers between attacking the rhetoric or messages of legal
rights and attacking the content of rights. 4 To the extent that
communitarian discontent with rights extends to rights themselves,
we must ask precisely what conception of rights they advance.
This Article argues that the freedom that rights provide
makes possible the exercise of responsibility and that leading liberal justifications for rights are not silent about this relationship
between rights and responsibility. As a schematic device, I argue
that communitarian and liberal talk about responsibility emphasize
two different, although related, meanings of responsibility: responsibility as accountability versus responsibility as autonomy, respectively. As I use the terms, responsibility as accountability connotes
being answerable to others for the manner and consequences of
the exercise of one's rights, whereas responsibility as autonomy
connotes self-governance, that is, entrusting the right-holder to
exercise moral responsibility in making decisions guided by conscience. If liberal rights talk seems silent about responsibility, as
the communitarians claim, it may be due in part to these very
different conceptions of responsibility. An important issue that the
irresponsibility critique highlights is the tension between pursuing
the goal of responsibility as accountability and protecting the principle of responsibility as autonomy. I illustrate that tension with
the example of the right to procreative autonomy.15
The differing communitarian and liberal emphases on accountability and autonomy as two aspects of the relationship between
rights and responsibility are not mutually exclusive: accountability
figures in liberal notions of responsibility and autonomy is featured in communitarian notions of responsibility. I argue that
liberal accounts of rights provide a better analysis of responsibility
than the communitarian accounts of rights have offered to date.
They also afford sounder means, short of coercion of the sort that
both liberals and communitarians claim to reject, to secure respon-

14. Glendon's analysis of the right to choose abortion is an illustration. See infra
subsection IV(C)(1).
15. See infra Section IV(C).
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sible behavior from a citizenry characterized by religious and moral pluralism.
In Part I, I explicate the critiques of rights talk and calls for
responsibility talk advanced by Glendon and the Responsive
Communitarian movement. I also examine the basic tenets of the
new communitarianism and certain proposed correctives to rights
talk. The irresponsibility critique holds that freedom requires responsibility as accountability and targets the costs of rights to
society and the inattention of right-holders to responsibilities. Two
key premises of the irresponsibility critique are that the social
costs of rights have become too high and that there is a need for
greater accountability, whether achieved through legal sanction or
moral suasion.
In Part II, I argue that a significant component of the irresponsibility critique is a social critique, the core theme of which is
the decline of a responsible citizenry. According to this critique, a
flight from individual responsibility coupled with an increased
demand for rights have led to a dearth of civic virtue and a
growth of social pathology. The critique laments a lapse in responsibility both as accountability and as autonomy. I challenge the
connection that the irresponsibility critique posits between legal
rights and those phenomena.
In Part III, I situate the new communitarianism and the irresponsibility critique on the terrain of political theory. I argue that
the communitarian agenda echoes core premises of liberalism
concerning the importance of the education of citizens, the duties
of citizenship, and the institutions of civil society. Yet the new
communitarianism also may be understood as a form of "soft
antiliberalism," particularly in its tracing of the responsibility deficit to an excess of liberal virtues. Some communitarians argue that
liberalism takes diversity and pluralism too seriously, 6 such that

citizens manifest liberal virtues by not making any moral judgments about each other's choices. I suggest, however, that the new
communitarianism, with its emphasis on listening to the "moral
voice of the community" and holding individuals to "values we all

16. I take this formulation from Suzanna Sherry, who calls for a revival of the responsibility and virtue of civic republicanism but is not a member of the Responsive
Communitarian movement. See Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for
Citizenship 15-25 (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Letter from
Suzanna Sherry to Linda C. McClain 1 (Dec. 9, 1993) (on file with author).
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share," does not take diversity and pluralism seriously enough.
Moreover, the communitarians' largely uncritical appeal to bygone
traditions and moral consensus pays insufficient attention to the
unjust and discriminatory aspects of such traditions and understates the reality of moral and religious pluralism. Finally, the new
communitarians fail to delineate precisely what "community" is, to
specify its relationship to government, and to indicate how and
when a community's moral voice should become a legal command.
In Part IV, I put forward a jurisprudential analysis of the new
communitarians' irresponsibility critique of rights. I explore both
strands of the irresponsibility critique: (1) that legal rights allow
for irresponsibility by permitting right-holders to act with legal
immunity; and (2) that legal rights may promote irresponsibility by
allowing people to act without regard to the moral rightness of the
exercise of rights. I grant that legal rights do not equate with
moral rightness, but I challenge the claims that legal rights send a
message about moral rightness, moral insulation, or the absence of
responsibility. In support of this challenge, I point to contemporary societal debates concerning a number of constitutional rights
and the employment of moral suasion and the language of responsibility in those debates.
I also challenge the dichotomous treatment of rights and
responsibility by showing that presuppositions about moral capacity, moral rights, and moral responsibility undergird liberal justifications of legal rights, including constitutional rights. Liberals believe
that the possibility of irresponsibility is a cost of recognizing and
protecting rights, a cost that is generally preferable to shifting the
locus of moral responsibility from individuals to the community or
the government. At the same time, liberal justifications of rights
do not espouse a view that the costs of rights never justify restricting or regulating individual freedom. In this regard, I argue that
the irresponsibility critique misunderstands or overstates the notion
of "rights as trumps."' 7
To illustrate the implications of the different uses of responsibility talk in communitarian and liberal accounts of rights, I exam17. Because Ronald Dworkin's notion of rights as trumps especially evokes
communitarian discontent, I focus in Part IV particularly on his early conceptualizations
of rights and societal constraints on them, see DWORKIN, supra note 12, as well as his
recent defense of individual freedom, which invokes notions of responsibility not only to
justify rights but also to allow room, in some cases, for government to encourage responsible rights exercise, see RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION (1993).
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ine the irresponsibility critique in the context of the right to procreative autonomy, a right that has drawn frequent charges of
being irresponsibly exercised. Recent legal developments and
scholarly commentary signal a turn to the language of responsibility in this area. 8 I contrast the liberal approach of Ronald
Dworkin and the communitarian approach of Glendon to explore
the interplay of responsibility as autonomy and as accountability,
asking what sort of responsibility each approach seeks to foster. 19
Glendon's analysis of abortion illustrates that, at least in
certain cases, her concern with the message that rights talk sends
goes well beyond the rhetoric of rights to the content of specific
rights. Moreover, her rejection of the idea of individual choice in
favor of a virtual prohibition of abortion suggests that in some
cases the commUnitarian plan for remedying the imbalance between rights and responsibility would not be left merely to social
persuasion and exhortation but would extend to legal prohibition
and coercion.
In contrast, Dworkin urges that people live up to the freedom
that a right to procreative autonomy protects by exercising their
ethical responsibility of reflection in deciding matters of serious
moral concern. He concludes that the state may encourage responsibility in making such decisions but may not coerce a particular
decision. I argue that, although Dworkin's use of responsibility
talk to meld autonomy with some form of accountability raises
some significant questions, it offers a better starting point for
thinking about rights and responsibility than the evisceration of
responsibility as autonomy that Glendon's approach entails.

18. For a discussion of judicial developments, see Danielle K. Morris, Note, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey: From U.S. "Rights Talk" to Western European "Responsibility Talk,"
16 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 761 (1992-1993). See also Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). For examples of liberal responsibility talk, see DWORKIN,
supra note 17. For explorations of responsibility talk in feminist justifications of abortion
rights, see RUTH COLKER, ABORTION AND DIALOGUE (1992); West, supra note 9. Elsewhere, I have critiqued the reliance on responsibility in West, Colker, and Casey. See
Linda C. McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?, 3 COLuM. J. GENDER & L. 119, 122-24
(1992).
19. See DWORKIN, supra note 17. Glendon has written extensively about abortion
and favorably contrasted the "communitarian" abortion laws of Western European countries with American abortion law. See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE
IN WESTERN LAW 33-39, 133-34 (1987); see also GLENDON, supra note 1, at 47-75. The
Responsive Communitarian movement has not taken a public position on the issue. See
infra text accompanying note 189.
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THE NEW COMMUNITARIANISM: IN SEARCH OF
"RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES"

The Calls for Responsibility

It is becoming a common refrain: Americans focus excessively
on rights, to the detriment of responsibilities. During the bicentennial of the ratification of the Bill of Rights, Harper's asked a
group of scholars and political figures to "carry on the founders'
conversation." They pondered whether a "Bill of Duties" should
complement the Bill of Rights, taking as their point of departure
the claim that although "the vocabulary of rights is nearly exhausted ... the vocabulary of responsibilities has yet to emerge."2 °
Although most of the respondents declined to endorse a bill of
enforceable duties,2' some of them (along with other people)
launched a new communitarian movement and drew up The Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and Responsibilities.2
The Platform "holds" that "a communitarian perspective [balancing rights and responsibilities] must be brought to bear on the
great moral, legal, and social issues of our time" and suggests an
array of duties and responsibilities to achieve that balance.'
Proponents of "rights and responsibilities" trace the responsibility deficit not only to the silence of our governing documents
about responsibility but also to the structure and rhetoric of
American "rights talk"'2 4 and its "morally incomplete" language

20. Who Owes What To Whom?, HARPER'S, Feb. 1991, at 43, 44 [hereinafter
Harper's Forum] (Gerald Marzorati, moderator, including as "modern day founders"
scholars Benjamin Barber, Mary Ann Glendon, Christopher Lasch, Christopher D. Stone,
and Daniel Kemmis, Mayor of Missoula, Montana). For an earlier discussion of the relationship between the Bill of Rights and citizen responsibilities inspired by the bicentennial
of the Constitution, see RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP AND RESPONSIBILITIES: THE PROCEEDINGS
OF FREEDOMS FOUNDATION'S SYMPOSIUM ON CITIZEN RESPONSIBILITIES 43 (Bradford P.
Wilson ed., 1985) [hereinafter RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP AND RESPONSIBILITIES] (offering a
Bill of Responsibilities); see also Symposium, Individual Responsibility and the Law, 77
CORNELL L. REv. 955 (1992) (exploring the significance of the absence of duties and
responsibilities of citizenship in the U.S. Constitution).
21. But see Harper's Forum, supra note 20, at 47-48 (statement of Christopher
Lasch) (advocating a constitutional amendment requiring fathers to marry the mothers of
their children and prohibiting divorce for couples with children under the age of 21).
22. See Platform, supra note 5.
23. Id. at 4-5. Three of the five participants in the Harper's Forum, Benjamin Barber, Mary Ann Glendon, and Daniel Kemmis, are signatories to the Platform. Glendon
and William Galston played central roles in writing the Platform, which was initially
drafted by Amitai Etzioni. See ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 251.
24. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 14.
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of rights.'

One alleged consequence of the imbalance between

rights and responsibilities is the erosion of personal responsibility
and of the institutions of civil society, such as families and associations. These "seedbeds of civic virtue" are necessary to inculcate
the traits of character on which the preservation of fights depends
but to which fights talk gives insufficient attention.26 The new
communitarians seek "[t]o rebuild America's moral foundations
[and] to bring our regard for individuals and their fights into a
better relationship with our sense of personal and collective responsibility."'2 7
Political leaders, including figures in the current presidential
administration, reportedly sympathize with, and perhaps draw
guidance from, this new communitarianism and its focus on responsibility.2 As a candidate, Bill Clinton ran on a "new covenant" of greater individual responsibility and government provision
of opportunity and on a Democratic Party platform charging the
Republican Party with a twelve-year "nightmare" of "irresponsibility and neglect."29 As President, he calls for a "new ethic of personal and family and community responsibility,"3 through which

25. Platform, supra note 5, at 14.
26.

GLENDON, supra note 1, at 109-20.

27. Platform, supra note 5, at 7.
28. Among President Clinton's new advisors is political philosopher and Responsive
Communitarian member William Galston, whose account of liberalism sounds themes of
individual responsibility wedded to opportunity similar to those President Clinton has
expressed. See GALSTON, supra note 5; see also infra text accompanying notes 29-33. In
addition, Platform signatory Henry Cisneros is now the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development. For a discussion of the influence of communitarian ideas on, and the presence of communitarians in, the Clinton administration, see Edward Epstein, It's Controversial-and Influencing Clinton, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 5, 1993, at Al (noting that Etzioni's
book, The Spirit of Community, has been seen on Clinton's desk and discussing parallels
between Etzioni's and Clinton's ideas); Amitai Etzioni, Joining Together, RECORDER,
Mar. 16, 1993, at 10, 11 (citing examples of Clinton's "communitarian tendencies");
Charles Oliver, Clinton's Politics of Meaning, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Jan. 7, 1994, at 1

(reporting the influence of communitarianism on President Clinton and Vice President
Gore). While a Senator, Vice President Al Gore praised the communitarian project at a
Responsive Community "teach in," offering the global environmental crisis as an example
of the limits of rights talk. See The First Communitarian Teach-In, 2 RESPONSIVE COMMuNrrY, Winter 1991-1992, at 21, 25-26. Communitarians quote as a "communitarian
theme" Gore's assertion that, "[w]hile we give supreme value to the rights of the individual, we expect that freedom to be exercised with respect toward others and with decent
restraint." Etzioni, supra, at 10 (quoting Vice President Gore).
29. Excerpts from the Platform:A "New Covenant" With Americans, N.Y. TIMES, July
15, 1992, at A10.
30. David E. Anderson, Political World "Too Secular," President Says, WASH. POST,
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Americans will "demand more responsibility from all" and "take
more responsibility" for themselves, 31 and he traces the roots of
contemporary social problems to the breakdown of social values,
family, and community. 2 Both President Clinton and First Lady
Hillary Rodham Clinton reportedly espouse support for the "politics of meaning" (if not a "politics of virtue") articulated by Michael Lerner and others in Tikkun, which calls for "a new ethos
of caring" and links rights with responsibility.33 Moreover, at various levels of government and in community organizations, there is

Sept. 4, 1993, at D6.
31. "We Force the Spring". Transcript of Address by President Clinton, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 21, 1993, at A15.
32. See State of the Union: Renewing Valtes, Revising Welfare, Transcript of President
Clinton's Message on the §tate of the Union, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1994, at A16, A16-17
[hereinafter State of the Union] (arguing that problems such as drug use and gang violence cannot be solved by government alone but are rooted in a "loss of values, in the
disappearance of work and the breakdown of our families and our communities"). In his
recent State of the Union address, President Clinton invoked Abraham Lincoln's appeal
to the "better angels of our nature," a favorite communitarian reference. Id. at A17; see
GLENDON, supra note 1, at 177; Platform, supra note 5, at 5. Moreover, echoing frequent
communitarian references to the "social fabric," see infra text accompanying notes 51-57,
Clinton urged that we "weave" the "sturdy threads" of the institutions of civil society
into a "new American community." State of the Union, supra, at A17.
33. See Michael Kelly, Hillary Rodham Clinton and the Politics of Virtue, N.Y.
TIMES, May 23, 1993, § 6 (Magazine), at 22; Thomas Fields-Meyer, This Year's Prophet,
N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1993, § 6 (Magazine), at 28 (reporting on the influence of Lerner's
"politics of meaning" on the Clintons); see also It's Not Just the Economy, Stupid,
TIKKUN, May-June 1993, at 7, 7-8 (reprinting Hillary Rodham Clinton's address at the
University of Texas, Austin, which called for a "new politics of meaning" and "new
ethos of individual responsibility and caring," and offering editorial viewpoints about how
to implement a "politics of meaning").
The "politics of meaning" resembles the new communitarianism in linking the language of rights to the neglect both of responsibilities and of the importance of community, and in advocating concern for family, work, national service, and the like. See Michael
Lerner, Work- A Politics of Meaning Approach to Policy, TIKKUN, May-June 1993, at 23,
23-25. But see Charles Derber, Coming Glued: Communitarianism to the Rescue, TIKKUN,
July-Aug. 1993, at 27, 28, 95-96 (characterizing Etzioni's The Spirit of Community as
advocating a "professional middle class" communitarianism, inattentive to the needs of all
Americans and to economic realities, rather than a "bold communitarian agenda on capitalism and the market system"). One distinction may be that the politics of meaning
articulates as a primary goal for public policies the reconstruction of society, and its
economic and political institutions, to provide meaning and purpose and to foster care.
See Lerner, supra, at 26 (advocating a national work policy premised on the goal that
every workplace should "serve the common good" and "provide meaningful work"); Michael Lerner, Reflections on Israel and Jewish Continuity, Violence and Crime, How
Clinton is Doing, and The Politics of Meaning, TIKKUN, Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 7, 10-11 (advocating making "a politics of meaning the dominant framework for economic and political life").
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considerable interest in bolstering personal, family, and community
responsibility as a cure for a range of social problems and pathologies, some of which are said to be linked to rights.' 4 Meanwhile,
political figures, cultural critics, and the popular media routinely
sound the alarm of an explosion of frivolous rights assertion accompanied by an abdication of personal responsibility and the
assumption of the mantle of victim.35
The refrain "too many rights, too few responsibilities" and the
appeal to attend to "rights and responsibilities" in themselves do
not explain how rights and rights talk directly undermine responsibility and permit, or even encourage, irresponsibility. To assess the
irresponsibility critique, we must get a clearer picture of what sorts
of responsibilities the communitarians believe are in need of restoration (e.g., moral, social, communal, or legal responsibilities) and
to whom or what such responsibilities are owed (e.g., to self, family, community, or country).
B. From "Rights Talk" to "Table Talk:" Glendon's Call for a
Refined Rhetoric of Rights
In Rights Talk, Glendon argues that rights talk impoverishes
political discourse and civic life because it drives out or obscures
the language of responsibility.36 She characterizes her critique as
aimed at the rhetoric of rights (rights talk) rather than at specific
rights or the idea of rights in general.37 Diagnosing a lack of fit
between, on the one hand, a rights talk that is silent about a
right-bearer's correlative responsibilities and duties and, on the
other, a deep American belief that persons should be personally
responsible for their actions, Glendon argues that the law's silence
about responsibility may even appear to send a message that the
law condones irresponsibility.38 Glendon urges a refined rhetoric

34. See infra note 108.
35. See, e.g., CHARLES J. SYKES, A NATION OF VICTMS (1992); infra text accompanying notes 128-29.

36. See GLENDON, supra note 1. For some reviews of Glendon's book, see Thomas
D. Barton, Reclaiming Law Talk, 81 CAL. L. REV. 803 (1993); Richard A. Epstein,
Rights and "Rights Talk," 105 HARV. L. REV. 1106 (1992); Suzanna Sherry, Rights TalkMust We Mean What We Say?, 17 LAw & SOc. INQUIRY 491 (1992); James B. White,
Looking at Our Language: Glendon on Rights, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1267 (1992); Cass R.

Sunstein, Rightalk, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 2, 1991, at 33.
37.

See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 15.

38. See iL at 104-05 (citing a 1989 poll on family values conducted by Mark
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of rights, drawn from "our own indigenous resources"-prominently household "table talk" and discourses from other settings in
which notions of
relationship, responsibility, connection, and com39
figure.
promise
What is wrong with rights talk? Glendon submits,
Our rights talk, in its absoluteness, promotes unrealistic expectations, heightens social conflict, and inhibits dialogue that might
lead toward consensus, accommodation, or at least the discovery
of common ground. In its silence concerning responsibilities, it
seems to condone acceptance of the benefits of living in a democratic social welfare state, without accepting the corresponding
personal and civic obligations. In its relentless individualism, it
fosters a climate that is inhospitable to society's losers, and that
systematically disadvantages caretakers and dependents, young
and old. In its neglect of civil society, it undermines the principal
seedbeds of civic and personal virtue. In its insularity, it shuts
out potentially important aids to the process of self-correcting
learning. All of these traits promote mere assertion over reasongiving.'
Glendon illustrates these lamentable features of American rights
talk with examples from constitutional, family, and tort law.4"

Mellman). Glendon's specific examples of instances in which law may encourage or appear to condone irresponsibility include: the "no duty to rescue" rule in tort law; the
constitutional embrace of that rule in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social
Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989), which speaks of the Constitution as a charter of negative
liberties and appears to sanction parental irresponsibility; and, finally, the law and policies
surrounding child support. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 105, 135. In the first two
instances, Glendon criticizes judicial. opinions for failing to explain the moral infrastructure of American society, notwithstanding the absence of legal obligations. Id. at 95-98,
102-05.
39. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 15, 174-75; cf. Martin P. Golding, The Significance of Rights Language, 18 PHIL. Topics 53, 53, 62-64 (1990) (noting the tendency "to
slip into rights talk, even when its appropriateness is questionable" and arguing that
"rights have their home in the arms-length, impersonal sort of relationship . . . [between]
members of the community of strangers," but are not appropriate within "certain types of
moral-communal relations," such as friendship).
40. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 14.
41. The format of Glendon's book is to devote one chapter to each feature of rights
talk. See, e.g., id. at 18-46 (using property law and theories of property to illustrate "the
illusion of absoluteness"); id. at 47-75 (critiquing "the lone rights-bearer" assumed by the
right of privacy); id. at 76-108 (examining "the missing language of responsibility" in the
context of the no duty to rescue rule in tort law and its constitutional application in
DeShaney); id. at 109-44 (observing "the missing dimension of sociality" in family law
and policy and in the inability of legal language to express the needs and interests of
communities); id. at 145-70 (arguing that a "rights insularity" by American jurists pre-
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Gauging the scope of Glendon's critique is difficult. At its

narrowest, it is a meditation on the silence in American governing
documents, such as the Bill of Rights, concerning responsibilities.
This silence is in striking contrast with European constitutions and
rights proclamations such as the French Declaration of Rights and
Duties.42 At its broadest, it is a social critique of American society and of American attitudes about freedom that are not tempered by a sense of personal responsibility and civic duties.
Glendon's leading example of such attitudes is a survey of teenagers reporting their perception that what makes America special is
that they are free to do whatever they want, without limit. 43 As a
jurisprudential critique aimed at features of rights talk itself, her
critique attacks the characterization of rights as trumps and absolutist formulations of rights that are silent about duty and responsibility and that appear to preclude any deliberation over
social needs or the common good.' Glendon argues that both
our public documents and our rights talk encourage a careless and
exaggerated way of speaking and thinking about rights, as if liberty meant license. Yet she points out that the interpretation of

rights by judges, lawyers, contracting parties, and others reveals
that rights are not. without limits, e.g., the limits imposed by judicial interpreters of our governing documents and those imposed by
the reciprocal nature of rights and duties in contractual and other
relationships."

vents them from looking to other legal systems for instructive approaches to legal rights).
42. For example, Glendon notes that the Bill of Rights has nothing comparable to
§ 29 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, which states that "[e]veryone
has duties to the community" and that everyone's rights and freedoms are subject to
limitations "for the purposes of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and
the general welfare in a democratic society." Id. at 13 (quoting Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 7, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1949)). But see ETrZONI,
supra note 2, at 10 (suggesting that citizens' obligations to the community might be inferred from references in the Constitution to "the quest 'to form a more perfect Union'
and . . . the need to 'promote the general welfare' for that purpose") (quoting U.S.
CONST. pmbl.).
43. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 9 (citing a survey by People for the American
Way). This example also is featured prominently in Responsive Communitarian literature.
See, e.g., ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 3-4.
44. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 18-46 (contrasting continental European and
American understandings of rights and tracing the latter to the influence of Blackstone
and Locke). For a discussion of rights as trumps, see infra subsection IV(A)(2).
45. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 9-10, 13. This concession by Glendon about the
actual practice of rights seems to throw into question her basic premise of the absence of
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Why is our rights talk silent about responsibilities and does
the silence matter? On the one hand, Glendon explains the undeniable differences between the American Bill of Rights and the
French Declaration of Rights and Duties on the basis of the different intellectual pedigrees of the American and French Revolutions (Lockean individual rights and self-interest versus classical
and Rousseauean civic virtue and duty).46 On the other hand, in
contrast with scholars who might link the absence of responsibility
talk to a triumph of liberalism over republicanism and a resulting
move from civic virtue to self-interest,4 7 Glendon downplays the
American and European textual differences by arguing that the
Founders did not need to adopt a bill of legal duties because they
relied on the institutions of civil society, the "seedbeds of civic virtue," to restrain and temper individual self-interest and the exercise of rights. Invoking speeches by the Founders, Glendon and
other proponents of an unwritten "constitution of responsibility"
stress the role of morality and religion as the ultimate supports for
maintaining a republican form of government, for respecting
people's rights and liberties, and for making "our experiment in
ordered liberty" possible.48 Relying particularly on Alexis de
Tocqueville's nineteenth-century observations of Americans,
responsibility talk in law. Responsibility is a basic term in the legal vocabulary, and the
formulation "rights and responsibilities" is a common and pervasive formulation appearing
in numerous contexts. Consider such formulations as the "rights and responsibilities" of
parties in litigation; customer "rights and responsibilities" in business and consumer
transactions; the "rights and responsibilities" of citizenship; and the Section on Individual
Rights and Responsibilities of the American Bar Association. It is not the project of this
Article to explore all such usages.
46. See id. at 10-11, 13, 32-37. For a discussion linking the silence in the U.S. Constitution about citizens' duties to the break by theorists like Hobbes and Locke, who
focused on natural rights, from the natural law tradition that focused on obligations and
duties, see Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV.
703, 753 & n.245 (1980).
47.

See

GORDON

S.

WOOD,

THE

CREATION

OF

THE

AMERICAN

REPUBLIC,

1776-1787 (1969); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986).
48. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 115-17. For Glendon's appeal to "ordered liberty,"
see id. at 10 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)); id. at 127-28. For
particular historical texts, see THE FEDERALIST No. 55 (James Madison); George Washington, Farewell Address, reprinted in GEORGE WASHINGTON: A COLLECTION 521 (William B. Allen ed., 1988). See also Steven Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Foreword: The Constitution of Responsibility, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 955 (1992) (arguing that the Founders
presupposed citizen responsibility as a vital support of government and took for granted
the vitality of civil society, morality, and religion); Orrin G. Hatch, "A Dependence on
the People," 77 CORNELL L. REV. 959 (1992) (same).

1994]

RIGHTS AND IRRESPONSIBILITY

1005

Glendon argues that the "seedbeds of civic virtue," such as families, myriad associations, and the constraints of morality and religion, once played a vital role in educating Americans about rights
and duties.49
In Glendon's view, the silence of our governing documents
concerning responsibility would not matter so much if the institutions that have traditionally anchored people in community and
provided a sense of duty, obligation, and responsibility were germinating virtuous citizens with the requisite character traits for "ordered liberty."5 That traditional, richly textured social fabric is
wearing thin, however, in part because of the infiltration of rights
talk and in part due to the weakening of social norms. Thus,
Glendon asserts, Americans increasingly view law as the primary,
if not only, source of teaching about morality." She traces the
rise of rights talk to what she claims was a significant shift in
constitutional law in the 1950s and 1960s to a focus on individual
rights and an eschewal of ordinary politics in favor of judicial
vindication of rights. 2 This "rights revolution," she argues,
brought with it an equally significant social phenomenon-a
change in "habits of thought and speech., 53 The result is a rightsladen discourse that makes public dialogue and deliberation about
responsibilities and the common good difficult and fosters attitudes
that the Founders would have disapproved of as "liberty as license."

49. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 117-20 (citing 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 63, 70, 93-94 (J.P. Mayer ed. & George Lawrence trans., 1969);
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE OLD REGIME AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION xiii (Stu-

art Gilbert trans., 1955)). For another example of communitarian reliance on Tocqueville.
see BELLAH ET AL., HABITS, supra note 5, passim. For a discussion of the problems with

uncritical and heavy reliance on Tocqueville by communitarians, see PHILLIPS, supra note
7, at 61-80.
50. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 115-17.
51. See id. at 87, 136-38.
52. Id. at 4-7. Although a critique of Glendon's constitutional history is not the project of this Article, it is likely that Glendon's account of the history of constitutional law
is problematic. For example, Glendon herself notes Tocqueville's observation of how legal
discourse and a legalistic spirit "infiltrate[d]" American society and "the manners and
morals" of Americans. Id. at 1-2. In the Lochner era, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
property rights and liberty of contract at the expense of social and economic legislation.
See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 8-2 to -7 (2d ed.

1988). It may be the type of right being asserted in recent years, i.e., rights of privacy
and equality, that the irresponsibility critique finds problematic. See infra Section II(B).
7.
53. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at
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Yet Glendon maintains that the social fabric is not threadbare,
and she charges that rights talk obscures a still-intact civil society,
with its "communities of memory and mutual aid."54 She marshals
"evidence" that America has indigenous cultural resources 55-"indigenous languages of relationship and responsibility"S6 -available
to refine rights talk, which she sees as a "simplistic" language
making it difficult for Americans, who would otherwise "speak[]
from the heart," to express themselves.
As with her critique of rights talk, the scope of Glendon's
proposed corrective is difficult to gauge. She claims that her goal
is a refined rhetoric of rights, one that would keep "competing
rights and responsibilities in view."5' She suggests that we address
such matters as
whether a particular issue is best conceptualized as involving a
right; the relation a given right should have to other rights and
interests; the responsibilities, if any, that should be correlative
with a given right; the social costs of rights; and what effects a
given right can be expected to have on the setting of conditions
for the durable protection of freedom and human dignity.5
Matters such as how to link rights with responsibilities and
how to factor in social costs, however, would appear also to raise
questions about the content of and limitations on rights. Glendon
appears to consider, as falling within the scope of refining rights
rhetoric, not only greater judicial attention to the publicity effects
of judicial opinions' ° but also greater judicial willing-

54. Id. at xii; cf. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS, supra note 5, at 333 (defining a "community of memory" as a group of socially interdependent people "defined in part by its
past and its memory of its past").
55. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 174-75.
56. Id. at xii.
57. Id. at 8. There are striking parallels between Glendon's analysis of the gap between rights talk and how Americans actually think and feel and the diagnosis offered in
Habits of the Heart. Similarities include reliance on Tocqueville's analysis and the use of
such notions as first and second languages, communities of mutual aid and memory,
ecological analogies for America's social problems and resources, and the emphasis on
people as products of institutions, traditions, and the like. See BELLAH ET AL., HABITS,
supra note 5, at 20, 35-41, 152-55, 283-86, 333-36. In turn, Bellah and his associates
relied on Glendon's analysis in their subsequent book. See BELLAH ET AL., GOOD SOCIETY, supra note 5, at 47-48, 129-30, 302.
58. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 15.
59. Id. at 177.
60. See id. at 95-96, 104-05 (faulting courts in "no duty to rescue" cases for failing
to explain the existence of a moral duty to rescue and criticizing the Court's decision in
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ness-regardless of whether a fundamental right is involved-to
consider and weigh "moral fabric" arguments and take into account citizen interest in using the criminal law (e.g., sodomy laws)
to express and maintain a "widely shared moral view.",61 Moreover, although Glendon rejects the idea of importing European
rights declarations codifying express limitations on rights and correlative duties to communities, she frequently invokes them as instructive' and proposes that the former West Germany's restrictive abortion law would better serve American women than the
right of privacy has. 63 As elaborated below, all this suggests a
substantive critique of the content of rights, as well as a tension
between, on the one hand, her wish to use law to signal hortatory,
educational messages about duty, responsibility, and the values that
the community "holds dear" and, on the other, her proposals to
use law to establish enforceable obligations.' 4
Glendon's appeal to the cultural resources that she believes
can offer correctives to an extreme rights talk and can help restore
the balance between responsibilities and rights similarly raises
questions about whether her goal is different rhetoric or different

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989), for failing
,to explain adequately that the absence of constitutional duties does not signal the absence of statutory and state constitutional duties to provide for the welfare of citizens);
id. at 153-54 (faulting the tone of the majority opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986), for its apparent indifference to "feelings of an unpopular minority").
61. See id. at 151-58 (criticizing the opinions of Justices White and Blackmun in
Bowers for assuming that the existence of a fundamental right overcomes any interest of
citizens in "officially maintaining certain traditional norms of sexual morality" and favorably contrasting a European decision that considered the impact of decriminalization on
the moral fabric). In Glendon's consideration of possible moral fabric arguments undergirding the Georgia sodomy law at issue in Bowers and in her contrast of a European
law she describes as criminalizing "certain homosexual acts," she appears, like Justice
White's opinion in Bowers, to ignore that the law focused not on homosexual sodomy
but on all sodomy. Id. at 148-52. Compare Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (concluding that "the
presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is
immoral and unacceptable" is a rational basis for the statute) with id. at 216 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he Georgia statute expresses the traditional view that sodomy is an immoral kind of conduct regardless of the identity of the persons who engage in it . . .
62. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
63. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 60-66. For a discussion of the abortion example,
see infra Section IV(C).
64. See Harper's Forum, supra note 20, at 48 (statement of Mary Ann Glendon)
(The "educational and symbolic [function of law is] to state prominently a society's central commitments."); id. at 51 (statement of Mary Ann Glendon) ("I prefer [a]
'declaration' [of responsibilities] over 'bill' because I prefer the hortatory mode over the
coercive.").
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rights. She envisions a refined rights talk informed by our more
carefully nuanced table talk, with its "potentially transform[ative]"
insights about attention to the "relationships, obligations, and longterm consequences of present acts and decisions" and to cooperation and compromise.' Similarly, she favorably invokes Stephen
Macedo's defense of liberalism, which argues that the "'moral
core' of our public order is a commitment to public justification, 66 and reason giving and that the liberal virtue of moderation counsels us in some cases "to moderate our claims in the face
of the reasonable claims of others ... and split at least some of
our differences."'6 7 Below, I argue that Glendon's invocation of
table talk and of models of public justification to refine rights
rhetoric invites consideration of what sort of rights she supports.68
C. The Responsive CommunitarianAppeal to "Rights and Responsibilities"
In the conclusion of her critique of rights talk, Glendon observes that refining the rhetoric of rights is but one element of the
transformative politics needed to repair the fabric of American
society.69 Attempting to begin the process, the Responsive Communitarian movement describes itself as a "communitarian social
movement"" committed to a "communitarian perspective" that
mandates attention to, inter alia, "the social side of human nature"
and "the responsibilities that must be borne by citizens, individually and collectively, in a regime of rights."71 Seeking "balances between individuals and groups, rights and responsibilities," the Responsive Communitarian Platform's goal is to reinvigorate a neglected moral realm-"which is neither one of random individual
choice nor of government control"-in which "moral voices" that
originate in "America's diverse communities of memory and mutual aid ... achieve their effect mainly through education and persuasion."'7 2

65.

GLENDON, supra note 1, at 174-75.

66. Id. at 176-77 (quoting MACEDO, supra note 8, at 34, 41).
67. Id. at 177 (quoting MACEDO, supra note 8, at 46).
68. See infra notes 250-52 and accompanying text.
69.

See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 183.

70.
71.

Platform, supra note 5, at 5.
Id.at 4-5. For consideration of the new communitarianism as a political theory,

see infra Part III.

72.

Platform, supra note 5, at 5; see also GALSTON, supra note 5, at 281 (arguing for
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Rejecting the labels "conservative" or "liberal" and advocating
a middle path between "Radical Individualists" (prominently associated with the ACLU) and "Authoritarians, 73 the new
communitarians hold that a "moral revival" is possible "without
allowing puritanism or oppression."'7 4 In effect, they aim to reinforce the thick social fabric that Glendon diagnoses as both fraying
and yet surviving (although masked by rights talk). Sympathizers
with the communitarian outlook applaud its focus on moral revival, suggesting that it gives "philosophical voice to the yearnings of
ordinary folk who wish to preserve their liberties while reclaiming
their Vision of a decent community, one in which the moral senses
will become as evident in public as they now are in private
75
life."
On the one hand, the new communitarian literature invokes a
model of community in which government is rarely necessary because the community's moral voice exhorts individuals to do what
they ought to do. Indeed, Etzioni concludes that unaided individual conscience is not enough. 76 "Much of what Communitarians
favor," Etzioni elaborates, "has little to do with laws and regulations, which ultimately draw on the coercive powers of the state,
but with being active members of a community. '77 On the other
hand, the Platform echoes Glendon in stating that "the law does
play a significant role not only in regulating society but also in
indicating which values it holds dear," hinting at the perhaps ineluctable movement toward embodying the moral voice of the
community in law.7' Thus, although the Platform states that a
communitarian approach "does not dictate particular policies, 79
the "legitimate role" of "moral argumentation and (in some cases) forms of public persuasion" within the regime of rights); infra text accompanying note 92. The voice metaphor is striking in light of another prominent discourse calling for a better integration of
responsibility into law, the strand of feminist legal theory inspired by Carol Gilligan's
influential book, In a Different Voice. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE
(1982); see also McClain, supra note 9.
73. ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 15.
74. Id. at 1. The journal The Responsive Community routinely has a news section entitled "Authoritarians, Libertarians, and Communitarians" and divides stories up within
their appropriate category. On the search for a middle ground, see Fred Strasser, Searching for a Middle Ground, NATL. LJ., Feb. 3, 1992, at 1, 28-29.
75.

JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE 248 (1993).

76.
77.
78.
79.

See, e.g., ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 30-31.
Id. at 39.
Platform, supra note 5, at 17; see supra text accompanying note 64.
Platform, supra note 5, at 5.
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responsive communitarians take a keen interest in public policy (as
their "position papers" on various issues indicate) and seek to advance the implementation of their idea that "strong rights presume
strong responsibilities" and their commitment
to "shoring up our
8
moral, social and political environment. 1
According to the Platform, "[a] responsive community is one
whose moral standards reflect the basic human needs of all its
81
members" or the "full range of legitimate needs and values.1
The Platform describes a process by which a community develops
shared moral values subject to certain criteria.' Once the community agrees on these shared values, members should hold each
other to them. The Platform asserts some of "those values Americans share," which schools should teach
that the dignity of all persons ought to be respected, that tolerance is a virtue and discrimination abhorrent, that peaceful resolution of conflicts is superior to violence, that generally truthtelling is morally superior to lying, that democratic government is
morally superior to totalitarianism and authoritarianism, that one
ought to give a day's work for a day's pay, that saving for one's
own and one's country's future is better than squandering one's
income and relying on others to attend to one's future
needs.... [T]he whole school should be considered as a set of
experiences generating situations in which young people either
learn the values of civility, sharing, and responsibility to the
common good or of cheating, cut-throat competition, and total
self-absorption.'
From this passage, we get a clue about what irresponsibility means
by considering the antonyms offered to civility and responsibility:
"cheating, cut-throat competition, and total self-absorption." In
80. The quoted language comes from the preface to the "Position Papers" published
by The Communitarian Network and The Responsive Community. Topics of position
papers to date include the family, rights and responsibilities of organ donors, domestic
disarmament, and "core values" in health care reform.
81. Platform, supra note 5, at 6, 7; cf. McClain, supra note 9, at 1193 (analyzing
Carol Gilligan's argument that responsibility, from a care perspective, is a "response" to
the needs of others).
82. In referring to the criteria for the development of moral values, e.g., that they
be nondiscriminatory, generalizable, and "justified in terms that are accessible and understandable," Platform, supra note 5, at 7, the Platform bears some resemblance to liberal
accounts both of hypothetical agreement on the principles of justice and social cooperation and of the requirements of public justification and public reason. See RAwLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 22-28, 223-27.
83. Platform, supra note 5, at 9-10.
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contrast, the strong themes of self-reliance and
common good point responsibility as autonomy
accountability.'
A responsive community would use social
age members to live up to their duties, many
form specifies. For example:
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of attention to the
in the direction of
suasion to encourof which the Plat-

[W]e should not hesitate to speak up and express our moral
concerns to others when it comes to issues we care about deeply
and share with one another. It might be debatable whether or
not we should encourage our neighbors to keep their lawns green
(which may well be environmentally unsound), but there should
be little doubt that we should expect one another to attend to
our children, and vulnerable community members. Those who
neglect these duties should be explicitly considered poor members
of the community."
The consequences of being considered poor members of the community are not indicated.86
The Platform gives another illustration of the link between
irresponsibility and social costs: parents who, consumed by "making it," "consumerism," or "personal advancement," take "shortcuts," thereby producing "woefully deficient" children and inflicting
social costsY The communitarians believe that many problems of
contemporary society stem from parents' failures to discharge their
responsibilities to their children. They call for a "culture of
familialism,"' one premised on "equal rights and responsibilities"
of mothers and fathers.8 9

84. For the association of irresponsibility with a decline in both senses of responsibility, see infra Section 11(A).
85. Platform, supra note 5, at 11.
86. Etzioni, however, supports public shaming in the case of certain nonviolent criminal offenses. See ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 140-41.
87. Platform, supra note 5, at 7-8; see infra note 209 and accompanying text.
88.

See JEAN ELSrrAIN ET AL., A COMMUNITARIAN POSITION PAPER ON THE FAMI-

LY, at 1-2, 19 (undated paper, on file with author). The preparers of this position paper
were Jean Elshtain, Enola Aird, Amitai Etzioni, William Galston, Mary Ann Glendon,
Martha Minow, and Alice Rossi.

89. Id. at 15. The references in communitarian literature to parenting responsibilities
as "not for women only" may account for some feminist support of the communitarian
agenda on the family. For example, feminist legal theorist Minow, a co-author of the
position paper, is a member of the Editorial Board of The Responsive Community. Coauthors Elshtain (also on the Editorial Board) and Rossi are Platform signatories, as is
Betty Friedan.
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Echoing Glendon's critique of rights talk, the new communitarians hold that "strong rights presume strong responsibilities" on the
part of the right-holder. ° The Responsive Communitarian agenda
for redressing the imbalance between rights and responsibilities
proposes a mixture of social and legal limitations on rights and
rights assertion, at times relying on social suasion and moral voice,.
at times resorting to political power and legal coercion, but also
calling for a "moratorium" on the "minting" of new rights. 9'
Furthermore, the new communitarians seek to bring the moral
voice of the responsive community to bear in closing the gap between rights and rightness. The Responsive Communitarian Platform states,
The language of rights is morally incomplete. To say that "I
have a right to do X" is not to conclude that "X is the right
thing for me to do." One may, for example, have a First Amend.ment right to address others in a morally inappropriate manner.... Rights give reasons to others not to coercively interfere

with the speaker in the performance of protected acts; however,
they do not in themselves give a person a sufficient reason to
perform these acts. There is a gap between rights and rightness
that cannot be closed without a richer moral vocabulary-one
that invokes principles of decency, duty, responsibility, and the
common good, among others?2
This tenet of the Platform indicates that a primary communitarian
method for linking rights and responsibilities is moral suasion
concerning how to exercise one's rights, instead of immediate
resort to legal coercion. The above statement illustrates both the
wrongness and immunity prongs of the irresponsibility critique.
Below I examine the notion of a morally incomplete vocabulary of
rights. 3

90. ETzIONI, supra note 2, at 1.
91. Etzioni argues for a "four-point agenda: a moratorium on the minting of most, if
not all, new rights; reestablishing the link between rights and responsibilities; recognizing
that some responsibilities do not entail rights; and, most carefully, adjusting some rights
to the changed circumstances." Id. at 4.
92. Platform, supra note 5, at 14 (giving specific examples of hateful, racist opinions
directed toward "a Jew" or "a black") (echoing language from William A. Galston,
Rights Do Not Equal Rightness, 1 RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Fall 1991, at 7, 8). For
elaboration on this point, see ETZIONI, supra note 2. at 201-02; GALSTON, supra note 5,
at 281.
93. See infra Sections IV(A)-(B).
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Whatever one's philosophical or practical disagreements with
the agenda, one might well applaud the communitarians for grappling with a number of difficult social problems and proposing
solutions for them. Still, one should ask: What do rights and rights
talk have to do with these problems, and how do rights interfere
with their solution?
II.

ASSESSING THE IRRESPONSIBILITY CRITIQUE
AS A SOCIAL CRITIQUE

Can America survive as a democratic society if everyone has
rights and no one has responsibilities? We say NO!94
Situating the new communitarians' irresponsibility critique in
the context of a number of contemporary critiques of American
society suggests that, to a significant extent, certain components of
the irresponsibility critique are a social critique aimed less at legal
rights and their justifications than at American society and "rights
culture." Those components include the following claims: (1)
Americans want rights and entitlements without the responsibilities
of citizenship, a symptom of a deeper moral crisis; (2) the legacy
of the 1960s includes not only the civil rights movement but also a
challenge to authority that led to the crumbling of moral authority
and tradition and an explosion of self-indulgent and socially harmful behaviors; and (3) Americans today debase the moral and social value of genuine legal rights by making ever-increasing and
frivolous claims to rights and entitlements while fleeing personal
responsibility and shifting blame to others.
The communitarians tie all these social phenomena together
with the thread of a decline or demise of responsibility. I will
grant that such an explanation may have some validity, although I
do not attempt to assess fully the communitarian account of the
problems of American society. Rather, the primary focus of this
Article is the alleged link between irresponsibility and legal rights,
and in this Part I challenge whether legal rights, liberalism, and an
"excess" of liberal virtues are plausibly characterized as causes of
these social phenomena.

94. Statement appearing on a pamphlet advertising the journal The Responsive Community (undated pamphlet, on file with author).
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The Quest for a Responsible Citizenry

As a social critique of rights, the irresponsibility critique explores the indispensable relationship between freedom and responsibility. The American experiment, the communitarians argue, depends on such traits of character as self-control, self-restraint, and
respect for the rights of others, as well as a willingness to assume
responsibility for oneself, for one's family, and for the health of
America's institutions. 5 Freedom, in other words, depends on
both responsibility as autonomy and responsibility as accountability.
The communitarians argue that, to a disturbing degree, Americans manifest "a strong sense of entitlement-that is, a demand
that the community provide more services and strongly uphold
rights-coupled with a rather weak sense of obligation to the local
and national community."9 6 To the extent that the irresponsibility
critique targets such public attitudes, it does not directly implicate
rights as much as lapses in civic responsibility. Indeed, the prominent example offered as a symbol of contemporary attitudes of
taking without giving is young people's reported expectation of
being tried by a jury coupled with a reluctance to serve on juries. 7 Not only is there no legal right to evade jury service but
(as the communitarians insist) jury service is a civic duty, nonperformance of which the state may legally sanction.98
In a sense, this component of the irresponsibility critique is a
helpful civics lesson about the role that citizens must play in sustaining a constitutional democracy and the inseparability of freedom and responsibility. In the communitarian view, however, civic
education and national or community service, although important,

95. See GLENDON, supra note 1, passim; supra text accompanying notes 46-53. For
an elaboration of these themes, see RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP, AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra
note 20.
96.

ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 3.

97. Id.; Platform, supra note 5, at 12; see also Etzioni, supra note 28, at 10 (stating
that this "symbolic" social science finding triggered the dialogue that launched the
communitarian movement).
98. Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 989, 999 (3d Cir.) (stating that
"governments may require individuals to perform certain well-established 'civic duties,'
such as military service and jury duty, and impose legal sanctions for the failure to perform"), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 85 (1993); Platform, supra note 5, at 12 (arguing that
"serving on juries" is a "fully obligatory" duty to the polity); see also N.Y. JUD. LAW §
527 (McKinney 1992) (imposing a civil penalty for failing to respond to jury summons or
to attend jury servide).
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cannot fully redress the decline of a responsible citizenry 99 because the roots of the American malaise go deeper into the per-

sonal and familial lives of the citizenry. Indeed, the moral or social
fabric, the "ecosystems" of society, result significantly from the
effects of the choices and conduct of millions of individuals. 1' °
Echoing Glendon, the Platform warns that perhaps the most basic
institution of civil society-the family-which should be a moral
educator schooling the next generation of citizens in the interplay
of rights and responsibilities, is in peril and that "the second line
of defense"-schools-cannot alone prevent the decline of a responsible citizenry.'1 1 Moreover, communitarians charge that, although schools are reluctant to engage in moral education and
character formation, they must do so to combat the "moral deficit" among young people.' 2
Communitarian inventories of the "moral state of the union"
indicate that the responsibility deficit in America includes not only
some conduct protected by legal rights but extends well beyond to
include conduct that is not even arguably protected by rights. 3
99. Communitarians are not alone in their support for such measures. For example,
President Clinton delivered an important speech on national service at Rutgers University,
the home institution of Responsive Communitarian Benjamin Barber, a prominent advocate of volunteerism. See The Call to National Service, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1993, at A24;
see also Evelyn Nieves, With Clinton Visit Due, Program at Rutgers is Spotlighted, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 1993, at 21 (reporting on the Rutgers University Civic Education and
Community Service Program, an extensive undergraduate community service program).
Consider also the National Community Service Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12501 (West Supp.
1993), which expresses the purpose of "renew[ing] the ethic of civic responsibility in the
United States" through encouraging citizens (particularly young Americans) to engage in
community service. Id. § 12501(2); see also Steirer, 987 F.2d at 997, 1000 (upholding a
compulsory community service requirement in high school that was supported by both the
American Alliance of Rights and Responsibilities and by People for the American Way).
100. Cf. Karl Zinsmeister, Parental Responsibility and the Future of the American
Family, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1005, 1011 (1992) (stating that civil society is the product
of many millions of individual choices and claiming that parents hold the fate of America
in their hands).
101. Platform, supra note 5, at 7-10; see supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
102. ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 89-97 (urging the inculcation of values, self-control,
and self-discipline); see also Albert Shanker, School Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1994, § 4,
at 7 (arguing that "school is one of the chief places where youngsters learn about rules
and responsibility" and that "[w]hen students see rules enforced, they are learning the
habits and sense of responsibility that people need to live together civilly and safely").
Shanker, President of the American Federation of Teachers, is a Platform signatory.
103. See ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 23-30 (reviewing the "state of the union's morality" and including as evidence of "moral erosion" not only rates of divorce and social
attitudes towards sex and marriage but also high rates of "chronic malingering at work,"
the use of physical force against others (in many instances, without regret), insider trad-
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Irresponsibility includes lawless behavior that is unprotected by
rights and often violative of the rights of others.'04 The current
example of such conduct of foremost concern to Americans, and
of considerable concern to communitarians, is violent crime."
What the irresponsibility critique seems to overlook is that although constitutional rights attend persons accused of crimes and
limit methods to prevent crime-and communitarians challenge
"absolutist" interpretations of such rights-the criminal activity
itself is not protected by rights. 6 Moreover, contrary to the
communitarian charge that libertarian interpretations of rights
prevent government from addressing the problem of violent crime,
liberal political theory treats providing for the physical security of
citizens as one of the most basic obligations of government. 7

ing in financial markets, political scandals, and the marketing of unsafe products by manufacturers).
A recent issue of The Responsive Community entitled The Moral State of the Union
similarly links together as causes for communitarian concern an admixture of attitudes
and behaviors. See, e.g., James Patterson & Peter Kim, The Decline and Fall: An
Alarmed Perspective, 4 RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Winter 1993-1994, at 47, 47-51 (listing
many of the same phenomena as Etzioni and also "systematic rule-breaking," "abusing
alcohol or drugs in the workplace," and high rates of crime and reporting that "93 percent of Americans report that they alone determine what is moral in their lives"). But
see Everett C. Ladd, The Myth of Moral Decline, 4 RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Winter
1993-1994, at 52, 52-64 (arguing that a perceived decline in "[t]he moral state of the
United States" is a recurring theme throughout American history but that such views are
unduly pessimistic because many social norms are firmly entrenched).
104. Glendon uses as one example of irresponsibility the violent abuse committed by
Randy DeShaney on his son, Joshua. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 135 (discussing
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)); see also
infra note 110 and accompanying text.
105. See Richard L. Berke, Fears of Crime Rival Concern Over Economy, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 23, 1994, at Al.
106. The communitarians attack interpretations of the Second and Fourth Amendments
that are invoked to oppose preventive measures in the name of neighborhood self-protection and support civil disarmament. See infra note 302 and accompanying text. A further
argument linking violence to rights would be that certain family structures (specifically,
female-headed households) more frequently produce people who engage in crime. Moral
deregulation in the area of family law is said to lessen societal sanctions against such
family forms. See infra text accompanying notes 121-24.
107. HOLMES, supra note 8, at 3-4; DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 14; see Steven J.
Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE LJ. 507 (1991). But see DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196, 202 (concluding that,
because the Due Process Clauses "confer no affirmative right to governmental aid," the
state of Wisconsin "had no constitutional duty to protect [a child] against his father's
violence" and that failure to do so did not violate the Due Process Clause). I do not
address in this Article the common feminist critique that, notwithstanding the existence of
criminal laws against rape and assault, the law has afforded immunity to male violence
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Similarly, communitarians are not alone in focusing on an

absence of a sense of personal and social responsibility (as well as
self-esteem) as an explanation for a range of behaviors that are
described as self-destructive and socially costly, nor are they the
only ones urging a shoring up of a sense of responsibility as a
corrective."' An absence of responsibility, in the senses of both
autonomy and accountability, may well be a significant cause of
such behavior. The question, however, is the relationship between
these social problems and legal rights and their exercise. Certainly,
a successful regime of fights depends on right-holders respecting
the rights of others. 9 Moreover, law places certain restraints on
freedom and holds people accountable for failing to obey the law.
It would appear that the underlying culprit for a substantial
amount of the irresponsibility communitarians target is not so
much rights as the erosion of qualities such as self-control, restraint, and respect for others and for the law, qualities esteemed-not discouraged-by liberalism."0 Yet the new
communitarians believe that rights have contributed to that erosion, stressing as pivotal the civil rights movement and the broad
challenges to authority and tradition during the 1960s.

against women within the institution of marriage. See, e.g., Robin West, Equality Theory,
Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45, 45-46
(1990).
108. Note the considerable interest in recent years by many local and state governments in fostering self-esteem (defined as a sense of personal and social responsibility) as
a "social vaccine" against a wide range of "dysfunctional" and socially costly behaviors
(such as substance abuse, child abuse, and teenage pregnancy). See, e.g., TOWARD A
STATE OF ESTEEM: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA TASK FORCE TO PROMOTE
SELF-ESTEEM AND PERSONAL AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 4 (1990).

109. One might call this the moral, if not logical, correlation between recognition and
protection of one's own rights and those of others. See JOEL FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 61-62 (1973).
110. See ETEIONI, supra note 2, at 30 (stating that "illegal and immoral behaviors
have broken through [the] important line of voluntary self-restraint"). For an argument
tracing many of the traditional causes of crime to low self-control, see MICHAEL R.
GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 85-120 (1990). On
the centrality of self-control and self-restraint in liberalism, see HOLMES, supra note 8, at
235-37 (invoking Nietzsche's criticisms of liberalism for its core insistence on self-restraint
to refute the antiliberal charge, from the opposite direction, that liberalism involves the
"total collapse of self-restraint"). But see JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME
237-38, 247-49 (2d rev. ed. 1983) (arguing that one factor accounting for crime increases
in the 1960s and 1970s was "the continued spread of the ethic of self-expression," an
ethic emphasizing self-gratification and rights rather than self-restraint and duties).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

B.

[Vol. 43:989

The Legacy of the 1960s and the Civil Rights Movement- Progress or Pandora'sBox?

Out of the literature of communitarianism emerges a tale of
the legacy of the 1960s explaining both the explosion of rights talk
and the erosion of morality and civic virtue. I shall attempt a
composite, if oversimplified, account.' In the 1950s, the moral
authority of leaders and community norms were respected; it was
possible to talk about what was right and what was wrong. Families were stronger, violent crime rarer, and habits of self-reliance
and self-restraint more abundant. This society had some notable
failings: racial inequality and segregation, gender inequality (including a male-governed family structure and the exclusion of women
from the commercial work world), and the marginal status of
certain ethnic and religious groups (like Jews and Catholics).
Moreover, the values themselves were somewhat authoritarian.
Nonetheless, there was a cultural consensus in America, a traditional morality, that was dominant and effective.
The civil rights movement, the communitarians grant, appropriately criticized injustice and exclusion and rightly sought to
realize the ideal of equality for all citizens."' Yet, for the communitarians, the 1960s were a Pandora's Box because that decade
unleashed a dangerous explosion of claims of entitlement, an ideology of personal fulfillment and liberation, and a pervasive challenge to traditional morality and all forms of traditional authority." Such a challenge undermined the solidarity, security, and
strong family values that held sway in the 1950s and repudiated a
traditional morality that emphasized self-control, self-restraint, and
self-discipline."' In its place, the challenge of the 1960s left us
with eroding moral foundations and institutions, moral relativism,
an ideology of liberty as license to practice unbridled individual-

111. Unless otherwise indicated, I have drawn on the work of Etzioni and Galston for
the composite account in this Section. See ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 12-13, 23-24;
GALSTON, supra note 5, at 267-70. It should be noted, however, that Etzioni expresses a
more critical view of tradition, and more readily concedes the appropriateness of challenges to it, than does Galston.
112. See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 1, at 6, 15-16.
113. But see ETZIONi, supra note 2, at 11-12, 23-25 (arguing that it was not the challenge to authority that was the problem, but the absence of new social forms and consensus). Moreover, Glendon argues, the 1960s led to an eschewal of ordinary politics in
favor of the judicial protection of rights. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 4-7.
114. GALsTON, supra note 5, at 268-70.
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ism, and a profound absence of moral consensus on new shared
values and new forms of social institutions."'

Indeed, Galston

considers it a debatable question "whether the cultural revolution
of the past generation has left the United States better or worse
off," noting that "[a]lthough the civil rights movement is widely
acknowledged to have righted ancient wrongs, epidemics of crime,
drugs, and teenage pregnancy have exacted a fearful tol.""' 6

The communitarian account is overstated. The assertion of
civil rights has no obvious or plausible link to the rise of irresponsible and often unlawful behavior because civil rights do not include "rights"

to commit violent crimes or drug offenses." 7

Moreover, many civil rights (such as voting, housing, and education) secure the capacity for responsible citizenship, for participation as well as autonomy."' Communitarians respond that this
115. ETZiONI, supra note 2, at 23-24; cf. Anna Quindlen, America's Sleeping Sickness,
N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 17, 1993, § 4, at 17 (arguing that Etzioni's "driving impulse-that we
have done away with old forms, connections, rules, traditions, but have put nothing much
in their place---cannot be denied" and urging that we "build to replace the old outmoded
forms").
116. GALSTON, supra note 5, at 273. Galston does not elaborate on his juxtaposition
of the civil rights movement and these "epidemics." But cf. infra note 123. He seems to
argue, however, that the metaphor of civil rights for African-Americans inspired a broad
range of challenges, in the name of freedom, to other hierarchies that formed part of
"traditional morality" (e.g., the subordination of women to men and of "heterodox sexuality" to "traditional families") and the demand for legitimizing social differences.
GALSTON, supra note 5, at 268-69.

117. In President Clinton's recent speech about Martin Luther King, Jr., he contrasted
the gains of the civil rights movement with such contemporary problems as violence
committed by African-Americans against African-Americans, teen pregnancy, and family
breakdown, and he stressed that Dr. King had fought for rights for blacks but not for
the freedom for them to kill each other. See Douglas Jehl, Clinton Delivers Emotional
Appeal on Stopping Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1993, at Al (calling for community and
government responsiblity). One possible interpretation of such a linkage is the argument
that before civil rights made greater social mobility by African-Americans possible, African-American communities had a stronger system of social sanction of criminal and other
unacceptable behavior. See The MacNeil-Lehrer NewsHour: Tarnished Dream (PBS television broadcast, Nov. 15, 1993) (remarks by Stanley Crouch), available in LEXIS, NEWS
library, SCRIPT file. In any event, the Reverend Jesse Jackson has characterized the recent "crusade" to stop the violence committed by some young African-American men
and boys against other African-Americans as a "new frontier of the civil rights movement." Don Terry, A Graver Jackson's Cry: Overcome the Violence!, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
13, 1993, at Al. But see id. (reporting the concern that Jackson's campaign may come
close to "blame-the-victim oratory" and arguing that the solution must include getting
"society to live up to its responsibilities to justice and equality"). For an argument that
the "racial construction of crime" in American society and in criminal law
disproportionately identifies black people with criminality, see Dorothy Roberts, Crime,
Race, and Reproduction, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1945-61 (1993).
118. See Sunstein, supra note 36, at 35 (characterizing voting rights and
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very expansion of opportunities, benign in itself, inadvertently
brought about harmful social changes. 119 In contrast, Cass
Sunstein argues that the posited link between rights talk and a responsibility deficit is exactly backward: rights talk arose because of
a deficit of responsibility on the part of society and government. 2 °
Nonetheless, as Galston's reference to the "epidemic" of teen
pregnancy suggests, the attempt to link the civil rights movement
to a growing social "pathology" and shrinking moral consensus is
part of a larger, often vituperative, debate over American values
that 'centers on whether society is "defining deviancy down" or
"up
and becoming too tolerant of behaviors and choices once
condemned socially, if not legally." An examination of some of

antidiscrimination laws as "social," rather than selfish, rights). Consider traditional justifications for private property as a means to secure independence and make civic participation possible. See id.; see also JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 54-55 (1990); GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 178-81, 234 (1992).

119. An example communitarians offer is women's entry into the workforce, which,
together with less restrictive divorce laws, it is argued, have had a dramatic impact on
patterns of childcare in the home, creating "latchkey" children and resulting in insufficient attention to the nurture and education of children. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at
127-28.
120. Sunstein, supra note 36, at 34.
121. See Daniel P. Moynihan, Defining Deviancy Down, 62 AM. SCHOLAR 17 (1993)
(arguing that Americans have reacted to increased rates of violent crime and births outside of marriage by redefining as normal what was once considered deviant); Charles
Krauthammer, Defining Deviancy Up, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 22, 1993, at 20 (agreeing
with Moynihan but arguing that there is a "complementary social phenomenon" of finding "normal" middle class family life and "ordinary" heterosexual relationships to be
"deviant").
122. See Moynihan, supra note 121. The centerpiece of this debate appears to be the
rise in single-parent, female-headed households and its causal relationship to a number of
social problems. Concern and rhetoric appear to escalate when one introduces the additional variables of public assistance and teen pregnancy and motherhood. See Mickey
Kaus, Bastards, NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 21, 1994, at 16 (reporting an emerging conservative
consensus that "[i]llegitimacy . . . is the single most important social problem of our
time," at the root of many of America's social problems) (quoting Charles Murray, The
Coming White Underclass, WALL ST. J.,Oct. 29, 1993, at A14); see also Gwen Ifill,
Clinton Warns Youths of the Perils of Pregnancy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4,1993, at A18 (linking the restoration of family values to personal responsibility and addressing the problem
of pregnancy among teenagers). Clinton has praised former Vice President Dan Quayle
for championing two-parent families and criticizing the television program Murphy Brown
for allegedly glamorizing single motherhood. See Paul Bedard, Clinton: Quayle Was Right
on Families, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1993, at Al. But see, e.g., Alan Wolfe, Only Connect,
NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 4, 1993, at 33, 36-37 (reviewing WILSON, supra note 75) (suggesting
that although James Wilson, as a social scientist, warns of the harmful effects of one-
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those choices and behaviors traced to the legacy of the
1960s-changes in mores concerning sexuality, greater diversity in
family forms, the increases in divorce, the greater acceptance of
pregnancy and parenting outside of marriage, and the availability
of abortion-suggests that the real targets of the irresponsibility
critique are such social changes. Developments in the area of
family law and recognition by the Warren and Burger Courts of
fundamental rights to make marital and reproductive (and some
would argue sexual) decisions also are implicated."2 In assessing
the irresponsibility critique, the critical questions are what messages are to be drawn from these legal developments and whether
certain legally protected choices are proxies for irresponsibility.124
C. The Rights Explosion and the Flight from Responsibility
Glendon and the new communitarians lament the increasing
tendency of Americans to express needs and wants in terms of
rights and to invoke rights talk, a tendency summed up by social
critics and popular media as "rights inflation" or a "rights explosion."' This component of the irresponsibility critique seems to
be directed at a supposed culture of rights, manifested in the frivolous or irresponsible assertion of rights. For example, people are
said to call for new rights without regard to the duties and obliga-

parent families, his attempt to root moral sentiments in nature would suggest that "[i]f
men are by nature irresponsible and women are by nature caring, then surely one-parent
families ought to be preferred over traditional ones"); Martha L. Fineman, Images of
Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE Li. 274 (criticizing the characterization in
poverty and divorce discourses of the single mother as pathological and challenging the
premise that a "natural" family has two parents). An analysis of the assumptions about
gender roles in the debate over family forms, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
123. See, e.g., GALSTON, supra note 5, at 269 (arguing that key U.S. Supreme Court
decisions on issues such as "school prayer, pornography, criminal justice, and abortion"
spurred the assault on traditional morality, "widened individual freedom," and called for
neutrality in areas "previously seen as the legitimate arena for collective moral judgment"). Another alleged legacy of the 1960s-as well as of the "greed decade" of the
1980s-is a range of business practices and unapologetic, irresponsible (and at times illegal) capitalistic pursuits that imposed social costs, such as plant closings, corporate takeovers and raids, insider trading, and the savings and loan scandal.
124. See infra subsection IV(B)(2).
125. See ETzIONI, supra note 2, at 6 (arguing that "[o]nce, rights were very solemn
moral/legal claims, ensconced in the Constitution and treated with much reverence," but
that today, people attempt to elevate every personal desire and special interest to the
status of a legal right and confuse privileges with rights). See infra note 128.
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tions that a right creates (e.g., asserting affirmative rights to health
care without considering the implications for the public fisc)." 6
Rather than creating more rights talk, which supposedly not only
shuts down debate and makes compromise difficult but also devalues rights, communitarians argue for a "return to a language of
social virtues, interests, and, above all, social responsibilities [that]
will reduce contentiousness and enhance social cooperation."127
The rights explosion frequently is said to be accompanied by a
corresponding plunge in Americans' sense of personal responsibility, manifest in the tendency to shift blame away from, or look for
causes outside of, oneself and to assume the mantle of the victim."2 To be sure, those who elaborate the victimhood critique
offer some startling and absurd (even laughable) examples, as well
as more disturbing and problematic illustrations, of rights assertion
coupled with the denial of personal responsibility." 9 It is unclear,
however, how this refusal to accept responsibility in the sense of
either autonomy or accountability is a legacy of the 1960s or is in
any way
due to the recognition and enforcement of legal
30
rights.

126. See id. at 5-6.
127. Id. at 6-7.
128. See John Taylor, Don't Blame Me! The New Culture of Victimization, NEW YORK
MAG., June 3, 1991, at 27, 29 (diagnosing the "inextricably linked concepts" of "victimization," whereby the principle of individual responsibility for one's actions is almost a
relic, and the growth of a "rights industry"); see also Jesse Birnbaum, Crybabies: Eternal
Victims, Hypersensitivity and Special Pleading Are Making a Travesty of the Virtues that
used to be Known as Individual Responsibility and Common Sense, TIME, Aug. 12, 1991,
at 16, 17 (reporting Taylor's thesis).
129. For examples in the absurd, or at least questionable. category, see Taylor, supra
note 128, at 32 (describing a lawsuit brought against a refrigerator manufacturer by people injured from, running races carrying refrigerators on their backs); Brent Staples, The
Rhetoric of Victimhood, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1994, § 4, at 14 (describing a lawsuit based
on strict liability brought by someone who lost a toe t6 a lawn mower "while cutting the
lawn recklessly uphill, in defiance of common sense and the owner's manual"). For an
example in the disturbing category, see id. at 14 (arguing that the defense of sexual
abuse and fear of harm offered by Lyle and Erik Menendez to the murder of their parents is "emblematic of the troubling American preference for taking on the role of the
victim," affording victims a "license" to kill).
130. The argument may simply be a further elaboration on the supposed significance
of having a Bill of Rights, but not a Bill of Duties, and of becoming unmoored from the
moral and legal constraints the Founders thought would ensure virtue and communitarians argue existed until the 1960s. See Sherry, supra note 16, at 15-25 (interpreting the
phenomena of blame shifting and claiming victim status as evidence that the "peculiarly
American" exaggerated focus on individual tights leads to "the loss of any notion of
responsibility," in contrast with republican notions of citizen virtue); supra text accompanying notes 46-53, 95-102, 111-15.
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More germane to the communitarian critique of the rights
explosion and the flight from responsibility is the contested legacy
of the War on Poverty and charges about the undermining effects
of liberal social welfare policies and entitlements on individual
responsibility. In contrast to liberal policies thought to vitiate such
basic values as personal responsibility, family cohesion, and the
work ethic, and thus to license irresponsibility,'31 communitarians

advocate welfare policies that combine compassion and a sense of
obligation to those in need with an insistence on individual and
community (rather than, at least initially, government) responsibility.132 The issue is not legal rights, conventionally understood, so
much as it is entitlement programs. This debate hinges critically on
one's assumptions about personal, institutional, and causal responsibility for poverty and its eradication. 33 Moreover, it is likely
that behind the charges of the rights explosion and flight from
responsibility lie philosophical and political divisions over the appropriate role of government in alleviating human suffering and
providing security against contingency," as well as disagreements
131. See GALSTON, supra note 5, at 159-62, 184-86; State of the Union, supra note 32
(statement of President Clinton faulting welfare policies that conflict with values of work,
family, and responsibility); cf. Samuel Scheffler, Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes, and
Liberalism in Philosophy and Politics, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 299, 314 (1992) (arguing
that the attack on political liberalism is due to a "perception that many of the programs
and policies advocated by liberals rest on a reduced conception of individual responsibility"). But see Stephen Holmes, The Gatekeeper, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 11, 1993, at 39,
42 (reviewing RAWIs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8) (suggesting a tension between Rawls's commitment to redistribution and social determinism and his apparent attempts to "make the poor responsible for their own behavior").
132. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 105 (arguing that liberal polities need "not only a
citizenry that is prepared to accept some responsibility for the less fortunate, but citizens
who are willing, so far as it is possible, to take responsibility for themselves and their
dependents"); see also ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 143-47. Glendon's favorable accounts of
European social welfare laws might suggest support for considerable government assumption of responsibility. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 98-108; see also infra note
135.
133. Compare CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND (1984) (arguing that the welfare
programs of the Great Society led to increased poverty and encouraged and rewarded a
range of irresponsible personal behaviors) with WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 16-18, 77-95 (1987) (rejecting Murray's analysis and attributing poverty in the
inner cities largely to systemic unemployment and other economic conditions, which in
turn affect personal behaviors).
134. See, e.g., Paul Magnusson & Owen Ullmann, The Second Year: Clinton Weaves a
Security Blanket for America, BUS. WEEK, Jan. 24, 1994, at 68, 70 (describing Clinton's
economic plan as designed to provide a security blanket and reporting criticism by conservative William Kristol that "It]his is emblematic of paternalistic liberalism, which does
not treat citizens as self-governing but as befuddled victims"); see also Taylor, supra note
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over whether such government assumption
of responsibility leads
135
irresponsibility.
individual
to or licenses
In sum, all three of the above components of the irresponsibility critique, understood as a social critique, provide an opportunity for reflecting on the current state of American society, but
they are unpersuasive as critiques of legal rights.
III. ASSESSING THE NEW COMMUNITARIANISM
AS A POLITICAL THEORY

A. The New Communitarianism:Liberalism Cured of Its Excesses
or "Soft Antiliberalism?"
Communitarianism, of course, is not a new political theory
and, in the past, it has served as a vantage point for a range of
critiques of liberalism. The new communitarianism eschews such
labels as liberal and conservative, or left and right, and offers itself
as a middle way between libertarianism and authoritarianism." 6
Communitarianism, we are told, rejects both an authoritarian imposition of one's moral positions on others and a libertarian belief
that "all will be well" if "individuals are left on their own to pursue their choices, rights, and self-interests."'37 The distinctiveness
128, at 29 (arguing that the twin phenomena of rights assertion and rejection of personal
responsibility reflect assumptions that individuals are not in control of their lives and that
personal misfortune or suffering must have an identifiable cause outside oneself that
could be controlled through social change).
135. As I understand the debate, it appears to touch on the intersection of responsibility as autonomy and as accountability. The argument seems to be that individuals, in
exercising their autonomy, fail to take responsibility for themselves yet are not held accountable for the consequences of their own choices because entitlement programs mitigate or ameliorate such irresponsibility. See Sherry, supra note 16, at 19-25; cf.
GLENDON, supra note 19, at 57, 136-37 (contrasting Western European social welfare
law, which takes for granted that "governments are responsible for public welfare," with
the reluctance in the United States to assume "public responsibility" for needy children
and public concern over whether social welfare and social assistance help the "truly
needy" or merely reward the irresponsible and undeserving).
136. ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 14-18. Etzioni's usage connotes "liberal" and "conservative" in the sense of American political parties and positions. He calls for a "new
social, philosophical, and political map," using the terms "Authoritarian,"
"Communitarian," and "Libertarian." Id. at 15-16.
137. Id. at 15. The Platform states that communitarians are "not majoritarian but
strongly democratic" due to their view that the experiment in ordered liberty depends
"not on fiat or force, but on building shared values, habits and practices" and on accepting policies because they are "recognized to be legitimate, rather than imposed." Platform, supra note 5, at 6. By favoring "strong democracy," they "seek to make government more representative, more participatory, and more responsive to all members of the
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of communitarianism, then, is its emphasis on attending to responsibility and on the role of community in shaping the moral behavior of free individuals. 38
In many ways, the new communitarianism simply calls atten-

tion to the failures of American society to realize liberal principles
and presuppositions about the requirements for a stable political

order. Most significantly, liberalism conceives of people as capable
of respecting and exercising not merely the rights but also the
duties of citizenship. 39 Indeed, in the ideal of citizenship that
Rawls posits, citizens are "normal and fully cooperating members
of society" who "want to be, and to be recognized as, such mem-

bers."' 40 Responsibility figures centrally in liberalism; both the

duties and rights of citizens assume forms of responsibility.'4 ' Al-

though rights talk supposedly impoverishes political life by encouraging the mere assertion of rights over reason giving, in fact, reason giving in political deliberation is the heart of the duty of civility and of the standards for a common public life. 42
Moreover, liberalism assumes that families and schools play
vital roles in providing children with moral education and in incul-

community" through, inter alia, curbing special interests, private money, and corruption in
government. Id. See generally BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY
POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 261 (1984) (espousing a model of strong democracy that

requires "unmediated self-government by an engaged citizenry" and calling for institutions
that would involve individuals at neighborhood and national levels in "common talk,
common decision-making and political judgment, and common action").
138.

ETzIONI, supra note 2, at 15; Platform, supra note 5, at 5.

139. See HOLMES supra note 8, at 228 ("Liberal rights are not opposed to duties or
obligations."); RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 18 (espousing a conception of the person as "someone who can . . . exercise and respect [social life's] various
rights and duties").
140.

RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 84.

141. This topic merits fuller treatment elsewhere. For an excellent discussion of responsibility in liberalism, see MACEDO, supra note 8. For some examples of responsibility
within Rawls's account of liberalism, see RAWVLS, THEORY, supra note 8, at 241 (describing the "principle of responsibility" with respect to knowing and obeying the law as following from the "principle of liberty"); id. at 389 ("To act autonomously and responsibly
a citizen must look to the political principles that underlie and guide the interpretation of
the [Clonstitution" in determining whether circumstances justify civil disobedience.);
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 33 (describing citizens as free because
they can "tak[e] responsibility for their ends").
142. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 176-77 (citing MACEDO, supra note 8, at 34, 41);
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 212-20 (analyzing the idea of public
reason, the duty of civility, and the ideal of democratic citizenship); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 20-27, 133-35 (1993) (discussing the commitment to political
deliberation and a republic of reasons).
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cating the capacities necessary to exercise the rights and fulfill the
duties of citizenship. 43 It recognizes that citizens are part of
many communities and associations and that the institutions of
civil society both play a vital role in the nurturing of citizens and
serve as an important
"fund" for public values such as justice and
cooperation." 4
Finally, liberalism is not hostile to the propositions that legal
rights do not exhaust the range of relationships among citizens and
that a society will not flourish if citizens do nothing more than
obey the law and act within their rights. 145 It is worth noting,
however, that the irresponsibility critique takes as a point of departure a claim that two core features of liberalism-an assumption that citizens obey the law (subject to a moral right and duty
of civil disobedience) and respect
the rights of others-are endan46
gered in American society.1
Nonetheless, the new communitarianism shows ambivalence
toward liberalism and seems to diagnose the extremes of rights
talk and the responsibility deficit as consequences of taking liberal
rights, principles, and virtues too far. Communitarian correctives
range from offering a new account of liberalism to apparently
repudiating liberalism. 47 Although not aimed specifically at

143. RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 8, at 516 ("[M]oral education is education for autonomy."); see also RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 199-200 (recommending "that children's education include such things as knowledge of their constitutional and civic rights ...[and] also prepare them to be fully cooperating members of
society and enable them to be self-supporting"). Although critical of Rawls's assumption
that families are just, Susan Okin notes that Rawls "treats the family seriously as the
earliest school of moral development." SUSAN M. OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE

FAMILY 17-23, 97-101 (1989) (citing RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 8, at 465). For a discussion of the proper role of schools in teaching the rights and responsibilities of citizenship and inculcating capacities for critical thought and deliberation, see Amy
Gutmann, Undemocratic Education, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE, supra note' 8,

at 71, 73-88.
144.

RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 14.

145. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REV. 479, 499-504
(1989) (articulating a model of "liberal community" in which citizens feel "integrated"
with their political community and link their own fate to the realization of justice in that
community). ,
146. See supra Section 11(A).
147. For the former, see GALSTON, supra note 5, at 3-21 (offering an account of a
"purposive liberalism" and rejecting the "neutrality thesis" said to underlie prevailing
accounts of liberalism). For the latter, see BELLAH ET AL., GOOD SOCIETY, supra note 5,
at 6 (noting the characterization of the debate over the best approach to contemporary
problems as being between "philosophical liberals" and "communitarians" and rejecting
philosophical liberalism if it reflects a belief that "all our problems can be solved by
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Glendon or the Responsive Communitarians, Stephen Holmes's
critique of American communitarianism as the most pervasive
contemporary form of "soft antiliberalism," with characteristic historical and theoretical fallacies, is helpful in assessing certain features of the new communitarianism.'"
For example, Holmes suggests that critics of liberalism often
contrast rights unfavorably with duties (or responsibilities), engaging in an ahistorical "antonym substitution" and ignoring that the
"original opposites of rights ... were tyranny, slavery, and cruelty."' 4 9 Communitarians acknowledge that rights, in such an historical context, were a good thing, avoiding the above fallacy.15
They argue, however, that there can be too much of a good thing
and that current American perceptions of freedom as unlimited
necessitates the corrective of reestablishing the link between rights
and responsibilities."' Similarly, the new communitarians voice

autonomous individuals, a market economy, and a procedural state"); see also PHILLIPS,
supra note 7, at 24-27 (noting support by communitarians such as Bellah and his associate William Sullivan (both Platform signatories) for classical republicanism).
148. See HOLMES, supra note 8, at 176. Holmes counts among American
communitarians Michael Sandel and Platform signatory Robert Bellah. Holmes's book
includes a chapter on Christopher Lasch. See id. at 122-40. Lasch's work is cited by
Glendon and in other communitarian literature. See, e.g., BELLAH ET AL., GOOD SOCIE'Y, supra note 5, at 6 n.8; GLENDON, supra note 1, at 173-74. The following features of
antiliberalism resemble themes of the new communitarianism: "the discourse of 'crisis'
and moral impoverishment," HOLMES, supra note 8, at 7; the insistence that human beings need roots and togetherness but that liberal society pulls them apart into atomized,
mobile, selfish, and rootless individuals; and the concern that there have been important
spiritual truths known to earlier times that have been obscured by philosophical error, id.
at 7-8. But see Alan Wolfe, Pressure Points, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 13, 1993, at 44, 45. 46
(reviewing HOLMES, supra note 8) (arguing that Holmes fails to establish that there is
"such a thing as antiliberalism" and that what he "dismisses as antiliberalism can also be
understood as an effort to adopt liberal principles to the specific dilemmas of late twentieth-century America").
149. HOLMES, supra note 8, at 253-55; see also Judith N. Shklar, The Liberalism of
Fear, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE, supra note 8, at 21, 23 (arguing that
"liberalism's deepest grounding" from the earliest defenses of toleration has been in the
conviction, "born in horror, that cruelty is an absolute evil").
150. See, e.g., GALSTON, supra note 5, at 12.
151. ETZiONI, supra note 2, at 3-10 (emphasis added); GLENDON, supra note 1, at
8-9. Holmes argues that antiliberals misleadingly juxtapose the purportedly liberal maxim,
"I can do whatever I want," with, "I shall do whatever morality requires," thus suggesting "nihilistic self-indulgence," rather than contrasting it with constraints on freedom imposed by rank or arbitrary authority. See HOLMES, supra note 8, at 254. In any event,
notwithstanding Glendon's report that some teenagers regard freedom as unlimited, see
supra text accompanying note 43, it is more likely that Americans would add a gloss, i.e.,
"consistent with respecting the rights of others." Indeed, Glendon herself reports that
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support for pluralism and toleration, but their call for raising the
moral voice of the community assumes that liberalism takes diversity and pluralism too seriously, resulting in the inability or unwillingness to make any moral distinctions or judgments about the
worth of different visions of the good life. 152 Thus, liberalism is
said to impoverish, and perhaps preclude, moral discourse.
Glendon's critique of American rights talk and call for a refined rhetoric of rights illustrates two of what Holmes calls the
"basic fallacies or theoretical failings characteristic of [communitarian antiliberalism]:" the "shifting target" of criticism and "theory
'
as therapy."153
First, Glendon "oscillate[s] between a criticism of
liberal theory and a criticism of liberal society." 54 On the one
hand, she claims that our liberal rights talk and theory deficiently
describe, indeed mask, most Americans' actual experiences of
connection with others and their vocabularies of rights and responsibilities. On the other hand, she asserts that liberal rights talk and
rhetoric all too accurately reflect, and in fact have contributed to,
the perilous decline in a sense of personal responsibility in American society. As Holmes suggests, however, conflating contemporary
society with liberal theory or portraying it as the inevitable outcome of a liberal regime of rights threatens to obscure the serious
criticisms that some liberals would make of contemporary society
precisely for its failure to realize liberal ideals.'55 As noted
above, some liberals argue that any contemporary responsibility
deficit is due in significant part to the failure of government to
realize the promise of legal and civil rights and to the failure of
society to embody ideals of equality, mutual respect, and justice."'
Second, Glendon offers "theory as therapy:" by adjusting the
message that our rights talk sends, she will put us in touch with
our traditions. Thus, Holmes notes, the communitarian theorist is
the therapist, not mere diagnostician but midwife as well.

adult Americans ranked "[b]eing free of obligations so I can do whatever I want to do"
at the bottom of the list of important personal values. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 105.
152. See infra text accompanying note 280. Calling for a return to republican virtue,
Suzanna Sherry reaches a similar conclusion. See Sherry, supra note 16, at 7-11, 13-15.
153. HOLMES, supra note 8, at 176, 181-83.
154. Id. at 181 (characterizing communitarian criticism in general).
155. Id. at 184.
156. See supra text accompanying note 120.
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Cognitive mistakes can have important behavioral consequences,
of course, and many of them are likely to be bad .... When

liberals impugn "the social," it seems, they not only misdescribe
human action but also allow the best part of life to wither on

the vine. By providing us with a new language, by redescribing
human existence accurately (as thoroughly dependent on a nourishing social milieu), communitarians can make it worthwhile
once again, or perhaps for the first time .

. .

. They will unearth

the hidden treasure, make explicit the implicit, and release the
warm human potential half-frozen beneath the ice of liberal ideology .... [The communitarian theorist] will rearticulate the

shared understanding that the rest of us have half-forgotten,
thereby abolishing loneliness and rendering our lives, again or at
last, joyfully communal. 57
Holmes's description of the communitarian as therapist seems to
fit quite well Glendon's twin focus on the phenomenon of
Americans' rights rhetoric belying and shutting them off from their
actual beliefs, experiences, and traditions, as well as on the potentially transformative nature of those traditions as hidden indigenous resources for refining the rhetoric of rights. Like Holmes, we
might question whether correcting theoretical errors will solve
social problems and express doubts whether supposed theoretical
errors of liberalism appreciably account for "the inner sickness of
American society."'58
B. Looking Backward to a Responsive Community?59
1. The Appeal to Tradition. In the new communitarian
appeal to tradition, communities of "mutual aid and memory," and
the Founders, there is a problematic inattention to the less attractive, unjust features of tradition. At the time of the Founding, the
class of Americans eligible for the rights, duties, and responsibilities of citizenship excluded many people: women, African men and
women in slavery, and unpropertied white men. Furthermore,
Glendon looks to women's traditional roles and special experiences

157. HOLMES, supra note 8, at 182-83.

158. Id. at 184. Granted, Glendon and her compatriots in the Responsive Community
movement do want to go beyond theory as therapy and to effect social change through
new social policies and, when appropriate, new laws.
159. The allusion is to Derek Phillips's book, Looking Backward, see PHILLIPS, supra
note 7, which takes its title from the famous utopian novel by Edward Bellamy.
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as moral educators and caretakers as a corrective to rights
talk,' 60 yet makes no mention of the role of tradition and law in
enforcing those special responsibilities (or "natural" duties) or of
the law's invocation of them to justify excluding women from the
rights, duties, and responsibilities of citizenship. 6 t Similarly, the
communitarian contrast of the moral consensus of the 1950s with
the alleged contemporary absence of consensus fails to consider
seriously whether such a consenstjs was severable from such features of the 1950s as suppression of dissent (McCarthyism), intolerance, bigotry, racism, sexism, and the like. To be fair, some
communitarians do appear to recognize the need for careful evaluation of what was good and bad about tradition and the possibility
of severing certain features of it from others. 62 At the same
time, acknowledging the discriminatory components of tradition
does not prevent other communitarians from lamenting its passing
and contrasting it favorably with the present cultural drift. 63
Inevitably, appeals to a more moral American past must confront questions about the relationship between, on the one hand,
the desired characteristics of virtue, values, and an assumed moral
160. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 174.
161. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 59-65 (1961) (holding it permissible for a
state to relieve women from jury duty because of their "special responsibilities" as the
"center[s] of home and family life"); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 289-90 (1947) (noting the "universal practice" of permitting only men to sit on juries and finding that the
idea that women should serve on juries is based not on the Constitution but on a
"changing view of the rights and responsibilities of women in our public life"); Bradwell
v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 140-42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (concluding
that, "in view of the peculiar characteristics, destiny, and mission of woman," it is not
unconstitutional for the legislature to conclude that only men, and not women, may be
attorneys). Similarly, Glendon invokes the values of relational feminism but does not
ponder what Carol Gilligan has called the problematic expectation of a self-sacrificing
female form of care. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 174; see also GILLIGAN, supra note

72, at 74-75, 149, 166; McClain, supra note 9, at 1194-98. But see GLENDON, supra note
1, at 127 ("[F]ew would care to call in question ... improvements in the educational
and economic position of women.").
162. See supra text accompanying note 112 and note 115; see also Amitai Etzioni, The
Limits of Reconstnction, NAT'L REV., Mar. 15, 1993, at 56, 57 (reviewing THE LOSS OF
VIRTUE: MORAL CONFUSION AND SOCIAL DISORDER IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA (Digby

Anderson ed., 1992)) (describing communitarian attention to severability and cautioning
about glorifying the past in this way).
163. See GALSTON, supra note 5, at 273; supra text accompanying note 116. Galston
advocates a "functional traditionalism" to ameliorate "the cultural cleavages of the past
generation," whereby public policy would endorse and sustain aspects of tradition (such
as "the intact two-parent family" or a moment of silence in public schools) if there are
"reasonable public arguments"-rather than an appeal solely to religious convictions-for
such traditions. GALSToN, supra note 5, at 280-88.
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consensus and, on the other, the glaring problems of injustice, inequality, and exclusion.'" It seems fair to ask whether the
communitarians draw the correct conclusions as to "what is to be
learned by looking backward."'65 Challenging communitarian
portraits of American history, Derek Phillips argues both that
communitarian portraits of bygone consensus and solidarity are a
"myth of fundamentalism" unsupported by history and that the
constant features of a politics of the common good have been aristocracy, inequalities of wealth and political rights, and the exclusion, subordination, and exploitation of the many for the benefit of
the few. 166 If the communitarians are wrong on their history, little is left of their appeal to return to bygone traditions.
2. The Appeal to Community. The new communitarians also
give insufficient attention to the meaning of community, its relationship to the state, and the role of authority and coercion in a
communitarian society. A central feature of communitarian discontent with liberalism is its alleged lack of an adequate vision of
community. Although "communitarians invest this word with redemptive significance," what we need to know is: "[W]hat is community? What does it look like? What are its problems?"' 67
The image of community that emerges from communitarian
literature is in the first instance a geographical community, wherein members agree on values, hold each other to such values, and
exhort each other to fulfill duties and responsibilities. 168 Etzioni
analogizes such communities to traditional small towns and villages
but suggests that such a model also is achievable in suburban and,
164. The literature on the revival of civic republicanism explores this issue. See, e.g.,
Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 801,
821 & n.55 (1993) (noting the exclusion of women and the poor from full membership in
society and arguing that "all their talk of virtue did not make the classical republicans
virtuous").
165. PHILLIPS, supra note 7, at 195 (concluding that, "[i]f those were the good times,
Lord protect us against the bad").
166. See id. at 149-74. Phillips also argues that heavy reliance on Tocqueville, rather
than contemporary social history, leads to these problems. See id. at 61-80.
167. HOLMES, supra note 8, at 177. Holmes argues, "When we hear [the word community], all our critical faculties are meant to fall asleep." Id.
168. See PHILLIPS, supra note 7, at 14 (defining community, as it appears in the
communitarian writing of Robert Bellah and his associates, Michael Sandel, Alasdair

MacIntyre, and Charles Taylor as "a group of people who live in a common territory,
have a common history and shared values, participate together in various activities, and
have a high degree of solidarity").
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to a lesser extent, urban areas. 69 Yet contemporary communities,
he argues, while maintaining social bonds, should differ from traditional
communities in permitting greater heterogeneity and diversi0
17

ty.

The new communitarians conceive of the units of society as
ever-larger communities, culminating in the United States as a
community of communities.' 7' As liberals such as Isaiah Berlin
and John Rawls remind us, however, government involves coercive
power. 172 Although the communitarians insist that much of their
program does not involve government or law, they propose to use
law and public policy to help repair the social fabric, to make
some "social" responsibilities legally enforceable, and to signal
values that they hold dear. 73
It is appropriate to wonder whether the communitarian agenda inevitably will result in government encouragement, if not enforcement, of communitarian shared values and responsibilities. 74
Moreover, although communitarians say that they prefer the law's
exhortative force to coercion, I argue below that communitarians
do not wholly eschew curtailing rights and enforcing responsibilities coercively when the perceived costs of not doing so are sufficiently high.
Finally, it is not entirely clear how a communitarian society
would blend community suasion and government persuasion concerning responsibilities with a commitment to protecting legal
rights. Communitarians themselves appear to acknowledge that

169. See ETzIONI, supra note 2, at 116-21; id. at 127-30 (offering proposals for "procommunity" architecture and planning).
170. See id. at 116-22 (distinguishing "Gemeinschaft" (what Etzioni calls "community")
and "Gesellschaft" (what he calls "society") and suggesting the need for a "new
gemeinschaft" that is neither hierarchical nor oppressive). Etzioni acknowledges that there
can be nongeographical communities that, although perhaps less stable and deep-rooted,
may fulfill some of the social and moral functions of traditional communities. See id. at
121-22.
171. See id. at 147-60; Platform, supra note 5, at 4.
172.

See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118,

121-22 (1969); RALS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 136, 216-17; see also
GALSTON, supra note 5, at 296 (suggesting that liberal theory is "preoccupied with the
threat of moral coercion").
173. See supra text accompanying notes 77-80.
174. Cf. Gey, supra note 164, at 820-21 (arguing that, in civic republican theory, the
community is "not simply a benign force that merely advises its members on their
thoughts and behavior" but also has "enforcement mechanisms that include the ultimate
resort to force").
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community suasion may become coercion or a threat to individu-

als.' 75 Moreover, communitarians have not given satisfactory ac-

counts of the relationship between individuals and the various
institutions of civil society at the heart of the Responsive Communitarian agenda. In political liberalism, individuals do not shed
their rights as citizens through membership in the institutions of
civil society, such as the family and religious organizations. 76
How would responsive communities protect individuals in the face
of expressed community or institutional needs or interests? 177 We
need to hear fuller answers from
the new communitarians to such
78
questions about community.1

3. Communitarian Virtues and Liberal Virtues: The Withering
Away of the State? Communitarians propose that we require a set
of shared "social virtues"-basic settled values-for a community
to endorse and affirm in order to indicate what conduct is "viewed
as beyond the pale.' ' 179 What is the relationship between those
virtues and liberal virtues (such as self-control, self-criticism, reason giving, and toleration)?"8 Are the shared social virtues that
the communitarians emphasize also political values, or would adherence to social virtues render a polity itself increasingly unnecessary? Although the Platform imagines an initial process of agreement on values, it does not emphasize a clear role for ongoing
deliberation about the common good or for the liberal virtues of
reason giving and critical reflection.'
175. Beyond the Pale?, 3 RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Fall 1993, at 66, 66 (reproducing
both an example of Operation Rescue's "NOT WANTED In Our Community" posters,
which feature the pictures and addresses of physicians who perform abortions, and an
example of a flyer with a picture of opponents of legal abortion used by pro-choice
organizations and asking: "When does a community's expression of moral disapproval
become an unacceptable threat to individuals? Are such tactics head-hunting or an expression of community outrage?"); see also ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 25 (anticipating that
"we will ...rebel if we feel we are pushed too far, by moral claims or a choir of our
peers").
176. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 221 n.8.
177. See Barton, supra note 36, at 812 (expressing fear that Glendon's weaker version
of rights might not suffice in light of the "ineluctable tension between the preservation of
authority" in such institutions and the "fair treatment of individuals").
178.

One possible source is an anticipated book. See COMMUNITARIAN THINKING:

NEW ESSAYS (working title) (Amitai Etzioni ed., forthcoming 1994-1995).
179. See, e.g., ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 24-25.
180. See MACEDO, supra note 8, at 265-77.
181. ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 19-20; see also supra text accompanying note 142.
Granted, the communitarians do imagine ongoing deliberation over more contested values.
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The communitarian program is somewhat ambivalent with
respect to the value it attaches to government and the role that
government should play in a communitarian social order. It is not
clear to what extent the life of a citizen in a responsive community is a political life, or whether and how the good citizen is different from the good neighbor. A responsible citizen, the Platform
asserts, is involved in community but need not be active in the
polity.1' 2 Notwithstanding communitarian calls for a richer political life and for national policies, at times it seems that the primary
goal is less civic virtue and the robust political life lived in the
public square, extolled by the classical republicans (to the detriment of the hearth), than a renewed "thick" civil society in which
small-town, neighborly virtues and a "culture of familialism" flourish. Thus, it is not clear whether the more appropriate
communitarian image is sharing table talk at grandmother's house
1
or deliberating about political issues at a town meeting. 8
Moreover, the communitarians believe that nongovernment
associations could solve many current social problems. In this
context, self-government would appear to mean a reduction in
government: the greater the sense of personal responsibility and
the stronger the bonds of civil society, the less the need for government (especially national government) to assume responsibility.Y An implication of this approach is that the attainment of
responsive communities would result in the withering away of the
state.

See ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 25.

182. Platform, supra note 5, at 12.
183. I use the gender reference because Glendon emphasizes the role of women as
purveyors of table talk and moral traditions. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 174-75. For
communitarian praise of the town meeting, see BELLAH ET AL., HABITS, supra note 5, at
168-85, 200-06.
184. This seemed to be a clear message of the 1992 Republican National Convention
and the rhetoric of family values. See Hatch, supra note 48, at 960 ("If citizens can behave themselves and make do for themselves, they need little government; if they cannot,
they need a great deal of government.") (quoting FORREST MCDONALD & ELLEN MCDONALD, REQUIEM 10 (1988)). Milder versions of this causal argument may be found in
communitarian literature; for example, that it is the failure of families to provide moral
education that requires the government to assume responsibility. See ETZIONI, supra note
2, at 92; see also id. at 134-47 (tracing the rise in goyernment involvement to the decline
in services provided by families and other associations and advocating ways that communities can engage in self-help without involving the government).
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4. Assessing Responsibility and Problems of Moral Conflict
and Pluralism. The Responsive Communitarians give inadequate
attention to issues of moral conflict, moral complexity, and pluralism. Communitarians claim to accept pluralism and diversity, but
they understate the significance, for example, of "reasonable pluralism" as a fact of contemporary life that reflects people's free
exercise of their moral powers."8 A key assumption of the new
communitarianism is the ability to identify, out of divergent moral
positions, a set of values that we all share and to use "the moral
voice of the community" to move people to rightness, signaling
disapproval when individuals fall short of meeting their responsibilities to the community.'86
To be sure, the communitarians are probably correct that
deliberation would yield some shared personal and political. values.
Indeed, an assumption that it is possible to reach agreement on
many fundamental political matters and basic questions of justice
notwithstanding pluralism undergirds prominent accounts of liberalism. 87 Although the communitarians say that modem communities will be diverse rather than homogenous, a crucial question
remains about the extent to which communitarian social virtues
depend on uniformity in "lifestyle choices."
There is sharp disagreement over both the desirability and the
meaning of certain values that communitarians assert we
share-for example, pluralism, tolerance, and abhorrence of discrimination-and whether and how public institutions, such as
schools, should inculcate them."8 Communitarians want to reinvigorate moral discourse about moral values or conceptions of the

185. RAWLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 37, 144.

186. Platform, supra note 5, at 6.
187. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 3-11; see SUNSTEIN, supra note

142, at 137.
188. See supra text accompanying note 83; Gutmann, supra note 143; Nomi M.
Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle that Shut Me Out'" Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the
Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581 (1993); Stephen Macedo, Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls, 105

ETHICS (forthcoming 1995). For example, Galston argues that parents may need "bulwarks against the corrosive influence of modernist skepticism" in public education to protect the right to live an unexamined life. See GALSTON, supra note 5, at 254-55. Sherry
counters that Galston exalts rights "at the expense of virtue" and argues that "[i]f we
leave our own lives unexamined, we cannot presume to take part in the governance of
others." Sherry, supra note 9, at 81.
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good life without raising fears of authoritarianism and intolerance
but offer no evidence that a deep or broad consensus is possible.
Indeed, communitarians acknowledge that there will be controversial areas and the communitarian silence to date concerning an approach to two of the most divisive contemporary social and political issues-abortion and civil rights for gays and lesbians-suggests
the difficulty of reaching agreement on such issues.8 9
Similar concerns attend the communitarian appeal to use the
moral voice of the community to exhort people to meet their
responsibilities. Responsibility, it is claimed, originates in community. There is an implicit certitude about what the responsible choice
is and a striking lack of attention to the problems of conflicting
responsibilities and values, particularly for people who are members of many communities and who find themselves pulled by
conflicting obligations. 9 ' Moreover, the particularity with which
some communitarians are willing to spell out what responsibility
requires and what fosters community seems to replace the role of
personal autonomy, of taking responsibility for one's own conception of the good life, with accountability to the prescriptions of the
community. They move from uncontroversial general values to

189. See Keith Henderson, Advocate for a Community Ethos, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Apr. 19, 1993, at 13 (quoting Etzioni as saying that he sees little chance of resolving the abortion controversy and that "it's not an issue I spend a lot of time with"). But
see infra subsection IV(C)(1) (discussing Glendon's stance on abortion). Further, several
of the initial signatories of the Platform signed "with exception to" certain of its sections.
See Platform, supra note 5, at 18-19. Although not expressly identified as a communitarian stance on toleration and homosexuality, The Responsive Community has published
material related to the issue of homosexuality that suggests a somewhat ambivalent
stance. See John Gray, The Failings of Neutrality, 3 RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Spring
1993, at 21, 24-25 (arguing for a policy of "a peaceful modus vivendi" form of toleration.
"in which homosexuals have the same personal and civil liberties as heterosexuals and in
which neither bears burdens the other does not," but which "would not mandate ...
wholesale reconstruction of institutional arrangements" (e.g., family and marriage) under a
principle of "radical equality").
190. For example, Thomas Nagel identifies the "fragmentation of value" as an inescapable part of contemporary ethical decisionmaking. See THOMAS NAGEL, The Fragmen.
tation of Value, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 128 (1979). Human beings, he argues, are subject
to many different claims. Some arise out of obligations to other people or institutions
based on one's relationships to others. Others arise from the constraints imposed by the
general rights of other persons. Still other sources of value that Nagel identifies include
utility (that is, the effects of what one does on everyone's welfare), perfectionist ends or
values, and the value of commitment to one's own projects or undertakings. See id. at
128-31. There can be, he argues, no simple metric, no index, no general rules as to
which moral and motivational claims take precedence. What we turn to, after the process
of practical justification, is judgment and practical wisdom. Id. at 131-35.
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highly contested specific values. Their prescriptions are at times
perfectly sensible, at times somewhat trite, and at times (at least
for some people) intrusive and inappropriate.'91
Finally, the repeated appeals to a settlement on values that
we all share and to the community's voice suggest a static model
of community and individual identity. In contrast, a more fluid and
dynamic model imagines a self capable of assessing and revising
particular attachments and convictions by making ongoing judgments about their value.'" Such a liberal view of the self recognizes the value of community but also recognizes that people may
wish or need not only to enter but also to exit communities, relationships, and associations, particularly if they come to view them
as undesirable, dangerous, or unhealthy. 3
In sum, the new communitarianism could be seen as a form of
soft antiliberalism, as an attempt to save liberalism from its supposed excesses, or as an indictment of contemporary society for its
divergence from liberal ideals. On any reading, however, the alternative political theory that the new communitarianism proffers is
neither internally consistent nor wholly satisfying on such issues as
the relationship between community and polity, the possibility of
consensus on values and responsibility, the role of law in achieving
a communitarian moral revival, and the role of rights in responsive
communities. I explore such issues further in the next Part by as-

191. To be sure, Etzioni's book is written in the manner of a manifesto and is somewhat colloquial or casual in its tone. With all due respect, some of the examples he
offers of what does and does not foster moral voices and community are trite. For example, he tells us that "a onetime evening of folk dancing at the local church is not nearly
as socially constructive as a folk dance group that meets every week" and that dating
services or singles parties are less "socially constructive" than groups serving "a
Communitarian purpose," like running crime watches or soup kitchens. ETZIoNI, supra
note 2, at 125. For a less innocuous prescription raising questions as to communitarian
acceptance of diversity, consider Etzioni's chapter on "The Communitarian Family," in
which he gives high praise to marriage as personally and socially beneficial and makes no
mention of same-sex relationships or families. See id. at 54-88. He concludes, "We [the
moral voice of the community] do not mean to ostracize those who remain single as
'aging bachelors' and 'spinsters' . . . . But we poorly serve the community, and the many

persons involved, if we fail to communicate that together is better for most people, most
of the time." Id. at 88.
192. KYMLICKA, supra note 8, at 48-52, 61.
193. Id. at 57-61; see also Nancy Rosenblum, Pluralism and Self-Defense, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE, supra note 8, at 207, 220-23 (interpreting liberal pluralism as
offering notions of personal movement and shifting involvements as defenses (particularly
for women) against absorption in a single role or sphere); cf McClain, supra note 9, at
1187-88 (discussing feminist cautions against the uncritical embrace of community).
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sessing the irresponsibility critique as a jurisprudential critique of
rights.

IV. ASSESSING THE

IRRESPONSIBILITY CRITIQUE
AS A JURISPRUDENTIAL CRITIQUE

'The new communitarian discontent with rights targets not only
a supposed rights culture, in which general notions of entitlement
exist without acceptance of responsibility, but also a rights talk
inattentive to the responsibilities that should attach to particular
rights. On one reading, the irresponsibility critique merely points
out and seeks to correct some erroneous inferences drawn from
certain features of legal rights, which I call immunity and wrongness. So read, the critique says little about rights themselves. On
another reading, the new communitarians' discontent with the costs
of rights-linked to immunity and wrongness-and their impulse to
link rights to responsibilities seem to reach deeper, to attack rights
themselves. We therefore must consider how the new communitarians understand rights and their purposes and what sorts of rights
they would defend.
A crucial issue in this regard is the different ways in which
rights implicate responsibility and irresponsibility and the interplay
of notions of responsibility as accountability and as autonomy. A
prominent liberal justification for rights, which I defend, is that responsibility, understood as the opportunity to exercise one's moral
and intellectual capacities, requires individual freedom. On this
account, "loss of the opportunity to develop and exercise moral
responsibility, to take responsibility for and act on one's life plan,
is a casualty, or cost, of not protecting individual freedom. In this
context, responsibility is understood as autonomy. Although protecting responsibility as autonomy may entail some irresponsible
decisions, this conception considers it a more serious cost to move
the locus of such responsibility from the individual to the community or state.
In this Part, I argue that the jurisprudential underpinnings of
the irresponsibility critique of rights and the communitarian agenda
of linking rights and responsibilities are flawed. The irresponsibility
critique mischaracterizes liberal conceptions of rights. I also argue
that such liberal conceptions are not devoid of notions of accountability and that an important issue that the irresponsibility critique
highlights is the tension between pursuing the goal of responsibility
as accountability and protecting responsibility as autonomy.
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A. The Immunity Critique
The immunity strand of the irresponsibility critique of rights
addresses both certain features of legal rights and their assumed
social messages. The new communitarians understand legal rights
to provide protection against legal coercion, preserving a zone of
noninterference or immunity: "Rights give reasons to others not to
coercively interfere with the [right-holder] in the performance of
protected acts."'

94

A consequence is that legal rights may include

the freedom to engage in "morally inappropriate," irresponsible, or
even socially harmful conduct without legal accountability." The
social message that people are said to infer from immunity is that
they have a right to be insulated from the moral claims or moral
scrutiny of others. 95 Although immunity creates social costs, the

irresponsibility critique appears to accept immunity as a feature of
legal rights. At the same time, communitarians express discontent
with rights talk for its alleged inattention to the social costs of
rights and for its message that rights are absolutes, to be enforced
no matter what their consequences.
1. Rights, Immunity, and Harm. The irresponsibility critique
posits that legal rights permit individual irresponsibility and impose
costs on society. I have shown that -iotions of social cost and harm
feature centrally in the new communitarians' condemnation of
irresponsibility but that much of what communitarians include
within their condemnation has little if any connection to actual
rights. 7 To the extent that the critique addresses legal rights, it
does not categorically reject rights because of the legal immunity

194. Platform, supra note 5, at 14.
195. Id. In elaborating the Platform tenet, "Rights vs. Rightness," Etzioni explains:
Scalia argues . . . that we must realize that a willingness to fight for the complete freedom of speech does not condone hateful speech, but rather that "we

are willing to fight and die for your freedom to be irresponsibleand even socially harmful because the alternative would sweep away too much good speech
along with the bad."
ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 201 (quoting Antonin Scalia, Law, Liberty and Civic Responsibility, in RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 20, at 3, 4). Compare

Justice
claims
text.
196.
strand
197.

Scalia's stance on the message sent by First Amendment protection with that he
is sent by abortion decriminalization. See infra notes 306-08 and accompanying
I address the social message of "noninsulation" when I discuss the wrongness
of the irresponsibility critique. See infra Section IV(B).
See supra Sections II(A)-(B).
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they afford. Yet in calling for a rhetoric of rights that is attentive
to their social costs, it does suggest some ambivalence about such
immunity. In any event, the critique vigorously rejects any leap
from legal immunity to social unaccountability. In assessing the
immunity critique, we should ask whether legal rights in fact immunize right-holders from liability for imposing social costs or
harms on others.
Wesley Hohfeld's classic account of rights provides a helpful
point of departure. Hohfeld argued that legal rights are usefully
understood in terms of several possible pairs of jural relationships
or correlatives.'

Of particular interest with respect to the immu-

nity critique are the first two pairs: right/duty and privilege/no
right. In the first pair (for Hohfeld, the only technically proper
usage of the term "right"), my right or claim to X or to do X
correlates with your duty either to provide me with X or not to
interfere with my doing X.199 Although not all legal rights entail
legal duties on the part of others, and vice versa, the "logical
correlation" of legal rights and legal duties, at least with respect to
rights having the structure of "claim-rights," seems "logically unassailable."2" In Hohfeld's second pair of jural relationships, privilege/no right, my privilege or liberty to do X correlates with your
having no right to require that I do otherwise nor any legal claim
against me regarding my privileged action (or inaction).0 1
Individual rights against government interference or the constitutional rights often used as examples in the irresponsibility critique might be understood as taking the form of Hohfeld's first
pair: an individual right to do or not do X and a government duty
not to interfere with that right. Arguably, one could also regard
constitutional rights as captured by Hohfeld's second pair: an individual liberty to do or not do X and no right or authority for
government to interfere.2" In either account, there is a realm of
activity or inactivity that is immune from legal interference or

198. See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L. 16, 28-30 (1913). For a recent article discussing the influence of Hohfeld's approach and proposing an alternative, see Morris, supra note 3.
199. Hohfeld, supra note 198, at 30-32.
200. See FEINBERG, supra note 109, at 62.
201. See Hohfeld, supra note 198, at 32-44.
202. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 GA.
L. REV. 343, 344 n.4 (1993) (arguing that individual rights against the government could
equally be expressed by either of these pairs).
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sanctioii, or at least from any claim of right that one perform or
refrain from activity. 3
Some scholars argue that in Hohfeld's account a legal right is
a right to do nonremediable harm to others. J.M. Balkin writes,
"Hohfeld's basic idea [is] that a legal right is a privilege to inflict
harm that is either not legally cognizable or is otherwise without

legal remedy."2" Similarly, Joseph Singer contends that the significance of Hohfeld's analysis was that it demonstrated the limits

of the then-prevailing justification for legal rights: John Stuart
Mill's harm principle 'and the distinction between self-regarding
and other-regarding acts. 0 5 In other words, Hohfeld's analysis
brought to the fore the notion that legal rights and liberties protect not merely self-regarding acts but also conduct that is harmful
to others. Although one could counter that some notion of harm
nonetheless does serve as a limiting principle in a regime of rights
and that not all rights impose harms, the point these scholars
illuminate is that a consequence of the immunity that legal rights
afford may be the imposition of noncompensable harms or costs
on others.2 °6
The new communitarians do not propose to expand the definition of harm to justify interfering coercively with all activities that
impose costs, yet harm does serve as a justification for constraining
203. With respect to the communitarian project of laying moral claims on right-holders, there may be many activities that I' have a right to do, or may be at liberty to do
because they are not prohibited by law, and other citizens may have either a duty not to
interfere with my doing them or no legal right that I not do them.
204. J.M. Balkin, The Hohfeldian Approach to Law and Semiotics, 44 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1119, 1129 (1990).
205. See Joseph W. Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudencefrom
Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 975, 1056-67. Mill's "principle" is as follows:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection .... [T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 10-11 (David Spitz ed., 1975) (footnotes omitted).
206. The most familiar limitation in laypersons' understandings of rights is probably
the competing rights of others. For a discussion of this and other limits on rights as
trumps, see infra subsection IV(A)(2)(a). There is an extensive literature on the allocation and enforcement of legal rights or, more broadly, entitlements, that addresses such
issues as the extent to which people may violate the rights of others and various remedies for such violations. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089
(1972); Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE
L.J. 1335 (1986).
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certain rights. As the Platform suggests, freedom of speech is the
paradigm example of a right that, although it imposes social costs
and individual harm, nevertheless warrants legal protection. 2w In
contrast, in areas of public health and safety, including measures
to prevent disease and crime, communitarians reject "absolutist"
assertions of rights and feature notions of harm and costs centrally.2"s With its imagery of social environments and ecosystems, the
irresponsibility critique assumes that a wide range of individual
choices have social costs, both for the public fisc and for the social
fabric. Thus, for example, the communitarians stress the social
costs of divorce, single-parent families, and deficient parenting, and
advocate a family policy that uses a range of facilitative, persuasive, and coercive measures to encourage or impose parental, institutional, and governmental responsibility.2°
Thus, although the communitarians accept legal immunity as a
feature of some legal rights, they urge a general principle of social
accountability for the exercise of rights and argue that legal immunity should not insulate right-holders from public persuasion. 210 It
is unethical, socially irresponsible, and intolerable, communitarians

207. See Platform, supra note 5, at 13-14 (stating that "[s]uggestions that [the First
Amendment] should be curbed to bar verbal expressions of racism, sexism, and other
slurs seem to us to endanger the essence of the First Amendment, which is most needed
when what some people say is disconcerting to some others"). Communitarians favor
nonlegal remedies to educate and promote tolerance. See ETZIONI, supra note 2, at
192-206; Platform, supra note 5, at 13-14.
208. See ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 11, 163-91 (advocating making adjustments to, or
"notching," rights in light of "new responsibilities"); Platform, supra note 5, at 15-16
(indicating support for sobriety checkpoints, antiloitering laws, drug testing, and civil
disarmament and invoking the "American moral and legal tradition" of balancing individual (in this case, Fourth Amendment) rights with public protection).
209. See ELSHTAiN ET AL., supra note 88, at 14-15 (detailing proposals that, for example, call for attention to "cultural values" of "excessive careerism or acquisitiveness"
that detract from child care and advocating a "children first" principle for divorce law to
"slow the rush to divorce"). Mill recognized a relevant limiting principle: otherwise selfregarding behavior became other-regarding if it ultimately implicated the public fisc or
placed demands on society when individuals failed at moral duties and obligations, particularly duties to children. See MILL, supra note 205, at 73-76, 90-91.
210. See GALSTON, supra note 5, at 281; cf. R. Bruce Douglass & Gerald M. Mara,
The Search for a Defensible Good, in LIBERALISM AND THE GOOD 253, 276 (R. Bruce
Douglass et al. eds., 1990) (advocating some balance between accountability and tolera-

tion because, "[w]hen people get into the habit of conceiving of the more consequential
decisions they make about the conduct of their lives as nothing but personal, it is all too
easy . . . to lose sight . . . of the inescapable difference that it makes, to everyone affected . . . how well such decisions are made").
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hold, not to take moral and social responsibilities into account in
exercising one's rights.
A comparison with Mill's delineation of the respective spheres
of individual freedom and legitimate government interference is
instructive on this point.211 Mill argued that an individual is not
accountable to society for actions concerning only himself (when
there was no harm to others), but "for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable, and
may be subjected either to social or to legal punishment, if society
[deems] that the one or the other is requisite for its protection., 212 Yet wvithin the realm of unaccountability, Mill granted
that society could use a range of measures, such as "[a]dvice,
instruction, persuasion, and avoidance," to signal disapproval of
individual acti6n or to attempt to influence such action.213
In this regard, the communitarians seem to reject Mill's nomenclature of a realm of unaccountability because of the social
message of insulation that it might foster. In any event, they argue
for a narrower understanding of such a realm because the interdependency of contemporary society increases the instances in which
the exercise of freedom imposes costs or harms on others.2 4
Nevertheless, they might find in Mill (and, indeed, in other liberal
defenders of individual freedom) support for their argument that a
right bestowing legal immunity does not immunize persons from
the moral scrutiny or moral claims of others. At the same time,
the communitarian quest to link rights and responsibilities poses

211. See MILL, supra note 205, at 10-11, 87. The irresponsibility critique often focuses
on constitutional rights and individual liberties, areas similar to the trilogy of freedoms-of thought, of action, and of association-that Mill addressed. Id. at 13-14.
212. Id. at 87.
213. Id. at 11, 70-74, 87.
214. See ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 7-8 (rejecting libertarian challenges to seatbelt and
motorcycle helmet laws and noting that "reckless individuals ...do not absorb many of
the consequences of their acts"). For a discussion of the social costs rendering untenable
assertions of Mill's distinction in challenges to seatbelt and motorcycle helmet laws, see
Picou v. Gillum, 874 F.2d 1519, 1522 (11th Cir.) (rejecting the invocation of the right to

privacy and of Mill's harm principle in upholding a helmet law and observing that such a
law prevents the imposition of costs on others), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 920 (1989); People
v. Kohrig, 498 N.E.2d 1158, 1164-66 (Ill. 1986) (upholding a seatbelt law because the
legislature could have rationally determined that the law would protect people other than
belt wearers and that it would reduce public costs that result from accidents); cf.
DWORKIN, supra note 12, at 261 (discussing the scope of Mill's principle and mentioning
the motorcycle helmet example as one of the "rare occasions when a government is
asked to prohibit some act on the sole ground that the act is dangerous to the actor").
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important questions concerning when persuasive measures rise to
the level of social tyranny, coercion, or social punishment of the
sort that Mill feared and criticized as a threat to individual liber215

ty.

2. Rights as Trumps. In the context of constitutional rights,
Ronald Dworkin has advanced a conception of rights as trumps
that grows out of the liberal tradition of which Mill's On Liberty
is an exemplar. Dworkin's conception, or at any rate his metaphor,
of rights as trumps has provoked the ire of the new communitarians because it supposedly illustrates how rights are out of balance
with responsibility. Communitarians charge that thinking of rights
as trumps leads to disregard of any responsibilities to society and
the social costs of conduct, to a shutting down of -debate and of
any attention to questions of society's interests, and even to an
attitude of excessive self-indulgence.216
The new communitarians' critique of the notion of rights as
trumps as contributing to the problem of irresponsibility goes
beyond the rhetoric of rights talk to the underlying conception of
what a right is. The communitarians' alternative conception of
rights is unclear. At bottom, the objection to rights as trumps
seems to be that this notion has spread from an account of certain
fundamental constitutional rights to an ubiquitous conception of
legal rights and thus to a proliferation of rights talk, and that
rights talk has ended all debate or thwarted all moderation of
claims by exalting individual desires over any social ends.217 As
the following discussion illustrates, the communitarian attack on
the idea of rights as trumps ignores important limitations on that
notion already developed in liberal theory. The attack reflects a
deep discontent with immunity, yet does not offer a clear picture
of how social costs should affect the protection of rights.

215. See MILL, supra note 205, at 5-6, 14-15, 62-63; see also supra text accompanying
note 175.
216.

See, e.g., ETzIONI, supra note 2, at 7-8; GLENDON, supra note 1, at 8, 40; cf.

WILSON, supra note 75, at 250 ("Believing that individuals are. everything, rights are
trumps, and morality is relative to time and place, [Enlightenment] thinkers have been
led to design laws, practices, and institutions that leave nothing between the state and
the individual save choices, contracts, and entitlements.").
217. See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 1, at x-xi (criticizing the proliferation of rights
talk as promoting "unrealistic expectations" and ignoring "both social costs and the rights
of others").
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a. The limits of Dworkin's theory of rights as trumps.
Many years before Glendon wrote Rights Talk, Dworkin observed
that "[t]he language of rights now dominates political debate in
the United States., 218 In Taking Rights Seriously, he presented
what he called a "liberal theory of law," defending a "strong
sense" of the "old idea of individual human rights.21" He championed this theory over legal positivism, a philosophy rooted in
utilitarianism. In his famous characterization of rights as trumps,
Dworkin argued that "[i]ndividual rights are political trumps held
by individuals. Individuals have rights when, for some reason, a
collective goal is not a sufficient justification for denying them
what they wish, as individuals, to have or to do, or not a sufficient
justification for imposing some loss or injury upon them."" 2 Rejecting a utilitarian political theory within which explicit consideration of the general welfare directly bore on what rights people
had and the extent to which those rights were protected, Dworkin
argued that fundamental rights trumped the utilitarian calculus of
the greatest happiness of the greatest number.
Similarly, Dworkin contended, "A right against the Government must be a right to do something even when the majority
thinks it would be wrong to do it, and even when the majority
would be worse off for having it done." 1 To conclude otherwise, by asserting that society has the right to do whatever advances the general welfare or "the right to preserve whatever sort of
environment the majority wishes to live in," would "annihilate[]"
individual rights against the government. 2 It would reduce them
to mere interests, to be balanced away at the majority's discretion.
Dworkin called his strong sense of rights an "anti-utilitarian
concept of a right" and argued that it was this sense that marked
the "distinctive concept of an individual right against the State
which is the heart, for example, of constitutional theory in the
United States. ' "m Whereas the irresponsibility critique asserts
that the moral vocabulary of rights talk impoverishes political

218.

DWORKIN, supra note 12, at 184.

219. Id. at vii.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at xi.
Id. at 194.
Id.
Id. at 269.
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discourse, Dworkin argued for reinvigorating the moral rights of
individuals against the state.
Glendon offers Dworkin's notion of "taking rights seriously,"
even at the expense of the general interest, as an illustration of
the "illusion of absoluteness" of American rights talk and of the
"spell" of William Blackstone's absolutist notion of property
rights. 4 She states that "it is difficult to imagine any serious
contemporary European legal philosopher" asserting, as Dworkin
did, that, "if someone has a right to something, then it is wrong
for government to deny it to him even though it would be in the
general interest to do so."' Dworkin's account of what taking
rights seriously requires apparently conflicts with what Glendon
thinks taking the social costs of rights seriously requires.
An examination of the limits of Dworkin's conception of
rights suggests that the illusion of absoluteness may be Glendon's.
The first important limit on the notion of rights as trumps is that
the strong rights that Dworkin defended were fundamental constitutional rights, not every constitutional right, much less every right,
and certainly not every imaginable "liberty interest." 6 Second,
he granted that, with respect to the vast bulk of laws not implicating those strong rights, promotion of the general welfare was a
sufficient justification for restricting liberty. 7 Third, even when a
strong right against the government was in play, Dworkin cautioned that it would overstate the point to say that "the State is
' For example, Dworkin
never justified in overriding that right."228
acknowledged that the government would be justified in overriding
a right of free speech to "protect the rights of others, or to prevent a catastrophe, or even to obtain a clear and major public
benefit." 29 Thus, Dworkin did not claim that societal welfare

224. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 40. But see Epstein, supra note 36, at 1109-17
(challenging Glendon's portrayals both of Blackstone's conception of property rights and
of contemporary conceptions in American law).
225. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 40 (quoting DWORKIN, supra note 12, at 269).
226. DWORKIN, supra note 12, at 190-91. Additionally, Dworkin emphasized that the
idea of liberty as license (freedom from social or legal constraint) did not capture Mill's
(or Dworkin's) interpretation of rights. He defended Mill's conception of liberty as "moral independence." Id. at 259-65.
227. See id. at 191.
228. Id.
229. Id. Nonetheless, Dworkin states that if one acknowledges the final circumstance
as a justification, one would be "treating the right in question as not among the most
important or fundamental." Id.
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never restrains rights or overrides them, merely that fundamental
rights are not simply an "interest" to be balanced against other
interests.
Fourth, an important ground for limiting rights that Dworkin
recognized is the competing or conflicting rights of others, especially conflicts between citizens' rights to the state's protection and
their rights to be free from the state's interference." 0 In such
situations, the more important right must prevail at the expense of
the less important, a matter requiring judgment. Fifth, in considering whether a particular right should be recognized or extended,
Dworkin acknowledged that government could limit the definition
of a right on certain grounds. For example, it might do so if the
values protected by the original right were not really at stake in a
particular case or if the costs to society went far beyond "the cost
paid to grant the original right." 1 Finally, Dworkin's account of
the constraints that strong legal rights put on the government did
not presume to answer all questions as to how the moral and
social responsibilities of citizens should guide their lives and the
exercise of their rights or how citizens and government might
attempt in noncoercive ways to shape other citizens' exercise of
their rights. 2
Dworkin recognized that a government taking rights seriously
would incur costs: "[T]he majority cannot travel as fast or as far as
it would like if it recognizes the rights of individuals to do what,
in the majority's terms, is the wrong thing to do." 3 Why take
rights seriously if doing so makes it more difficult and expensive
for a polity to secure the general benefit? Dworkin argued that,
although the "bulk of the law ... must state, in its greatest part,

the majority's view of the common good," the institution of rights
is the promise of the majority to the minority "that [its] dignity
and equality will be respected."' Indeed, ideas of human dignity

230. Id. at 193-94.
231. Id. at 200.
232. Dworkin has addressed such questions in his subsequent works. See DWORKIN,
supra note 17, at 148-54, 166-68, 237-41; Dworkin, supra note 8, at 113-18; Dworkin,
supra note 145, at 491-504; infra subsection IV(C)(2). Communitarian critiques of
Dworkin's liberal conception of rights generally do not take these works into account.
See GALSTON, supra note 5, at 90-91 (discussing, inter alia, Taking Rights Seriously);
GLENDON, supra note 1, at 40 (discussing Taking Rights Seriously).
233. DWORKIN,supra note 12, at 204.
234. Id. at 205.
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(particularly, the supposition of what it means to treat individuals
as full members of the human community) or equality (particularly, the requirement that government treat individuals with equal
concern and respect) are typical grounds for protecting strong
rights."3 Furthermore, both dignity and equality implicate responsibility as autonomy.
In sum, two points are critical. First, the communitarians (as
well as other critics of liberal rights talk) seem to overlook that
Dworkin acknowledged many limits on the idea of rights as
trumps.16 Second, if the communitarians reject Dworkin's underlying conception of what a right is, it is not clear whether they accept legal immunity as a feature of legal rights. If that is the case,
we need to know what alternative conception of rights the communitarians would embrace and how they would wed legal, as well as
social, accountability to rights.
b. What is wrong with rights as trumps? The account of
rights in the irresponsibility critique appears to grant that: (1) a
legal right held by one person generally involves a correlative duty
on the part of another; (2) the Constitution provides a reason for
government not to interfere coercively with the exercise of rights
guaranteed therein; and (3) the exercise of legal rights may result
in irresponsible or socially harmful conduct. 37 If the communitarians accept these features of legal rights (and even state that moral claims may undergird some constitutional rightsp8 ), it is not
235. Id. at 198-99; cf. Robin L. West, Constitutional Scepticism, 72 B.U. L. REV. 765,
791 (1992) (stating that liberal rights must ultimately be grounded in an intuition that "in
the long run the benefits of having a right ... outweigh any costs incurred by its possession").
236. A good example of other criticism is found in the work of Robin West. She
charges,
Mainstream liberal constitutional discourse is presently characterized by an almost obsessive refusal to acknowledge or examine the nature of the costs of
constitutional rights and liberties because of the logic and structure of rights
themselves: the right exists to preclude precisely such cost-benefit analyses.
Because there is no social cost that a right does not theoretically "trump," from
a liberal perspective there is simply no reason to assess the costs of rights, and
plenty of reason not to: assessment only threatens societal respect for the right
in question.
West, supra note 235, at 791.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 92, 126, 194-95.
238. See, eg., ETZIONi, supra note 2, at 6 (describing constitutional rights as "solemn
morallegal claims"); id. at 51-52 (arguing that public opposition to the obscenity prosecution of the Mapplethorpe photographic exhibition, notwithstanding the fact that many
people found the art deeply offensive, reflected "moral support for free speech").
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clear why they object to the key component of rights as trumps,
namely, that government may not act coercively to prevent rights
exercise, even if such inaction might limit society's ability to pursue its conception of the general welfare.
Glendon objects to the claim that it would be wrong for government to prevent people from exercising rights when their doing
so is against the general interest of society. Is it therefore right for
government to prevent people from exercising rights in such situations? Although the communitarians ask that we talk about rights
in a different way, they offer no coherent alternative to the strong
sense of constitutional rights that Dworkin advances.
Perhaps the new communitarians object to the blunt and peremptory image of a trump, which may send social messages that a
right automatically trumps any consideration of the impact of
rights on the common good, rather than to Dworkin's particular
conceptions of what a right is and of what is required if government is to take rights seriously. Thus, communitarians may fear
that talking about rights as trumps sends the (mistaken) message
that the assertion of rights cuts off debate. Similarly, Cass Sunstein
suggests that too often rights -"masquerad[e] as reasons" and are
not conducive to deliberation. In contrast, a more deliberative
approach, even if it led to the same protection of a right, would at
least acknowledge that there are other issues to consider. 239 Of
course, the image of rights as trumps itself suggests that other
cards are on the table.
c. Are rights really trumps in an age of balancing? Regardless of whether rights should be characterized as trumps, there
is reason to doubt that they in fact are treated as trumps in contemporary constitutional law. It is ironic that the notion features
so centrally in the new communitarians' irresponsibility critique as
emblematic of the failings of contemporary rights talk, given developments in constitutional law in the years since the publication of
Dworkin's appeal to -take rights seriously. The conservative Burger
and Rehnquist Courts often have been criticized for not taking
rights seriously. Indeed, James Boyd White suggests that Glendon's
critique of rights tells only part of the story since the "characteristic vice" of the Supreme Court cases of the last few decades is not

239. Id. at 7 (citing Sunstein, supra note 36, at 34).
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the assertion of absolute rights of the sort that Glendon decries
but "the claim to judge every case by a process of 'balancing' one
cluster of interests off against another."2'
Likewise, other observers of current constitutional jurisprudence have suggested that it is the metaphor of balancing that best
describes the identification, valuation, and comparison of competing interests now pervasive in adjudication of individual constitutional rights.24' The metaphor of balancing is quite at odds with
that of trumps and raises significant questions concerning the impact of treating rights as interests to be balanced with other interests.242 Whatever the best answers to these questions may be,
Glendon's protests against the "absolutist" rhetoric of the idea of
rights as trumps ring oddly in an age of balancing. The characteristic vice of such an age is more likely to be balancing rights
away,3 rather than taking them seriously, though the heavens
fall. 24
3. Weighing the Social Costs of Rights. It is not clear to what
extent the greater individual accountability that communitarians
seek with respect to rights is compatible with a strong conception
of rights. For example, Glendon urges a refined rights rhetoric that
is attentive to the social costs of rights and to the question of "the
responsibilities, if any, that should be correlative with a given
right."2' The irresponsibility critique sounds an ominous warning
that strong defenses of individual rights undermine both communities and the support on which rights themselves ultimately depend.24 The argument is that strong defenses of rights underes-

240. White, supra note 36, at 1273.
241. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943, 963-72 (1987); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Political Unity and the Powers of
Government, 41 UCLA L. REv. (forthcoming June 1994); Fallon, supra note 202, at
346-47, 360-64.

242. Cf. Fallon, supra note 202, at 372 (arguing that both indi idual rights and government powers must be defined by reference to often conflicting interests that must be
balanced but suggesting that his approach is not inconsistent with Dworkin's).
243. A recent conference at Hastings College of Law, San Francisco, sponsored by the
Hastings Law Journal, convened to consider the implications of the "madness" of the
Supreme Court's attempts to balance public values and individual liberties. See When is a
Line as Long as a Rock is Heavy?: Reconciling Public Values and Individual Rights in
Constitutional Adjudication, Conference at Hastings College of Law (Feb. 26, 1994) (informational brochure, on file with author).
244.

GLENDON, supra note 1, at 177.

245. Id. at 138.-
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timate the costs of rights to communities, and ultimately, to a
polity. Within the new communitarians' expansive interpretations
of the social costs of rights, including the impact of millions of
daily decisions on the social fabric and on communities, we 'might
ponder what freedoms the new communitarians would recognize as
inviolate.
Consider two approaches to linking rights with responsibilities.
In one, the moral voice of the community exhorts an individual
that her action (although legally within her rights) either is not the
responsible thing to do or is not consistent with her responsibilities
to the community. In the other, the moral voice of the community
(reflected in law) tells an individual that she has no right to act or
that her right to act may be overridden by her responsibilities to
the community. To the extent that Glendon's critique offers guidance concerning a communitarian stance, it raises questions as to
whether communitarians generally favor suasive, nonlegal measures
to legal measures, whether they favor suasive or coercive legal
measures, and under what circumstances communitarians would
choose one approach over another.
Glendon unfavorably compares Dworkin's supposedly absolute
formulation of what a right is to European declarations explicitly
'
She offers
linking rights to duties to serve "the public weal."246
as a good example of a "strong," although not "absolute," form of
rights the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It guarantees
rights "subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society"
and subjects a "wide range" of constitutional rights to either a
national or local "legislative override procedure."2' 47
Such comparative models suggest a critique, not merely of the
rhetoric of rights talk, but of the immunity that a right affords,
and a corrective of not merely social, but legal accountability. (Of
course, even rights in Dworkin's strong sense are not without
limitation, and one might question whether what American courts
do in interpreting and adjudicating claims of constitutional rights is
in practice dramatically different from interpreting a codified,
limited right.2') Below, I will examine Glendon's analysis of

246.
247.
R.S.C.
248.

Id. at 38-39 (discussing example of German property law).
Id. (quoting The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Canada Act 1982,
app. II, no. 44 (1985)).
Even in the heyday of strong constitutional rights, rights jurisprudence recognized
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abortion law, one clear example of her rejection of legal immunity
in favor of the accountability she finds in European models (albeit
models turning, to some extent, on the presence of conflicting
rights).249

As suggested in Part I, Glendon's appeal to craft a refined
rights rhetoric from "indigenous resources," such as household
table talk, models of compromise, attitudes of tolerance and forbearance, and even political deliberation, raises questions as to
what sorts of rights she would support and the respective roles of
courts and legislatures in enforcing such rights. 2s The same questions arise with respect to the communitarian call for a moratorium on the minting of new rights in favor of an appeal to social
virtues and responsibilities.
First, it is unclear whether Glendon's point is that individuals
should voluntarily moderate their exercise of rights or that government should restrict such exercises in the general interest of society. Vindication of rights indeed often assumes that there are clear
winners and losers, people in the right and people in the wrong.
Does government do no wrong when it fails to protect people's
rights? Moreover, although the mutual forbearance and compromise of the sort that go on between family members, neighbors,
and business partners may be useful models in certain legal contexts, they seem to be poor models for conceiving the relationship
between the rights of individuals and the powers and interests of
the state.251 Thus, some critics ponder whether liberalism's comthat fundamental constitutional rights may be limited in the face of compelling state
interests if the means used are narrowly tailored to further those interests. Stringent
judicial protection of constitutional rights in many areas has been watered down considerably since Gerald Gunther wrote that strict scrutiny in the equal protection context was
"'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). Rights that are not fundamental
face considerable limitation in the name of legislative pursuit of legitimate state interests
and exercise of the police power.
John Finnis suggests that most of the practical import of the type of limitations in
European codifications (of the sort that Glendon admires) is captured in the clause, "due
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others"--a limiting condition even
on a strong defense of rights. JOHN C. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS
214-15 (1980) (quoting and interpreting Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
249. See infra subsection IV(C)(1); see also supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
250. See supra Section I(B).
251.

Cf. JOEL FEINBERG, RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 157 (1980)

(arguing that an important feature of rights is that "[k]nowing that one has rights makes
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mitment to individual freedom could survive the weaker form of
rights that Glendon appears to advocate, particularly in the case of
vulnerable individuals (for whom the protections of rights are so
important, and the promises so often unrealized) being asked to
moderate their claims against the state?. 2
Second, the communitarian eschewal of further rights talk in
favor of appeals to social virtues seems forgetful both of the extent to which prior victories in securing, for example, civil rights
involved challenging and disturbing the community status quo and
of how the language of social virtues and the common good (as
well as the costs of social change) may be deployed to reject such
challenges. Would communitarians accept rights at least as a fall
back position if an appeal to social virtues fails? Finally, if a
communitarian model of rights would shift responsibility from
courts to legislatures, that move itself would seem to suggest both
a less central role for rights and more attention to the costs of
rights to the community. 3
In conclusion, it is not clear how communitarians would factor
social costs and responsibilities into defining, justifying, and enforcing rights. 4 Is the message of the irresponsibility critique that
rights are privileges, protected only as long as they are exercised
responsibly? 25 A similar concern attends conditioning enforcement of rights on a determination of community approval or of
the interests of the community. 6 One of liberalism's core values

not only claiming (and self-respect) but also releasing (and magnanimity) possible").
252. Barton, supra note 36, at 807, 812.
253. I find the communitarian literature somewhat murky on this point. See, e.g.,
David Schuman, Communitarian Search and Seizure, 3 RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Spring
1993, at 32, 33-38 (advocating a "law first, rights second" approach to search and seizure
law and a shifting of responsibility and initiative in this area from courts to legislatures).
254. Cf. West, supra note 9, at 79-85 (arguing for a defense of rights that would require "public regarding arguments" to support rights by referring to the responsibilities
that they entail and by demonstrating that freedom is deserved).
255. See Roger Pilon, Freedom, Responsibility, and the Constitution: On Recovering
Our Founding Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 507, 510 & n.8 (1993) (citing the
Platform, supra note 5, as an example of contemporary communitarians implying such an
understanding of rights).
256. Addressing the question of rights vulnerable to interest balancing at their core,
Feinberg observes,
It is only a small parody to interpret the prima-facie right as permission to do
anything except what one shouldn't, and to interpret the nonabsolute "right" as
permission to do anything for which permission is not subsequently withdrawn.
These are hardly "rights" that one can stand upon, demand, fight for, or treasure. They are "rights" that make men humble, not claims that make men bold.
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is individual liberty, which includes "the right to be different, the
right to pursue ideals one's neighbor thinks wrong, .. . and so
forth." 7 If responsive communities come up with lists of values
we all share and hold people accountable to some collective notion
of social and moral duty, is there any longer a right to pursue
ideals one's neighbor thinks are wrong? If recognition of a right is
conditioned on whether it has desirable consequences for or imposes costs on others, it may no longer be a right in any meaningful sense.' 8
4. Which Costs Count? Even assuming, as the communitarians do, that the social costs of rights should factor into the recognition and enforcement of rights in a manner different than they
do in liberal accounts, such a communitarian project must reach
conclusions about how to measure social costs relative to the value
of rights, as well as when to use legal (versus nonlegal or social)
means of linking rights and responsibility. For example, how would
communitarians weigh the costs of protecting rights against the
costs of not doing so? What is the cost to individuals of coercion

FEINBERG, supra note 109, at 83.

257. HOLMES, supra note 8, at 4.
258. See Marion Smiley, Is Corporatism the Answer? Fox-Genovese's Feminist Theory,
18 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 115, 130 (1993) (commenting on the quest for a socially obligated and personally responsible freedom (as opposed to the supposed prevailing conception of liberty as license) and observing that "any right that can be taken away from
individuals on the grounds that it is no longer in sync with communal beliefs is not
much of a right"); see also George Kateb, Democratic Individuality and the Meaning of
Rights, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE, supra note 8, at 183, 202 (arguing that a
right is "denatured" if it hinges on a collective determination of well-being).
How do or should the consequences of rights enter into their defense or limitation?
For example, notwithstanding his account of the First Amendment, which may permit
social harm, supra note 195, Justice Scalia has rejected an analysis of liberty under the
Due Process Clauses that fails to examine the consequences of the exercise of that liberty. He has suggested that such an analysis would be like recognizing a liberty to fire a
loaded gun into someone else's body. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 n.4
(1989). On this analysis, Justice Scalia rejected the assertion of a biological father's constitutionally protected right to a relationship with his daughter because of the consequences for the mother's familial relationship with her husband and the daughter. Id. at 127.
Justice Scalia, joining Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas, would
apply this analysis and gun analogy to abortion, which he sees as a uniquely destructive
act distinct from other exercises of liberty. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v.
Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2859 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). In both cases, Justice Scalia would not recognize a fundamental constitutional right.
In discussing abortion below, I ask about the implications of assessing constitutional rights
with reference to their consequences. See infra text accompanying notes 385-87.
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or restriction? What is the cost of the risk of government error in
weeding out costly exercises of rights? 9 An inquiry into which
costs count and how much they count will likely yield considerable, conscientious disagreement.
The one clear example of a near-absolute right that the communitarians defend strongly, and even use to illustrate how rights

may license irresponsible and socially harmful conduct, is the First
Amendment.260 Communitarians balance the values of the First
Amendment and the risks of censorship against the harms of hateful, racist speech quite differently than do critical race theorists
and other scholars who argue that the costs of such speech fall

disproportionately on members of the groups at whom the speech
is directed and thus imperil their equal citizenship.26' Similarly,
to the extent that the communitarians address and recognize the
harms of pornography,2 62 it is doubtful whether they would support civil rights measures advocated by some (although certainly
not all) feminists who argue that pornography is not "only words"
and that it contributes centrally to the inequality of women and to
violence against them.263 The very comparative law enterprise
that Glendon favors, however, lends support to limits on rights of

259. For a discussion of the government error rationale, see infra text accompanying
notes 334-36. For an analysis of the costs of protecting or restricting rights from a law
and economics perspective, including the risk of government error, see Richard A.
Posner, Free Speech in An Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1 (1986).
260. See Platform, supra note 5, at 13 ("The First Amendment is as dear to
communitarians as it is to libertarians and many other Americans.").
261. See MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND (1993); see also CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 180-93, 197-208 (1993);

Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106
HARV. L. REV. 124 (1992).
262. Compare Amitai Etzioni, Sexual Harassment,Second Degree, 3 RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, winter 1992-1993, at 54, 54-56 (raising doubts about characterizing exposure to
Goya's Naked Maja portrait, pin-up calendars, sexual jokes, and flirtations as sexual harassment and arguing that "[a]cts that merely contribute to a sexually drenched climate"-rather than pressure to engage in sexual acts-should be treated as a lesser, or
"second degree," form of sexual harassment) with Sharon J. Pressner, Pornography: Free
Speech vs. Civil Rights, 3 RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Summer 1993, at 78, 78-82 ("But,
before we dismiss the civil-rights legislative approach outright, can we continue to tolerate
brutal images that may contribute to incidents of sexual violence against women?").
263. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993). For communitarian discussion, see Pressner, supra note 262. For feminist positions opposing the model ordinance
drafted by MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, see Nan D. Hunter & Sylvia A. Law, Amici Curiae Brief of Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce et al., American Booksellers Ass'n
v. Hudnut, reprinted in 21 J.L. REFORM 69 (1988); Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critique
of "The" Feminist Critique of Pornography, 79 VA. L. REV. 1099 (1993).
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expression in view of individual and social harms, competing
rights, and the violation of community standards." 4 It is not clear
why such a stance is not more communitarian than the strong
defense of the First Amendment that the new communitarians
offer.265
To offer another example, the new communitarians depict the
two-parent heterosexual family as a principal "seedbed of civic
virtue" and place reinvigoration of such families, by using a combination of facilitative, persuasive, and coercive measures, at the
core of their project of moral revival. In contrast, Robin West, a
"progressive" feminist scholar, submits that "progressive" feminists
believe that the greatest harms to women come from male violence against them in the home and on the street and from the
injustice that the nuclear family imposes on women and children. 66 She argues that constitutional rights of negative liberty
immunize the private realm from interference by the state despite
the costs to the positive liberty of women and other subordinated
people.26 Although one might challenge this feminist critique of
constitutional privacy rights, it nonetheless indicates a view of' 2the
family as less a "haven in a heartless world" than a "hellhole. 6
One could foresee similar disagreements over which costs
count, and how much, with respect to a wide array of individual
264. See, e.g., Regina v. Butler, 1 S.C.R. 452 (Can. 1992) (classifying pornography as
obscene, and therefore falling outside the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and
upholding restrictions on it in view of the harm to society, including the effect on attitudes toward women); Mai J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim's Story, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2320, 2341 (1989) (citing Article 4 of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which outlaws
racist propaganda).
265. Cf. Note, A Communitarian Defense of Group Libel Laws, 101 HARV. L. REV,
682 (1988).
266. See West, supra note 235, at 775. West also argues that the free exercise of
religion has contributed to the subordination of women. Id. at 776. For an account of the
alleged harms to women from organized religion, see Mary E. Becker, The Politics of
Women's Wrongs and the Bill of Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 453, 458-86 (1992). But see
Randy Lee, A Look At God, Feminism, and Tort Law, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 369 (1992)
(noting West's and Becker's criticisms but arguing that second-stage feminism should take
into account Judeo-Christian values).
267. West, supra note 235, at 775-76 (arguing that the greatest harms to subordinated
members of society come not from state power but from "private power, whether of a
patriarchal, racist, homophobic, or capitalist sort"). Of course, some of the injustice that
West is discussing is the uneven division of labor in the home, which some
communitarian literature also criticizes.
268. For the formulations in the text, see CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD (1977); MacKinnon, supra note 9, at 1311.
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rights. Such disagreements raise the question of the relative costs
of protecting responsibility as autonomy and promoting responsibility as accountability. To evaluate such costs, it is important to
consider the justifications for a regime of rights. A consideration
of the second strand of the irresponsibility critique, wrongness,
illuminates those justifications.
B.

The Wrongness Critique

The wrongness strand of the new communitarians' irresponsibility critique of rights involves a feature of legal rights captured
by the communitarian slogan, "the gap between rights and rightness;" that is, one may have a "right" to do "wrong" acts. As the
Responsive Communitarian Platform explains, "To say that 'I have
a right to do X' is not to conclude that 'X is the right thing for
me to do.' . . . [Rights] do not in themselves give a person a sufficient reason to perform [protected] acts. 2 69 In explaining this
gap and its implications for the communitarian agenda, William
Galston states, "Between rights and rightness lies a vast terrain
where moral argumentation and (in some cases) forms of public
persuasion have a legitimate role."'27 Indeed, because the language of rights is said to be morally incomplete, people fail to
appreciate the distinction between, and tend to equate, rights and
rightness. Moreover, Etzioni asserts, "Many Radical Individualists
confuse the right to be free from government intrusion with a nonexistent 'right' to be exempt from the moral scrutiny of one's peers
and community."271
If such a gap exists, the wrongness critique challenges defenders of legal rights to justify those rights. I challenge communitarian
arguments about the messages of rights, drawing not only on liberal defenses of rights but also on contemporary societal debate over
a number of constitutional rights. I suggest that justifications of
rights assume that rights protect and call for the exercise of responsibility, although one must differentiate notions of responsibility as accountability from those of responsibility as autonomy.
Liberal responsibility talk emphasizes that rights protect autonomy,
i.e., that they locate in individuals the responsibility to make im-

269. Platform, supra note 5, at 14.
270. GALSTON, supra note 5, at 281.
271.

ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 38.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:989

portant decisions in accordance with, or accountable to, the responsibilities of conscience. Communitarian responsibility talk, by
contrast, stresses that rights require accountability, i.e., that individuals exercising rights should not be guided primarily by untutored conscience but by the responsibilities, duties, and moral
claims laid on them by the moral voice of the community. I argue
that the deployment of responsibility talk in Dworkin's recent
work272 offers an opportunity to assess a liberal vocabulary of
rights that addresses the issue of responsibility in the sense of both
autonomy and accountability. Pressing questions in this area include how that liberal account of rights and responsibilities compares with the proposed communitarian correctives and what role
government may properly play in encouraging responsibility.
1. The Morally Incomplete Language of Rights. The Responsive Communitarian Platform's observation of a distinction
between rights and rightness is neither a new nor a controversial
assertion about the relationship between legal rights and what is
morally right. As Dworkin observed in Taking Rights Seriously,
"[t]here is a clear difference between saying that someone has a
right to do something [in the strong sense of a legal right] and
saying that it is the 'right' thing for him to do, or that he does no
'wrong' in doing it."'273
What is the significance of this difference? To charge that the
language of legal rights is morally incomplete implies that legal
rights fail us as a guide to what we ought to do because they do
not talk about moral rightness or moral responsibility. Yet contemporary liberal rights theorists do not claim that the purpose of
declaring individual rights is to signal the requirements for "a fully
human and morally satisfactory life" or that the menu of one's
legally permissible choices is a full account of one's moral duties
and responsibilities.274
272.

See DWORKIN, supra note 17.

273. DWORKIN, supra note 12, at 188 (offering the example of gambling). Generally,
this discussion focuses on legal rights to moral independence and not on the philosophical
question whether there is a moral right to do the wrong thing. Some philosophers have
argued that there is a moral right to do wrong, but Galston denies that there is such a
right. See Jeremy Waldron, A Right to Do Wrong, 92 ETHICS 21 (1981); William A.
Galston, On the Alleged Right to Do Wrong: A Response to Waldron, 93 ETHICS 320
(1983); Jeremy Waldron, Galston on Rights, 93 ETHICS 325 (1983).
274. See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 251, at 156 ("[K]nowing that one has rights and
being prepared to act accordingly are not sufficient (but only necessary) for a fully hu-
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There may be constraints on rights that are legal, moral, or
social and take the form of duties or responsibilities owed to self,
other persons, the community, or humanity. Independent of the
community's raising its moral voice or laying moral claims,275
people might consider themselves under moral duties, for example,
to engage in benevolence.276 The communitarians rarely dwell on
internal convictions of duty, manifesting a lack of faith in a conscience unbolstered by the community's moral voice. Indeed, to
put the point bluntly, when communitarians state that rebuilding
community is vitally important "because the social pressures community brings to bear are a mainstay of our moral values, 2 77 it
makes one wonder whether the form of accountability they seek is
not primarily the social pressures of an old-fashioned shame society, in which people refrain from acting out of fear of gossip or
that "people will talk."
Yet communitarians charge that rights talk so exalts individual
autonomy that right-holders view themselves as properly exempt
not only from responsibilities but from any moral scrutiny or dis-

man and morally satisfactory life."). By saying "contemporary," I acknowledge that, in
earlier historical periods, the notion of a right apparently was linked to "the right," and
a right was understood as a right to act rightfully or justly. Some political and legal
philosophers suggest that the separation of a right in the sense of a power or liberty to
act from a normative notion of rightness or justness began with Grotius and culminated
in Hobbes's separation of law and rights. See FINNIS, supra note 248, at 205-10; RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES 67-68, 130 (1979). For a contemporary Catholic
natural law account speaking of rights and duties as correlative, see John Langan, Catholicism and Liberalism-200 Years of Contest and Consensus, in LIBERALISM AND THE
GOOD, supra note 210, at 105, 109-14.
275. In contrast to the accounts of legal rights, which regard my right as logically
correlative with other people's duties, see supra text accompanying notes 198-203, the
communitarians' intent is to make the moral claims of others correlative with the moral
duties of a right-holder and thus constrain legal rights by recourse to moral duties.
276. Explaining why she went to Bosnia to stage a play, Susan Sontag stated that she
felt it was her duty to go and that it would not have been wrong if she died there. See
MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour: Conversation (PBS television broadcast, Aug. 31, 1993)
available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, SCRIPT file (statement of Susan Sontag). Similarly,
Joel Feinberg asserts that, without knowing the duties correlating to rights, there could
be no sense of going beyond what is required to supererogatory conduct towards others.
See FEINBERG, supra note 251, at 156-57.
277. ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 30, 40 (arguing that "individuals' consciences are neither inborn nor-for most people-self-enforcing"). Presumably, the Platform is one
source of exhortation. Communitarians also might favor a Declaration of Responsibilities
to give moral guidance to right-holders about "the right thing to do." See Harper's Forum, supra note 20, at 51 (statement of Mary Ann Glendon); id. at 53-54 (statement of
Benjamin Barber).
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approval. Worse still, other people shrink from expressing such
disapproval or making moral claims on them. I now turn to those
charges.
a. Does rights talk foster indifference? The new communitarians contend that people generally hesitate to use moral suasion
because they think that legal rights do, or should, insulate people
from the moral scrutiny of their neighbors and peers." "Liberal
virtues"2 79 of tolerance, it is argued, make people hesitant to
make judgments about the choices (and characters) of others.28
People may refrain out of an attitude that we should live and let
live, that the choices of others are not our business. Such an attitude might reflect the very atomism of contemporary life, the
threadbare social fabric that the communitarians lament. Alternatively, not making moral claims on one's neighbor as she exercises
her rights might reflect respect for human moral agency, along
with a notion of the difficulty of assessing what is right for another person to do without full knowledge of her circumstances." s
Do such attitudes somehow stem from an inference of a right to
insulation from moral voices and attitudes of indifference toward,
or disinterest in, the choices of others? Do liberal justifications of
rights foster such indifference?
Leading liberal defenses of rights, such as those advanced by
Mill and Dworkin, do not advocate indifference by members of
society concerning each other's choices. Protection of rights does
not preclude citizens from a range of expression and behavior
concerning the exercise of rights. Although they take individual
moral independence seriously, defenders of liberty from Mill to
Dworkin do not claim that citizens have no interest in the moral
choices of other citizens.
Mill urged that his advocacy of the harm principle, which
governs the realm within which a society might legitimately act
278. See ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 34-39; cf. West, supra note 9, at 71-72 (arguing
that, under "liberal legalism," when we afford people their rights, it exhausts our relationship to them).
279.

GALSTON, supra note 5, at 213.

280. Id. at 222; GLENDON, supra note 1, at 127; Sherry, supra note 16, at 11; cf.
MACEDO, supra note 8, at 233-40 (discussing the consequences of a "plurality of values").
281. See MACEDO, supra note 8, at 234 (noting the "difficulty of entering into the
experiences of others in a way that would be adequate to fathom and evaluate their
personal projects and choices").
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coercively against individuals, should not be understood as an
assertion that people have no interest in each other's actions; he
urged citizens to take an interest in each other's happiness and
well-being. As noted above, in the realm in which society may
not act coercively, he recognized a wide range of acceptable means
by which society could attempt to influence individuals in their
exercises of liberty and signal disapproval of some exercise 3
At the same time, Mill recognized that social disapproval could
amount to compulsion or tyranny and praised variation, change,
and diversity in lifestyle. A Millian would be dubious about the
communitarian allusion to a chorus of moral voices, the appeal to
tradition, and the certitude that we can come up with a list of
values we all share and hold each other to them.
Dworkin envisions liberal citizens who care passionately about
what they think is good and indeed argue with and persuade each
other about their convictions of the good life.' For example, in
defending the right to procreative autonomy, he urges that he not
be interpreted to counsel indifference toward the decisions of
friends, neighbors, and other citizens, because people's choices do
have an impact on the moral environment.' Citizens must be
tolerant, however, and are denied "one weapon:" the use of
majoritarian power to prohibit individuals from, or punish them
for, acting on their view of what life is best for them. 6
The core of communitarian argument about indifference appears to be an attack on liberal "neutrality," or the idea that government should refrain from making substantive moral judgments
about the worth of citizens' ways of life by either prohibiting
certain choices or premising distribution of resources on them. 87
The communitarians' leap from a requirement of government
impartiality to an inference of citizen neutrality is unwarranted.
Communitarians themselves claim that they reject the use of public
coercion to make citizens embrace a communal vision of the good

282. See MILL, supra note 205, at 70-72.
283. See supra text accompanying note 213.
284. See Dworkin, supra note 8, at 113-15.
285. See DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 167.
286. Dworkin, supra note 8, at 115-16. Liberalism, however, is not "neutral toward
ethical ideals that directly challenge its theory of justice." Id. at 117 (arguing that
liberalism's ethical toleration is not compromised "when a racist is thwarted who claims
that his life's mission is to promote white superiority").
287.

See, e.g., GALSTON, supra note 5.
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life in their own lives.' As I discuss below, one of the important questions that the irresponsibility critique raises is what, in
communitarian and liberal accounts, may take place within the
realm between government coercion and noninterference. 289
b. Contemporary illustrations of the moral vocabulary of
wrongness and irresponsibility.Whatever liberal theorists say about
the social meaning of rights, communitarians contend that the gap
between rights and rightness cannot be closed without a richer
moral vocabulary that invokes principles such as decency, responsibility, and the common good. Notwithstanding the recurrent images in the irresponsibility critique of rights as knives, guns, or
porcupine quills,2' recognizing and protecting legal rights does
not preclude citizens from having views about the right, or responsible, thing to do or communicating those views to each other.29'
There is considerable evidence available in contemporary society
that people do recognize the distinction between rights and rightness and do engage in the sort of moral suasion that the communitarians urge.2" There is nothing wrong with this behavior in
288. Id. at 178, 182.
289. See infra Section IV(C). Galston's proposed liberalism shorn of neutrality seems
to envision not only citizens but also government taking a view about better or worse
ways of life and educating and persuading citizens about them. See GALSTON, supra note
5, at 222.
290. See, e.g., MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour: Conversation (PBS television broadcast, May
25, 1993), available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, SCRIPT File ("[I]t's that . . . our rights,
which are kind of knives that ... cut us off from our identity and membership in the
American Nation . . . . [T]hat's the problem I think with rights.") (statement of Benjamin Barber); Birnbaum, supra note 128, at 16 ("I have [an] image of human beings as
porcupines, with rights as their quills. When the quills are activated, people can't touch
each other.") (quoting Roger Conner, executive director of the American Alliance for
Rights and Responsibilities); cf ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
MOVEMENT 36 (1986) ("The right is a loaded gun that the right holder may shoot at

will in his comer of town ....
[T]he give-and-take of communal life . . . [is] incompatible with this view of right .... ").
291. In this Article, I discuss examples involving certain constitutional rights. My monitoring of newspapers for the terms "irresponsible" and "irresponsibility," however, reveals
frequent use of such terms, within and outside the context of rights, both to criticize and
to condemn decisions, conduct, or speech and to justify conduct or decisions (e.g., for me
to do otherwise would have been "irresponsible"). Such references involve individuals,
corporations, institutions, and governments and include, in addition to the popular category of journalistic irresponsibility, such categories as fiscal, government, corporate, environmental, parental, sexual, and personal irresponsibility. Consistent with the thesis of this
Article, charges of the failure of responsibility both as accountability (i.e., the costs and
consequences of irresponsibility) as well as autonomy (i.e., failure to make wise, wellconsidered, or careful decisions) are common.
292. Of course, the corrective of suasion works only on those who are sensitive to
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principle, nor anything about it that is necessarily inconsistent with
liberalism.
Vigorous political and societal debates over a number of constitutional rights, prominently the First Amendment, the Second
Amendment, and rights of procreative autonomy, illustrate that

citizens often perceive a gap between having a right and doing the
right thing and that they are raising their voices to close that gap.
In all these areas, frequent charges of irresponsible use of rights
abound, as do campaigns to urge people to behave responsibly and
do the right thing. Often campaigns targeting irresponsibility state
the point exactly as the Platform does: they charge the right-holder with confusing a right to do something with doing what is
right.293 They grant that the right-holder has a right to do X but
urge that the right-holder has a responsibility not to do X for a
number of reasons, prominently, the impact on society.294 People

engaging in such efforts may invoke the social and moral responsibility of a community to create a climate in which exercising rights
in certain ways that are harmful and disrespectful of others be-

moral condemnation and may be ineffective on the "sensible knave," "insensible" to such
pressure, who exploits others without breaking the law. See Annette Baier, What Do
Women Want in a Moral Theory?, XIX NOs 53, 59 (1985).
293. Commenting on the absence of self-regulation by the gun industry, one observer
remarked, "The premise seems to be that if they've got the right to do something, than
that's the right thing to do." Erik Larson, The Story of a Gun, ATLANTIC, Jan. 1993, at
48 (quoting Colonel Leonard Supenski, a national firearms expert with the Baltimore
County Police Department).
294. The notion that social responsibility should factor into the exercise of rights is
prominent in debates over responsible and irresponsible entertainment, entertainers, and
corporate producers of such entertainment. One example is the reaction to the song
"Cop Killer," included on rap singer Ice-T's album, Body Count, which was released by a
Time Warner subsidiary and subsequently withdrawn at Ice-T's request, after vociferous
protests (particularly by law-enforcement groups) and calls for boycotts and divestment.
See Chris Morris, "Cop" Removal Satisfies Foes, To a Point, BILLBOARD, Aug. 8, 1992,
at 1 (reporting that law enforcement groups had protested Time Warner's "irresponsibility" and had called for assurances that Time Warner would be "responsible" in the
future, asserting their "right" to expect Time Warner to exercise "social responsibility").
The controversy over rap lyrics is part of a larger debate over representations of
violence and the alleged link to violent and other anti-social behavior, particularly when
an audience of young people and the possibility of imitative conduct are involved. See
Bernard Weinraub, The Talk of Hollywood: From Target of Reno's Attack, an Uneasy
Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1993, at 23. For example, Touchstone Pictures received
praise for being "socially responsible" after promising to delete a scene from its movie,
The Program, after three teenagers imitated a scene in the movie, resulting in the death
of one and injuries to the other two. See Joan K. Bernard, Lethal Risks: Young Copycats, NEWSDAY, Oct. 23, 1993, at 20; infra text accompanying notes 299-301.
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themselves invoke notions of taking responsibility and avoiding
social irresponsibility to explain why they have voluntarily refrained-perhaps after the suasion of others-from arguably pro2 96
tected conduct.
Of course, when people say that a person ought not to do
something, they sometimes mean not simply that it is the wrong
thing to do but also that there is not, or should not be, a legal
right to do it.2' That conclusion may flow from a perception
that there is too great a gap between rights and rightness to rely
on suasion alone to secure accountability. For example, consider
the recurring warning that society will not tolerate a free press
that "abuses its freedom and fails to fulfill its social responsibilities," thereby failing to live up to the moral right of freedom. 298

295. See MacNeiL/Lehrer NewsHour (PBS Television broadcast, Sept. 15, 1993), available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, SCRIPT File (statement of Minister Calvin Butts explaining the campaign by African-American community leaders to fight "Gangsta rap" because
of its degrading depictions of African-American women and its reinforcement of behavioral stereotypes harmful to the black community). A recent example of public condemnation of speech and appeals to citizen, as well as to community, responsibility to publicize and condemn such speech involved a speech by Nation of Islam Minister Khalid
Abdul Muhammad, given at Kean College on November 29, 1993, which was characterized by many as bigoted, racist, anti-Semitic, anti-Catholic, and homophobic. See Confronting a Hate Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1994, at A20 (stating that "responsible black
political and organization leaders have risen to deplore and denounce" the speech and
that the "responsible academic community" has an obligation to fight Muhammad's "hatefilled notions").
296. See, e.g., Georgia Dullea, In Your Face, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1993, § 9, at 5
(reporting that Vanity Fair retouched a photo of a pregnant model to remove a cigarette
because "to show smoking during pregnancy would have been an irresponsible act" in
light of the possible message sent to young female readers); Calvin Sims, Radio Station
Bans "Harmful" Music, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1993, at A8 (reporting a rap station's decision to ban "socially irresponsible music" in order to "serve our community"). In addition, there was strong condemnation of the Olin Corporation's Winchester Ammunition
Division for engaging in "a particularly ugly brand of corporate irresponsibility," dangerous to public health, by producing the Black Talon bullet, which unfurls sharp claws on
impact. High-Tech Death from Winchester, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1993, at A22 (urging
Olin to bow "to morality and common sense" and make legislation unnecessary). Olin
subsequently ceased production of the bullet, announcing that the controversy threatened
the "good name" of Winchester, "which has stood for the safe and responsible use of
ammunition and firearms for 125 years." Ronald Smothers, Manufacturer to Withdraw
Controversial Ammunition, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1993, at B9.
297. See DWORKIN, supra note 12, at 189 n.1. Consider the success of Mothers
Against Drunk Driving and other expressions of social outrage that have shaped a public
perception that drunk driving is not a legal right.
298. See Lee C. Bollinger, Why There Should Be an Independent Decennial Commission on the Press, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 7 (citing COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF
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Thus, discontent with the irresponsibility that certain constitutional
rights are said to permit sometimes leads to calls for restricting
those rights,299 as is evident in the area of gun control3 and in
proposals to regulate television violence.3"' With respect to gun
control, the issue is often framed as an issue of competing rights:
pitted against asserted Second Amendment rights are people's
rights to safety and security, said to be threatened by the proliferation of guns and gun-related violence."l At the same time, atTHE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS 80 (1947)); see also Julia A. Loquai, Com-

ment, Keeping Tabs on the Press: Individual Rights v. Freedom of the Press Under the
First Amendment, 16 HAMLINE L. REv. 447 (1993) (arguing for protecting individual
rights against the recurring problem of an "irresponsible press"). Many state constitutions
contain provisions on freedom of the press that meld freedom with responsibility as accountability for abuse of such freedom. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. II, § 10 ("No law
shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech; every person shall be free to speak,
write or publish whatever he will on any subject, being responsible for all abuse of that
liberty."); FLA. CONST., art. I, § 4 ("Every person may speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects but shall be responsible for the abuse of that right."). My research
indicates that at least 40 state constitutions have a similar provision on freedom of
speech and press.
299. Justice Scalia has argued, "Legal constraint-the opposite of freedom-is in most
Law steps in-and will inevitably step
of its manifestations a cure for irresponsibility ....
in-when the virtue or prudence of the society itself is inadequate to produce the needed
result." See Scalia, supra note 195, at 4.
300. Gun control efforts appear to be enjoying some success, which can be attributed
to the level of public concern over safety and violence. See State of the Union, supra
note 32, at A17 (statement of President Clinton praising the passage of the Brady Bill
and calling for further steps "to keep guns out of the hands of criminals"); Isabel
Wilkerson, After 2 Weeks of Mayhem, The Nation Is Asking Why, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14,
1993, at B7 (reporting support for banning guns). Additionally, in the wake of tragic
stories of children killed by firearms stored in the home, numerous states have passed or
are considering legislation aimed at the irresponsible storage of firearms. See, e.g., Ill.
H.B. 3072, 87th Leg., 1991-1992 (introduced March 31, 1992) (reporting a finding that "a
tragically large number of Illinois children have been accidentally killed or seriously injured by negligently stored firearms, [and] that placing firearms within the reach or easy
access of children is irresponsible . . . and should be prohibited"); see also FLA. STAT.
ch. 790.173 (1992) (expressing a similar concern).
301. See Edmund L. Andrews, Cable Industry Endorses Ratings and Devices to Lock
Out Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1994, at Al (reporting that self-regulation might prevent national legislation); Ellen Edwards, Reno: End TV Violence, WASH. POST, Oct. 21,
1993, at Al (reporting on Attorney General Reno's exhortation to television industry
representatives to "acknowledge their role and their responsibilities" and stating that "the
regulation of violence is constitutionally permissible").
302. At the swearing in of Judge Louis Freeh to the position of Director of the FBI,
President Clinton stated, "You, the American people, have a right to freedom from fear.
Your families have a right to security and to safety." Remarks by President Clinton and
Attorney General Janet Reno at the Swearing-In Ceremony of FBI Director Louis Freeh,
Federal News Service, Sept. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, FNS file. The
gun control debate raises questions about the proper interpretation of the Second
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tempts to regulate the sale of firearms draw charges that regulations would punish citizens who use their rights responsibly and
would threaten those citizens' safety.0 3
Another issue at the heart of an intense social and political
controversy is a pregnant woman's right to decide whether to
terminate a pregnancy. Opponents of a legal right to choose abortion not only seek to abolish such a right but also engage in
speech or actions designed to persuade individual women not to
choose abortion, and physicians not to perform it. Some acts go
beyond suasion (or harassment, depending on one's point of view)
and literally prevent women from exercising their rights in the
name of serving higher law." To recall the communitarian notion of raising the moral voice, the steady attempts by abortion
protestors to use various forms of pressure to stop pregnant women from getting abortions and to cut off the availability of legal
abortion makes it difficult to believe that, as a social matter, abortion rights insulate people from the moral claims or scrutiny of
others. Such acts, particularly those directed against physicians,
appeal to public shaming by "exposing" physicians within their
communities, places of worship, and children's schools as "murderers" and "abortionists." These tactics, some critics argue, are responsible for such violent consequences as the actual shooting of

Amendment. The Responsive Communitarians support civil disarmament and hold that
"the Second Amendment confers no individual right to bear arms." AMITAI ETzIONI &
STEVEN HELLAND, THE CASE FOR DOMESTIC DISARMAMENT 34 (1992) (Communitarian
Position Paper, on file with author) (proposing draft legislation which would prohibit all
handguns). Supporters of gun control charge the National Rifle Association with taking
an irresponsible, absolutist stance against all reasonable gun control. See Dear Member of
the N.R.A., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1993, § 4, at 14. For a call to repeal the Second
Amendment for the sake of security and peace, see James M. Banner, Jr., The Unthinkable Solution to Gun Violence, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1993, at A17.
303. A sampling of letters to the editor concerning gun control following the shooting
of passengers on the Long Island Rail Road reveals such uses of the language of responsibility. See, e.g., Susan C. Chambers, Licensed Gun Owners Don't Commit Crimes, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 1994, at A16 (letter to the editor) (describing herself as a former prosecutor who has practiced firearms law and stating, "[Llet's discuss how we can take the
guns out of the hands of criminals, instead of disarming the good, accountable and honest members of the social fabric."); Ben Macaulay, Letter to the Editor, TIME, Jan. 10,
1994, at 6 ("How many lives might have been saved if there had been on that commuter
train at least one law-abiding, responsible, documented citizen carrying a good, working,
concealed semi-automatic?").
304. See, e.g., Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993) (rejecting a federal civil rights claim brought against Operation Rescue members who were
blocking access to abortion clinics).
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physicians."0 5 In sum, although the above illustrations are hardly
exhaustive, they suggest that responsibility talk and the use of
social suasion concerning the exercise of rights are widespread with
respect to a number of contemporary problems.
2. The Messages that Rights Send. The above discussion suggests that people recognize a gap between rights and rightness
with respect to the rights of others but does not tell us what message right-holders themselves think the existence of rights signals.
The silence of rights talk about responsibility is said to send people the message that the existence of a legal right implies the
nonexistence of a responsibility or even societal approval of the
conduct that the right protects. As Justice Scalia describes the
inference, "[tihere is a perhaps inevitable but nonetheless distressing tendency to equate the existence of a right with the nonexistence of a responsibility," that is, to assume that, if one has a legal
right to do something, it is "proper and even good" to do it."
With respect to abortion, for example, he describes as a "natural,"
although not "accurate[,] line of thought" the idea that, "[i]f the
Constitution guarantees abortion, how can it be bad?""3 7
This inference is neither "natural" nor "inevitable," despite
the silence of rights talk about responsibility. Offering a dispositive
response to the irresponsibility critique's charges concerning what
messages people draw from legal rights would be difficult because
it would involve both testing intuitions and answering empirical
questions. I cannot demonstrate that the existence of a legal right
sends no message, but I question the premise that the message is
a simple equation of rights with rightness (e.g., as Justice Scalia
puts it, "how can it be bad?"). Any assumption, like Justice
Scalia's, that rights signal rightness stems from an authoritarian
notion of law, one that concludes that what the law prescribes is
right, what it permits is good, and what it forbids is bad." 8 In
305. See Activists: National Reactions to the Violence in Kansas, AM. POL. NETWORK,
ABORTION REP., Aug. 20, 1993 (quoting National Organization for Women President

Patricia Ireland), available in LEXIS, NEWS library, CURNWS File.
306. ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 201 (quoting Scalia, supra note 195, at 3). It seems
odd for someone like Justice Scalia to make this assertion, given his own positivist in-

sistence on the gap between the full scope of natural or inalienable rights and constitutional rights.
307. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2882 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
308. As argued above, the communitarians seem ambivalent as to what the proper

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:989

reality, however, if a citizen does not believe that law is completely coterminous with morality, she might conscientiously question
the justice and morality of a law and believe that the acts it prohibits are morally right or just and should be protected by a legal
right, or, conversely, that the acts the law permits are immoral or
unjust and should be prohibited.0 9
Thus, the existence of a legal right might be read in a number
of different ways. To take the abortion example discussed by Justice Scalia, a shift from criminalizing certain conduct to treating, as
a fundamental right, the decision whether to engage in it may in
fact reflect a changing consensus about what is moral. Of course,
there are vexing causal questions about whether changes in law
cause changes in mores or reflect such changes, or some combination of the two. For example, such a legal change might reflect a
changed consensus as to what is moral or simply as to the extent
to which law must track morality.310 Recognizing a right might
reflect acknowledgment that society will not disintegrate if the
protected conduct is not criminally prosecuted and punished or
that the social costs of criminal sanction at the discretion of the
government outweigh the costs of freedom.3 '

role of law should be, simultaneously lamenting the extent to which people look to law
as a primary carrier of moral messages and arguing that law should have aspirational
aims and signal values that society holds dear. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53,
60-65, 77-81; see also GLENDON, supra note 1, at 86-87 (criticizing the acceptance of
Justice Holmes's idea of the proper separation of law and morality and his notion that
law is designed to enable the "bad man" to predict the material consequences of his
actions).
309. One important implication of recognizing that rights do not equate with rightness,
or that law and morality are not necessarily coterminous, is the moral responsibility, and
perhaps moral right, of citizens to oppose unjust laws and engage in civil disobedience.
See RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 8, at 388-91 (explaining that a citizen acts conscientiously if, after assessing how political principles underlying the Constitution apply in a
particular situation, he engages in civil disobedience); DWORKIN, supra note 12, at
184-222. On the notion of unjust laws in the context of slavery, see ROBERT M. COVER,
JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 159-91 (1975); DAVID
AJ. RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, THEORY, AND LAW OF
THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 58-104 (1993).
310. See Kristin Luker, The Hard Road to Roe, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1994, § 7, at 7
(reviewing DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY (1994)) (stating that "[b]etween
roughly 1967 and 1972, there was a huge shift in American attitudes about sexuality" as
to the moral permissibility of both premarital sex and abortion).
311. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 212 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("We have ample evidence for believing that people will not abandon morality ...
merely because some private sexual practice which they abominate is not punished by the
law.") (quoting H.L.A. Hart, Immorality and Treason, in THE LAW AS LITERATURE 220,
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A different view might be that the existence of a fundamental
right signals that this decision and a range of possible choices are
protected out of respect for human dignity and personhood. t2
Allocating decisionmaking responsibility to the individual may
suggest a societal (or constitutional) judgment that it is legally
permissible to make such choices and not prudent or appropriate
to use law to prohibit them. That there is a range of legally permissible choices, however, does not signal that all choices are
equally responsible or equally moral, or even that all legally permissible choices are morally permissible. As I suggest below, the
wrongness critique invites the question whether communitarians
have a conviction that certain choices protected by rights are never
morally appropriate for anyone, indeed, are predictable proxies for
irresponsibility.
3. Is There a Right to Make "Incorrect" or "Irresponsible"
Choices? The wrongness strand of the irresponsibility critique also
raises the issue whether there is a right to make "incorrect" or
"irresponsible" choices. Liberal justifications of rights often derive
basic rights and liberties from a conception of persons as having
certain moral powers or human capacities. In that sense, a regime
of rights makes assumptions about the possession of capacities for
responsibility, maturity, and judgment and does not premise rights
on a case-by-case inquiry into the demonstration of such capacities.313 A liberal regime may seek to ensure the development and
exercise of moral capacities (e.g., through education), but protecting the opportunity for the exercise of moral powers does 31not
4
guarantee full development of such powers or their wisest use.
225 (Louis J. Blom-Cooper ed., 1961)); cf. id. at 211 ("[W]e apply the limitations of the
Constitution with no fear that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse or even
contrary will disintegrate the social organization.")) (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943)).
312. See THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES
(Michael J.Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992).
313. See MACEDO, supra note 8, at 32-33; id. at 33 (observing that "[n]o 4-year-olds,
but most 18-year-olds, attain levels of judgment and responsibility that justify the possession of a range of liberties"); RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 19 (de-

scribing the second moral power as the capacity to "form, to revise, and rationally to
pursue a conception of one's rational advantage or good").
314. See RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 8, at 504-15 (securing the preconditions for the
development and exercise of moral powers); see also RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM,
supra note 8, at 324-40 (same). For a discussion of the potential problems raised by
Rawls's assumption of a society of people with the capacity to be "normal and fully
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Along those lines, one reading of the wrongness critique is as
a charge that persons are failing to exercise their moral capacities
in a responsible way and that the logic of liberal toleration and
rights talk precludes consideration of such issues. Of course, a
critical question is Whether a communitarian corrective would insist
on not only moral or social but legal accountability. In either case,
the critique manifests a lack of trust in people as moral agents
exercising freedom of conscience, capable of behaving with integrity, and living pursuant to genuinely held convictions. The communitarians frankly fear that individual conscience is too weak
without the strong reinforcement of the moral voices of others. In
that sense, they resemble those critics of liberalism (and, more
generally, of post-Enlightenment thought) who charge that people
are not good enough for liberalism and fault it for its apparent
"fatally flawed assumption.., that autonomous individuals can
freely choose, or will, their moral life."3 15
A common liberal formulation of the issue is that rights protect individuals who act in ways thought wrong by society or by
others but that reflect those individuals' own views of the good.
Dworkin's analyses often use such a formulation.316 Similarly,
Roger Pilon argues, "The mere 'irresponsible' exercise of rights,
short of violating the rights of others, is itself a right. What else
' A right or freecould it mean to be responsible for oneself?"317
dom to exercise rights irresponsibly, he argues, stems from the
acceptance of the notion of individual responsibility to pursue
happiness as one sees fit, consistent with the rights of others.3 8
Likewise, Stephen Holmes argues that one of liberalism's "core
norms or values" is "individual liberty," understood as "a broad
sphere of freedom from collective or governmental supervision,

cooperating members of society over a complete life," see MARTHA MINOW, MAKING
ALL THE DIFFERENCE 150-51 (1990) (arguing that Rawls's emphasis on autonomy and
rationality in forming the social contract leaves out mentally disabled persons, children,
and others deemed to lack capacity for rational thought); Holmes, supra note 131, at 42
(questioning whether "systematic and self-conscious neglect of the non-cooperator...
transform[s] justice-as-fairness into a form of just exchange").
315. WILSON, supra note 75, at 250. My formulation may suggest too stark a contrast
between individual choice and adherence to community suasion. The point is not to deny
that persons are importantly shaped by their relationships and communities but to observe that the communitarians give slight attention to inner motivation and convictions.
316. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 8, at 115; infra note 327 and accompanying text.
317. Pilon, supra note 255, at 510.
318. See id. at 510-11.
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including freedom of conscience, the right to be different, the right
to pursue ideals one's neighbor thinks wrong,

. . .

and so

forth."3 19 In support of that kind of right to be different, Mill
argued that individuals have their own well-being most at heart
and know best, or better than the majority (which does not share
their particular circumstances and perspectives), what is right for
them. 320
Such liberal themes resonate in our constitutional jurisprudence, which, in justifying rights to individual liberty and autonomy, observes that there are competing conceptions of the good
(particularly as to matters about which "women and men of good
conscience" disagree) and that there may be more than one right
choice (especially concerning complex moral matters about which
there is deep disagreement).321 That diversity may extend to interpretations of responsibility and of what is the responsible thing
to do. 3z2 Thus, one possible response to the wrongness critique,
to the idea of a gap between rights and rightness, is to ask,
"Whose idea of rightness, anyway?" or, "Irresponsible in whose
view?" Indeed, communitarians, liberals, and others may disagree
over substantive moral questions such as whether homosexuality,
abortion, sex outside of marriage, and single parenthood are seldom, generally, or always immoral.3
Although such a response is arguably a powerful one, linking
protection of rights to the diversity of human moral choices need
not stem from a complete moral relativism or skepticism, or a
denial that there are better and worse, or moral and immoral,

319. HoLMES, supra note 8, at 4.
320. See MILL, supra note 205, at 71-72, 78-79. Dworkin calls this the "evidentiary"
view of why we should protect autonomy, which he argues is inadequate in light of cases
in which people act contrary to their own best interests. See DWORKIN, supra note 17, at
222-24.

321. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807-09 (1992) (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 206 (1986)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 223-24 (1972);
(stating that it is not for the majority to say that a minority choice is wrong and the
majority alternative right)).
322. See infra text accompanying notes 341-43; cf. Dworkin, supra note 145, at 497-99
(rejecting the notion that community cohesion demands a unitary sexual ethic and finding
it implausible, in a diverse political community, that there could be one uniform "set of
standards of sexual responsibility").
323. Perhaps a communitarian vision of ordered liberty would consist in not making
certain permissible choices but adhering to conventional views about morality and responsibility.
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choices.324 It instead appeals to what Rawls calls the "fact of reasonable pluralism: ' '31 that it is an inevitable fact (and not to be
regretted) that, in a society that protects basic liberties, such as
liberty of conscience and freedom of association, people exercising
their moral powers will form and act on divergent conceptions of
the good. Moreover, this approach assumes that a stable political
order does not require a unitary conception of the good life, a
unity that would be possible, if at all, only through the exercise of
oppressive state power.326 In Dworkin's account of liberal toleration, a liberal society rejects the use of such coercive power to
compel an individual's adherence to the life others think best for
her (even if they may be correct) out of the requirements of equal
concern and respect and the view that a life lived "against the
grain" of one's own conviction is not a good one and has not
been improved. 27
Such defenses of individual freedom, echoed in our constitutional jurisprudence, treat the risk that some people may make
incorrect (or irresponsible), although legally protected, decisions as
a lesser evil than the outright denial to everyone of the right to
make decisions profoundly affecting their individual destiny. 28
Allowing people freedom to make decisions with serious consequences for themselves, and to make mistakes in doing so, respects
their dignity and autonomy.329 Moreover, the development and

324. This seems to be one common basis for criticizing liberal "neutrality." See
GALSTON, supra note 5, at 89-97.
325. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 36.

326. Id. at 37.
327. See DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 167-68; Dworkin, supra note 145, at 484-87
(arguing that paternalism cannot improve one's "critical well-being"); Dworkin, supra note
8, at 50-51, 115-16 (making similar argument and also arguing that using law coercively
deprives an individual of equality of circumstances and resources). Dworkin has argued
for a right to "moral independence" rooted in equal concern and respect. RONALD
DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 353-59 (1985). For one powerful criticism, see
H.L.A. HART, Between Utility and Rights, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 198, 210-11, 213-21 (1983).

328. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 781-82 (1986) (Stevens, J.,concurring); see also Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2840 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (linking "[t]he authority to make . . .traumatic and yet empowering decisions" to
"basic human dignity").
329. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2842; see also MILL, supra note 205, at 56 (noting that,
although one "might be guided in some good path, and kept out of harm's way," one
might not have much comparative worth as a human being if one had "no need of any
other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation").
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exercise of personal and moral responsibility require freedom
within which to exercise discretion and judgment.330 Dworkin
argues that the fact that, despite accepting the responsibilities of
judgment and of living life well, we may make mistakes is "at the
very foundation of our ethical lives."331 Thus, a legal right securing the opportunity to exercise moral responsibility may protect
mistaken, incorrect, bad, or irresponsible choices.332 What else
could responsibility for oneself mean? Such a possibility is an
implication of securing rights and a cost of preserving freedom.
4. Rights and Responsibilities in Liberal Justifications of Fundamental Rights. In contrast to the communitarians' account of the
morally incomplete language of rights, one could argue that the
existence of a legal right, far from obscuring the issue of responsibility, calls for the exercise of moral responsibility precisely because it protects and affords a realm of choice. I have begun to
illustrate such an account of rights by drawing on constitutional
jurisprudence involving fundamental rights associated with liberty,
privacy, and substantive due process and analyzing liberal justifications for such rights. My argument in this subsection elaborates on
that account. In the next Section, I offer a brief sketch of responsibility talk in the context of abortion.
There are several ways in which legal rights protect and imply
responsibility in liberal rights talk and justifications of constitutional rights.333 Such justifications seek to protect responsibility as
330. Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L. 293, 300 (1988)
(arguing that responsibility connotes freedom and that "at the core of the notion of responsibility is the exercise of discretion"). This realization may be why communitarians
sometimes use the term "responsibility" rather than "duty", see Harper's Forum, supra
note 20, at 54 (statement of Benjamin Barber) ("preferfing] the word 'responsibility' to
"duty" because "[tihe modem conception of duty has to balance itself with the
individual's autonomy, with human choices" and arguing that democracy-giving law to
ourselves---"provides the link between autonomy and duty"); id. at 51 (statement of Mary
Ann Glendon) (drafting a "Declaration of Responsibilities," instead of one of "dut[ies],"
because of a preference for "the hortatory mode over the coercive").
331. DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 206; see Martha Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, in LIBERALISM AND THE GOOD, supra note 210, at 203, 229 (arguing for the

importance of a government role in moving citizens "across the threshold into capability
to choose well").

332. MACEDO, supra note 8, at 231 ("[T]o be free is to be capable of making choices,
of making mistaken or even bad choices.").
333. I focus on constitutional rights because they occupy so central a place in
Glendon's critique (e.g., the right of privacy) and because a constitutional right (the First
Amendment) is used in the Platform to illustrate the rights versus rightness point. See
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autonomy by locating responsibility for making certain fundamental decisions in the right-holder, rather than in the state or other
persons, and by recognizing the moral capacity of the right-holder
by affording her room to exercise moral responsibility in making
decisions or engaging in protected conduct. Moreover, in exercising
rights, a person may reflect on her responsibility to herself and to
others, as well as on the responsible decision to make in her circumstances.
In explaining the Platform's tenet that rights do not equate
with rightness, Etzioni (invoking Justice Scalia) says that rights
protect the freedom to be irresponsible and even socially harmful
because "the alternative would sweep away too much good...
along with the bad."3" That explanation appeals to the risk of
government error and reflects a concern that government officials
might not exercise their power wisely or responsibly. Although
such risk is certainly one reason for affording a sphere of legal
immunity from government interference for a range of personal
conduct, there are other prominent justifications for rights that
more directly implicate notions of the individual responsibility of
the right-holder. In those justifications, legal rights protect people
against government coercion within certain zones of thought and
conduct out of respect for an underlying conception of human
personhood, autonomy, moral independence, dignity, or equality.
Such conceptions in turn locate moral responsibility in the rightholder. Indeed, some would argue that legal rights stemming from
such conceptions have their ultimate basis in moral rights or inalienable, natural rights.335 In any event, all these ideas suggest a
defense of rights that is rooted in respect for human moral capacity and for human moral agency.336

GLENDON, supra note 1, at 45-75, 145-70; Platform. supra note 5, at 14.
334. See ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 201 (quoting Scalia, supra note 195, at 4).
335. For a discussion of moral rights, see DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 130-31 (discussing moral rights against the government made into legal rights by the Constitution).
For a discussion of inalienable rights, see Peggy C. Davis, Contested Images of Family
Values: The Role of the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming April 1994) (manuscript

at 34-35, 43-45, on file with author) (characterizing the abolitionist struggle as being in
the name of inalienable civil rights); Pilon, supra note 255, at 513 (suggesting that the
Ninth Amendment confirms that the people retain certain natural rights).
336. Such commitments are manifest in the liberal political theories of John Rawls
and Stephen Macedo, as well as in Galston's responsive communitarian/liberal account of
liberalism. See GALSTON, supra note 5, at 173-75, 227-31; MACEDO, supra note 8, at
207-12, 214-16; RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 19, 334-38.
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In understanding this type of justification of rights, it is important to keep in mind a relationship between rights and irresponsibility different from those elaborated by the new communitarians
but relevant to understanding constitutional rights and their justifi-

cation. American history reveals that characterizing groups of
people as irresponsible (e.g., characterizing African-Americans as

childlike and ignorant) has served to justify denying them
rights.337 We also learn from history that those challenging such
denials have argued that recognizing rights affords people wrongly
excluded from the community of moral agents the status of persons capable of exercising moral and intellectual responsibility.338

Peggy Davis argues that appreciating this historical context of the
Fourteenth Amendment helps to situate its antitotalitarian (or
anticaste) notions of liberty and its restrictions on government
interference with moral independence in the realm of individual
and family choice.339

Thus, appeals to human personhood, autonomy, moral independence, dignity, or equality offer powerful accounts of principles
in constitutional law concerning the proper limitations on the exerIn
cise of legitimate government power against individuals.'
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, its
most recent account of the cluster of cases associated with substantive due process, the U.S. Supreme Court spoke of the "right to

337.

PHILLIPS, supra note 7, at 72.

338. Davis, supra note 335, at 55 ("The deepest critiques of slavery were based on an
understanding of human rights as they related to human capacities."); see also Elizabeth
B. Clark, Religion and Rights Consciousness in the Antebellum Woman's Rights Movement,
in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW 188, 200-01 (Martha A. Fineman & Nancy S.
Thomadsen eds., 1991) (noting the influence of abolitionist arguments concerning natural
rights and human capacities on feminist arguments for women's rights).
339. Davis, supra note 335, at 55 ("Totalitarian control of decisionmaking and social
interaction robs the enslaved of the ability to act from moral conviction or to contribute
to moral reasoning in the larger community."); see Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy,
102 HARV. L. REv. 737, 787 (1989) (interpreting privacy cases as manifesting an "antitotalitarian principle"). Davis argues that protecting choice recognizes moral agency and
capacity, and contrasts such protection to the experience of slaves, who were controlled
and dominated, uprooted from communities, and given no choice. See Davis, supra note
335, at 43-52. Such a moral argument for choice has a different underlying premise than
some communitarian critiques of choice, which claim that liberalism overlooks that people
derive meaning and identity from their communities. See Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REV. 521, 522-25
(1989).
340. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 217 (discussing the liberal
principle of legitimacy).
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define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life" and noted that "[b]eliefs about
these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were
they formed under compulsion of the state."' "4 Casey echoes judicial and scholarly interpretations of constitutional rights that appeal to the idea that a certain realm of freedom with respect to
fundamental decisions, which typically implicates ethical or religious convictions, is critical to respect for decisional autonomy or
liberty of conscience and to the development of personality and a
sense of moral responsibility. 2 The issue before the Court in
Casey was constitutional protection of a woman's decision to continue or terminate a pregnancy: the Court analogized such a decision to a decision about contraception and characterized it as
being deeply personal and concerning "not only the meaning of
procreation but also human responsibility and respect for it," matters on which there is reasonable disagreement.
Dworkin stresses themes of moral responsibility, dignity, and
individual integrity in his justification for the Court's privacy jurisprudence. Additionally, he argues that with respect to decisions
concerning life and death-abortion and euthanasia-freedom of
conscience protected by the First Amendment is in play, calling
for toleration by the government.3' Such a justification stresses
the importance of allowing room for responsibility as autonomy.
Dworkin also emphasizes the importance of how people exercise their freedom: "It matters as much that we live up to our
freedom as that we have it. Freedom of conscience presupposes a
personal responsibility of reflection, and it loses much of its meaning when that responsibility is ignored."' Dworkin's elaboration
of the personal responsibility of reflection certainly contemplates
341. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992) (opinion
of O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.).
342. Indeed, the much-praised and often-maligned notion of the "right to be let
alone" also involves protection of Americans in their thoughts, emotions, and sensations
by reference to "the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
intellect." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,dissenting).
For a discussion of liberty of conscience as embracing decisional autonomy, see James E.
Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L. REV. 211, 253-56, 294-97
(1993). But see Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L.
REv. 115, 172-75 (1992) (asserting that liberty of conscience does not protect autonomy
or choice but only religious obligation).
343. Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2807-08.
344.

DwoRKIN, supra note 17, at 160-68.

345.

Id. at 239.
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that it may include taking into account others' views and one's
connections to them, but it emphasizes the reflective exercise of
freedom of conscience. Although most people, he argues, treat
living as a "sacred responsibility," this exercise of personal responsibility is difficult and complex. 36 Moreover, even people who
share beliefs in certain intrinsic values may disagree deeply over
how best to respect those values and whether particular decisions
are responsible or irresponsible.
Indeed, Dworkin suggests that government may encourage
responsibility in the exercise of freedom of conscience in deciding
whether to have an abortion or to request euthanasia. He admonishes, however, that the government may not insist on conformity
in making that decision or use coercion to obtain a particular
decision. 7 I now turn to consider how Dworkin's liberal approach attempts to meld responsibility as autonomy with responsibility as accountability in the context of abortion and to compare
his efforts with Glendon's communitarian approach.'
C. Responsibility as Accountability Versus Responsibility as Autonomy: Glendon and Dworkin on Abortion
1. Glendon on Abortion: Is It the Message that Matters or Is
Abortion a Wrong Right? Glendon uses American abortion law as
an example of the extremes of rights talk, and her analysis illustrates key features of the irresponsibility critique. Her stance on
legal abortion offers an instance in which the irresponsibility critique goes far beyond the rhetoric of rights to the substance of the
underlying right itself. Initially, in Abortion and Divorce in Western
Law, Glendon offered an "anthropological" approach to abortion
law to learn about the constitutive message abortion law sends or
346. Id. at 205-06, 238.
347. See infra text accompanying notes 366-78.
348. Glendon has favorably described the European laws as "communitarian." See
GLENDON, supra note 19, at 33-39, 133-34. Some communitarians have stated that the
European abortion laws Glendon describes in Abortion and Divorce in Western Law have
"many virtues" and that her analysis shows that to frame the abortion issue in terms of
rights is "to inhibit realistic, morally engaged social debate'about the nature of abortion,"
BELLAH ET AL, GOOD SOCIETY, supra note 5, at 129-30. In describing Glendon's approach as communitarian, however, I do not intend to attribute it to the Responsive
Communitarian movement as a whole. As noted previously, the Responsive Communitarians themselves have taken no public position on abortion and have observed that the
divisiveness of the issue may make a solution impossible. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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the "story" it tells about a society.34 9 She contrasted America's
"extreme and isolating version of individual liberty, 350 (as endorsed in Roe v. Wade) of a pregnant woman who has no responsibilities to others and to whom nothing is owed by society, with
Western European laws striking a balance between women's liberty and their responsibilities as members of society who are carrying unborn life.35 ' Glendon suggested that America, as well as
women's interests, might be better served by a "compromise"
abortion law, such as the French law, which guaranteed "the respect of every human being from the commencement of life" but
permitted, and paid for, first trimester abortion if a woman stated,
after a waiting period and counseling in favor of childbirth, that
she was in "distress., 352 Deflecting questions over the actual impact the respective laws would have on the practice of abortion,
particularly on the number of abortions, Glendon asked her readers on both the pro-life and pro-choice sides to accept that, even if
the access to abortion and numbers of abortions were the same, a
different abortion law would send a different message about respect for life and the seriousness of the abortion decision.353
In Rights Talk, Glendon argues that the "lone-rights bearer"
imagined by the right of privacy, an isolated individual with the
"right to be let alone," bears little resemblance to and poorly
serves the needs of "vulnerable pregnant women." She asks whether women might not fare better under a legal approach envisioning
a woman as "situated within, and partially constituted by, her relationships with others."354 Her contrasting European example,
West Germany's abortion law (prior to the unification of Germany, the passage of a more liberal law, and the recent invalidation
of that law by the Federal Constitutional Court), balanced
women's statutory right to free development of their personalities

349. See GLENDON, supra note 19, at 1-9.
350. Id. at 62.
351. See id. at 40-57. Glendon's book has received considerable praise, but her empirical account of European law and its contrasts to America law has been criticized. See,
e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Int'l Women's Health Organizations in Support of Appellees
at 2-20, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605); Jane
M. Cohen, Comparison-Shopping in the Marketplace of Rights, 98 YALE LJ. 1235 (1989)
(reviewing GLENDON, supra note 19).
352. GLENDON, supra note 19, at 18-20, 52-58, 155-57 (providing the text of the
French Abortion Law of 1975).
353. Id. at 59-62.
354.

GLENDON, supra note 1, at 48, 60-61.
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(subject to the limits of the "moral code" and the rights of others)
against fetuses' right to life.355 The West German law seems to

have restricted abortion (after compliance with an informed consent procedure aimed at facilitating continuation of the pregnancy)
to instances of a medical determination that a pregnancy would
pose a serious danger to a woman's physical or mental health that
could not otherwise be averted. Glendon argues, however, that this
step was simply one more procedure signalling the "gravity" of the
decision and that abortion 35was
"relatively easy to obtain" in the
6
first trimester of pregnancy.
Recently, Glendon's name appeared among those individuals
and organizations calling for "A New American Compact: Caring
About Women, Caring for the Unborn."

357

The proposers of the

Compact (whose other signatories include fellow Responsive Communitarian The Reverend Richard John Neuhaus, along with many
organizations and public figures prominent in opposition to legal
abortion358 ) call for serious moral reflection by the American
people, whose voice must be heard through the "normal procedures of democracy." "America," the Compact announces, "does
not need the abortion license," which "has ushered in a new era
of irresponsibility toward women and children," but instead needs
policies that "responsibly protect and advance the interests of
mothers and their children, both before and after birth." Thus, the

355. Id. at 61-65. In 1992, the German Parliament passed legislation intended to reconcile the restrictive laws of the former West Germany with the more permissive laws of
the former East Germany. The resulting statute was invalidated by the Federal Constitutional Court because it was held to violate constitutional guarantees said to protect a
fetus's right to life. Marc Fisher, German Court Rules Most Abortions Illegal, WASH.
POST, May 29, 1993, at A20.
356. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 65. On the question of access under the former law,
see Jonathan Kaufman, Liberal German Abortion Law Falls, BOSTON GLOBE, May 29,
1993, at 1 (noting that, "in practice," sympathetic doctors could approve abortions for a
wide range of reasons, but women's degree of access to abortion varied from "relatively
free" to "difficult" depending on the geographical location and religious affiliation of doctors).
357. A New American Compact: Caring About Women, Caring for the Unborn, N.Y.
TIMES, July 14, 1992, at A23 [hereinafter Compact].
358. For example, Robert P. Casey, Governor of Pennsylvania; officers of Feminists
for Life of America; Sidney Callahan; and Nat Hentoff and law professors Gerard V.
Bradley and Michael McConnell are signatories. The actual text of the Compact strikingly
parallels many of the ideas prominent in the rhetoric of signatory Feminists for Life of
America. See Linda C. McClain, Equality, Oppression, and Abortion: Women Who Oppose Abortion Rights in the Name of Feminism, in FEMINIST NIGHTMARES: WOMEN AT

ODDS (Jennifer Fleischner & Susan Ostrov Weisser eds., forthcoming 1994).
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goal should be the "enactment of the most protective laws possible
on behalf of the unborn," ideally, a law prohibiting abortion but
recognizing an exception in the "very rare[]" cases in which pregnancy poses "a threat to maternal life or health." The Compact
sounds the theme of choice-not choice "faced by isolated women
exercising private rights," but choice by citizens collectively to
determine "[wihat kind of a people are we?," "[w]hat kind of a
people will we be?," and "[w]hose rights will we acknowledge?"
The Compact condemns Roe for its denial to "every human being,
for the first nine months of his or her life, of the most fundamental human right of all-the right to life," a denial reversing
America's progress toward justice for all. It is time, the Compact
proclaims, "to reconstitute
the story of America as a story of in359
protection.
and
clusion
In view of the Compact, it seems reasonable to say that much
more than the rhetoric of rights and rights talk, the message the
law sends, or the law's use as a tool to educate and exhort are at
issue for Glendon."6 To make the story that the law tells come
out right, the law must prohibit abortion, except in very rare cases.
Ironically, notwithstanding her earlier disavowal of a competing
rights model as impoverished, it is precisely the language of rights
(i.e., the fetus's right to life) that supports the West German law
and that is used in the Compact to justify rejecting an abortion
right for women.
For Glendon, responsibility with respect to pregnant women
seems to mean accountability, the obligations and duties that society may reasonably demand of them, 36' and it appears that such
359. Compact, supra note 357, at A23.
360. This observation is not meant to reject the possibility that Glendon has changed
her mind about an appropriate abortion law since writing her books and now would
argue that even the European laws are too lenient. My main point is that, in presenting
these European laws, she has emphasized the relative ease of obtaining abortions notwithstanding the written laws. The Compact, in calling for a law prohibiting abortion with
an exception only in the very rare cases of threats to maternal life or health, suggests a
different stance on the relationship between law as written and as enforced.
361. For example, Glendon notes that the West German Court specified that legislation must proceed in principle "from a duty of bringing the pregnancy to term" and
quotes the following language from the opinion as to the purpose of legislative provision
of welfare and social assistance:
In this context it will be principally a matter of strengthening the willingness of
the person about to become a mother to accept the pregnancy with responsibility to self and to bring the fetus to full life. . . .It should be the most eminent
purpose of government efforts on behalf of the protection of life to reawaken
and, if necessary, strengthen the maternal protective will [in cases] where it has

1994]

RIGHTS AND IRRESPONSIBILITY

1081

responsibility should be secured through the coercive power of
law, not through mere suasion or exhortation by the moral voice
of the community. Although Glendon's earlier praise of the French
scheme might suggest some support for responsibility as autonomy
(subject to such suasion), hef advocacy of the West German law
as preferable to Roe, as well as her support for the Compact,
suggest that responsibility does not entail the exercise of autonomy
by a pregnant woman in deciding whether to terminate a pregnancy-or rather, that the only permissible, responsible outcome of a
pregnancy (absent threat to life or health of a pregnant woman) is
continuation to term. Indeed, the issue is one of societal, rather
than individual, choice. For Glendon, the right of privacy from the
outset had a regrettably atomistic cast, but it took a fateful turn
when it evolved into a defense of individual autonomy, rather than
marital and family privacy. 62 Like many opponents of Roe, she
rejects any fundamental right that affords a realm of legal immunity, or unaccountability, wherein women may choose to terminate
pregnancy.
Glendon's critique of American abortion law attacks both the
legal immunity that abortion rights afford the right-holder and the
social messages that she claims such immunity sends. For Glendon,
abortion rights also are wrong rights because they license the irresponsibility of women's male partners and of society, allowing
them to be unaccountable to and ignore the needs of pregnant
women and mothers. 3 Thus, she rejects a woman's right to autonomy, yet she argues that abortion does not further women's
equality and that women neither need nor want the autonomy

been lost.
GLENDON, supra note 19, at 27, 28 (quoting Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, BverfG, 39
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1 (F.R.G.), translated in THE
ABORTION DECISION OF FEBRUARY 25, 1975, OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 63 (Edmund C. Jann trans., 1975)).

362. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 56-57 (describing the decisive move from Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), to Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
363. See id. at 65-66. An instructive contrast in this regard is the equality arguments

that some feminist legal theorists use in defense of abortion rights. Such theorists stress
the unequal conditions under which women become pregnant and/or mothers and the
society-wide lack of support for pregnant women to challenge assumptions of female
irresponsibility, to illustrate why women lack full autonomy, and to explain why, under
conditions of sex inequality, abortion should be legally protected. See, e.g., MacKinnon,
supra note 9; see also McClain, supra note 358 (contrasting MacKinnon's position with

that of Feminists for Life of America).
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bestowed on them by the right of privacy.3 " Instead, she would
appeal to social virtues and responsibility and a model of mutual
responsibility and accountability. 65
2. Dworkin on Abortion: Taking Rights Seriously by Exercising Rights Responsibly?
a. Responsibility versus conformity. Dworkin interprets
the Supreme Court's privacy jurisprudence as protecting from
coercion by state or majoritarian judgments a realm of decisionmaking critical to the "sense of moral responsibility."3 66 In his
recent book, Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom, responsibility talk features prominently, not only the responsibility of the individual right-holder to
make protected decisions reflectively but also the responsibility of
government to encourage the responsible exercise of rights. 67
"People," Dworkin argues, "have the moral right-and the
moral responsibility-to confront the most fundamental questions
about the meaning and value of their own lives for themselves,
answering to their own consciences and convictions." 3" The legal
right that protects that moral right, he argues, finds constitutional
bases or "textual homes" not only in the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment but also in the freedom of conscience
secured by the First Amendment. 69 Dworkin describes autonomy
as accountability to self, the responsibility to live up to one's freedom by exercising one's rights reflectively.

364. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 58-61, 65-66. The Compact charges, "Unfettered
access to abortion on demand has addressed none of women's true needs; nor has it
brought dignity to women. It has, in fact, done precisely the opposite. It has encouraged
irresponsible or predatory men, who find abortion a convenient justification for their lack
of commitment." Compact, supra note 357, at A23. It is beyond the scope of this Article
to address the ways in which Glendon's presentation reads female agency and the efforts
of the women's movement out of the story of the recognition of the legal right to abortion.
365. As Glendon puts it, "[W]hat the pregnant woman can be required to sacrifice for
the common value is related to what the social welfare state is ready and able to do to
help with the burdens of childbirth and parenthood." GLENDON, supra note 19, at 39
(characterizing opinions of the West German and Spanish constitutional courts).
366. Ronald Dworkin, The Great Abortion Case, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 29, 1989, at
49, 51.
367. DWORKIN, supra note 17.
368. Id. at 166.
369. See id. at 160-68.
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To say that citizens must answer fundamental questions of
conscience for themselves, however, does not mean that states,

pursuant to their "responsibility for guarding the public moral
space in which all citizens live, 37'

do not have the power to

"encourage their citizens to treat the question of abortion serious-

ly."37' Decisions about abortion and euthanasia, he argues, implicate the intrinsic value of "sanctity," or the sacredness and inviola-

bility of life,372 and do have an impact on the ethical environ-

ment that we share. 73 Dworkin argues that, although the Roe
Court correctly concluded that a fetus was not a constitutional
person with "derivative" rights and interests subject to government
protection, the Court did not address whether a government might
constitutionally seek to protect the "detached" value of sanctity by

encouraging women to exercise their right to choose abortion responsibly.374 He concludes that Casey correctly observed that
there is no "right.to be insulated from all others" in making a
decision and that a state may encourage a woman to learn that
there are philosophical and social arguments in favor of continuing
a pregnancy. 375 Dworkin concludes, however, that Casey erred in
upholding the informed consent restrictions before it because of

370. Id. at 150.
371. Id. at 153. Dworkin argues that abortion lies at the intersection of the traditions
of personal freedom and government responsibility.
372. Id. at 81-84.
373. Id. at 167. On first reading, Dworkin's justification of abortion regulation in the
name of guarding the public moral space, or his reference to the ethical environment,
may sound surprising, given his earlier rejection of the appeals to the moral climate or
ethical environment to forbid private pornography consumption or to criminalize homosexual activity. See DWORKIN, supra note 327, at 349-59; Dworkin, supra note 145, at
480-84. For example, T.M. Scanlon finds Dworkin's reference" to "maintaining a moral
environment" a "slightly surprising phrase." See T.M. Scanlon, Partisan For Life, N.Y.
REv. BOOKS, July 15, 1993, at 45, 47 (reviewing DWORKIN, supra note 17). Arguably,
Dworkin is consistent in acknowledging the impact of individual choices and acts on a
community's ethical environment, in distinguishing some degree of permissible regulation
from prohibition, in rejecting coercion, and in affirming an ultimate position of freedom
to choose for oneself. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 145, at 480-82. One wonders whether he might support regulations encouraging the responsible exercise of First Amendment
speech rights on the basis of the impact on the ethical environment.
374. See DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 148-54. Dworkin argues that the state does not
have a "derivative" interest in prenatal life because fetuses do not have rights and interests, but that it may have a "detached" interest, stemming from the important shared
value of sanctity of life. See id. at 107-17, 148-51.
375. See id. at 153. For a discussion of "insulation" in the context of privacy rights to
procreative autonomy, see McClain, supra note 9, at 1244-56; McClain, supra note 18. at
127-33, 141-45, 164-72; West, supra note 9, at 71-72, 79-85.
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the burden that they impose, the unlikelihood that they in fact
contribute to reflective decisionmaking, and the possibility of encouraging
responsibility in more effective and less intrusive
6
ways.

37

Dworkin draws. what he argues is a crucial distinction between
two possible state goals with respect to decisionmaking about
matters of conscience: responsibility and conformity. 3' Indeed,
he argues that the two goals are incompatible because the former
encourages individuals to exercise moral responsibility by deciding
for themselves and the latter dictates a result and thus precludes
the exercise of responsibility. The Constitution does not preclude
states from pursuing the goal of responsibility, he contends, as
long as they do so in ways "that respect the crucial difference
between advancing
that goal and wholly or partly coercing a final
378
decision.
How does Dworkin's argument look when viewed through the
lens of the irresponsibility critique? His enterprise of making a
philosophical argument aimed at accounting for people's opinions
about the morality of abortion and translating such an argument
into a legal argument for the right of procreative autonomy belies
communitarian charges that liberal justifications of rights flee from
substantive moral argument.379 A critical question to ask in assessing Dworkin's project of bringing people closer to consensus is
whether the costs, or consequences, of abortion decisions will be
perceived differently if citizens believe that women making the
choice are faithful to a responsibility of reflection. Furthermore,
his explicit invocation of responsibility talk may imply a broader
conception of both sanctity and responsibility in the context of
procreative autonomy and in other areas.
b. Immunity and wrongness. Dworkin argues for legal
immunity in the sense of the right to decide free of coercion. He

376. See DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 153, 173-74 (suggesting means, such as providing
financial aid to poor mothers, to eliminate financial necessity as a ground for deciding
whether to have an abortion). Moreover, Dworkin argues that, if we understand the
abortion dispute as involving contested views of what the sanctity of life requires, then
we quite possibly should revisit the public funding cases because opposition to such funding rested on particular religious opposition to abortion. See id. at 174-76.
377. Id. at 150-51.
378. Id. at 151.
379. See Sandel, supra note 339.
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analogizes the abortion controversy to the religious wars of prior
centuries.. and calls for toleration of an individual's exercise of
her freedom of conscience.381 Legal immunity, however, does not
insulate women deciding whether to have an abortion from state
efforts to encourage responsibility in decisionmaking. Moreover, as
noted above, although citizens must adhere' to the principle of
toleration (e.g., not use the law to enforce conformity with their
own view of the right decision), it is understandable and appropriate that citizens care very much about how strangers, neighbors,
and friends make decisions concerning abortion because of the
impact of such decisions on the ethical environment. Thus, in
Dworkin's account, a legal right to procreative autonomy carries
with it neither a right to insulate oneself from state encouragement
of responsible reflection nor a right to insulate oneself from the
interests of others in one's decision.
Although Dworkin rejects coercing exercises of conscience, he
is not agnostic on whether or when abortion is the right or responsible thing to do. He maintains (akin to the liberal stance
that, he argues, most people share3") that abortion is presumptively bad because it destroys life and thus insults the sanctity of
life, unless not to have an abortion would be a greater waste of
life or an insult to what respect for life requires." In that view,
there are a range of circumstances in which abortion can be a
morally responsible choice."
DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 4, 15.
381. Id. at 167-68.
382. Dworkin's characterization of the majority, liberal position suggests an impressive
degree of fit between public approval of reasons for abortion and women's actual reasons. Other assessments suggest less of a fit. See McClain, supra note 18, at 164-72 (citing other assessments).
383. Dworkin writes, "Abortion wastes the intrinsic value-the sanctity, the inviola-

380.

bility-of a human life and is therefore a grave moral wrong unless the intrinsic value of

other human lives would be wasted in a decision against abortion." DWORKIN, supra note
17, at 60.
Dworkin's liberal position might not capture, for example, feminist arguments that
start from the premise not of the presumptive "badness" of abortion but of a moral and
legal right to abortion based on the requirements of women's well-being and reproductive
health. See, e.g., ROSALIND P. PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE 368-401

(rev. ed. 1990).
384. DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 32-34, 97-100 (arguing that, in addition to cases of
rape or incest, liberals think that abortion is justified in instances of serious "frustration"
of the life of the eventual child or of the woman and other family members, e.g., a
"very grave physical deformity" of the child, "economically barren" family circumstances,
risk to the pregnant woman's life, or a permanent and grave impact on the woman's or
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c. Some questions about encouraging responsibility to
protect sanctity. Again, Dworkin suggests that states may constitutionally regulate decisions implicating the sanctity of life to encourage responsible reflection but may not coerce a particular result.
Although Dworkin concludes that the Casey Court erred in upholding the particular provisions before it, his endorsement of
Casey as to the permissibility of encouraging women to learn of
philosophical and social arguments in favor of continuing a pregnancy countenances that the state, for all practical purposes, may
equate encouraging responsibility with conveying a message against
abortion.3 5
Dworkin's analysis may reflect the assumption that abortion
decisions impose costs on society, specifically, on the ethical environment. Indeed, both Dworkin's account and the joint opinion in
Casey seem to reflect or resemble communitarian attention to the
social costs of exercising rights. Casey gave a prominent place to
abortion as a unique act "fraught with consequences for others"
(and hence not merely an exercise of conscience), including not
only the consequences for prenatal life but also the impact on
society of living with the knowledge that a procedure that some
regard as an act of violence is being conducted in the community.386 In this context, responsibility as accountability, as well as
autonomy, seems to be the goal: it is appropriate for citizens to

her family's life or the life of the child if born).
385. See McClain, supra note 18, at 141-50 (arguing against Casey's conflation of encouraging the "wise exercise" of reproductive liberty with adopting measures designed to
persuade against abortion). In an earlier article, Dworkin suggested that the state not
only may encourage responsibility about the decision but also may express a collective
view about (although not insist on conformity with) the appropriate decision. Ronald
Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. CHI.
L. REv. 381, 409-10 (1992). In Life's Dominion, he does not appear to restate this view.
386. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992) (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). An interesting question I leave for consideration elsewhere is whether, read in light of the communitarian diagnosis of irresponsibility, informed consent schemes premised on a state's preference for childbirth over abortion counsel women to make choices likely to be deemed socially irresponsible. As we
have seen not only in communitarian literature, but in numerous fora, the increased rates
of births outside of marriage, teen pregnancy, and single-parent (usually female-headed)
households serve as prime exhibits in the communitarian analysis of moral decline, social
crisis, and irresponsibility. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text. If a state encourages responsibility in making a decision to continue or terminate a pregnancy, how
should a pregnant woman weigh competing assessments of her moral and social responsibilities?
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signal through law that certain decisions of great consequence
should be taken seriously.
Dworkin's immediate task is affirming freedom of conscience
in decisions involving the sanctity of life, prominently, abortion
and euthanasia. Many other protected decisions, however, implicate
deep human views about responsibility and sanctity and arguably
have consequences for others. Should encouraging responsibility in
decisions extend to a broader range of human decisions? To what
other areas might Dworkin's moral environment argument apply?
Like the irresponsibility critique, Dworkin's responsibility talk
raises significant questions about what government may do in the
realm between noninterference and coercion and about precisely
how to delineate coercion from persuasion.3" Many of the implications of Dworkin's analysis remain to be explored. For our purposes, the main point is that Dworkin's theory of rights does take
responsibility seriously, primarily responsibility as autonomy but
also responsibility as accountability. It offers a better starting point
for thinking about rights and responsibility than the evisceration of
responsibility as autonomy that Glendon's approach entails.
V.

CONCLUSION

I have argued that a discontent with rights and rights talk is
today commonplace. I have examined the new communitarians'
discontent, focusing especially on their claims about the links between rights and irresponsibility. I have contended that, on close
examination, much of the irresponsibility critique does not really
establish a strong case against rights, although it provides an opportunity to reflect on an array of social problems. At the same
time, the critique does reflect ambivalence about core features of

387.

For example, one of the most widely cited constitutional precedents for protec-

tion against coercion in one's beliefs and conduct notes that the state may not compel,
but may seek to encourage, patriotism. See West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943) (upholding an injunction to limit the enforcement of a regulation requiring public school children to salute the American flag).
T.M. Scanlon suggests that Dworkin's attention to impersonal intrinsic values is a
,significant departure," not only for Dworkin but for a contemporary moral philosophy
that concentrates almost exclusively on such notions as rights, interests, duties, and obligations. Scanlon, supra note 373, at 46. Of course, one might argue that the sanctity of
life is, in a sense, a public or political value. Cf. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra
note 8, at 243-44 & n.32 (suggesting that the analysis of abortion should include political
values of respect for human life and equality of women).
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rights, summed up by the notions of immunity and wrongness.
There is a corresponding ambivalence about when communitarian
correctives to link rights and responsibilities would embody the
moral voice of the community in law and when they would draw
boundaries between suasion and coercion, and between community
and state. If the communitarians are to gain widespread acceptance
of their agenda, they will have to explain more clearly and precisely how far their discontent with rights and rights talk, as well as
with liberalism, extends.
It may well be that we are always dreaming of community' ss
and that the calls to attend to responsibility result from a language
of rights that says too little about the social glue that communitarians insist holds our society together. I have argued that although
the language of legal rights does not offer a full account of moral
responsibility, inquiring about what rights do and why we protect
them reveals that the protection of rights reflects respect for the
exercise of individual responsibility as autonomy in a pluralistic
constitutional democracy. Furthermore, communitarians overstate
the case when they suggest that prevailing notions of rights accept
no limits on individual freedom in view of social costs and discourage or preclude individual and societal reflection on responsibility.
That the protection of rights yields some irresponsibility is undeniable, yet it is better to bear that cost than to incur the sacrifices
of individual freedom that a communitarian model based primarily
on responsibility as accountability would require. Ultimately, the
new communitarianism must reject such' a model if it is to be
consistent with American ideals and deeply held values about the
vital importance not only of responsibility but also of rights.

388. See PHILLIPS, supra note 7, at 3.

